IV
11

Group FO
Class 406
Piece 24

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

Printed for the use of the Foreign Office. April 1906.

CONFIDENTIAL.

(8668.)

F.O.
406

F.O. 406/24

PART V.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

AFFAIRS OF ARABIA.

24

October to December 1905.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
1	Sir N. O'Conor ..	135 Tel.	Oct. 1, 1905	Hazza mail. Arrangement has been made with Shaikh for transport of mail overland through Koweit	1
2	" " ..	136 Tel.	1,	Germans at Koweit. German engineers expected at Koweit to inquire into possibility of railway construction. Major Knox should return to his post immediately	1
3	India Office ..	..	Sept. 30,	Ahmed-bin-Selmeen. Transmits letter from Viceroy dated 21st August, referring to piracies committed by	1
4	To Sir N. O'Conor ..	346	Oct. 3,	Red Sea piracy. Conversation with Turkish Ambassador re action of His Majesty's ship "Fox" at Hodeida	8
5	" " ..	348	2,	Proposed appointment of Political Officer at Dhala. Transmits No. 89, Part IV. To furnish observations on	9
6	To M. Cavignari ..	..	2,	Arms traffic at Muscat. Refers to No. 19, Part IV. Indian Government should be informed that French Government consider it unnecessary to issue fresh regulations re smuggling of arms	9
7	To India Office ..	..	3,	Expected arrival of German engineers at Koweit. Transmits Sir N. O'Conor's telegram No. 136 respecting. Important that Major Knox should return to Koweit forthwith	9
8	Sir N. O'Conor ..	137 Tel.	4,	Red Sea piracy. Reports telegram from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Hodeida. Co-operation of His Majesty's ship "Fox" in attack on pirates	10
8*	India Office ..	..	5,	Germans at Koweit. Instructions have been given that Captain Knox should, if possible, reach Koweit before the arrival of the German engineers	10
9	" " ..	..	5,	Muscat Arbitration Award. Transmits copy of telegram to Viceroy dated 29th September. M. Lecomte has started for Muscat with instructions to cultivate friendly relations with his British colleague	11
10	" " ..	..	6,	Germans at Koweit. Refers to No. 1. Suggests that Captain Knox be instructed to proceed immediately to Koweit even if reported arrival of Germans prove to be false	11
11	To Sir N. O'Conor ..	180 Tel.	6,	Red Sea piracy. His Majesty's ship "Fox" at Hodeida. Protest of Turkish Ambassador against action of Commanding Officer. Immediate withdrawal of "Fox" requested	12
12	Sir N. O'Conor ..	140 Tel.	8,	Red Sea piracy. Refers to No. 11. Action of His Majesty's ship "Fox." Turkish protest against	12
13	" " ..	141 Tel.	8,	Red Sea piracy. Refers to No. 12. Reports telegram from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Hodeida. Proposal to request confectionaries contained from Turkish Commander. Twenty-six pirate vessels captured ..	12

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
14	Sir N. O'Conor ..	687	Oct. 5, 1905	Rising in the Yemen. Little information as to progress of military operations. Town of Yemen occupied by Turkish troops without resistance	13
15	India Office ..	..	10,	Muscat Arbitration Award. Incloses letters from British Political Agent at Muscat commenting on and raising questions in regard to	13
16	To India Office ..	..	11,	Koweit. Concurs in view that Captain Knox should return to his post	16
17	India Office ..	..	11,	Aden delimitation. Transmits maps and final Report by Mr. Fitzmaurice	16
18	Sir N. O'Conor ..	698	10,	Hazza mail. Transmits copy of despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah relative to proposal of British India Steam Navigation Company that their line should carry mail to and from Ojair	18
19	India Office ..	..	13,	Return of Captain Knox to Koweit. Transmits telegram to Viceroy of 12th October. Directing immediate	18
20	" " ..	..	17,	Muscat Award. Transmits telegram from Viceroy of 16th October. Proposed instructions to Captain Grey as to co-operation with M. Larmee	19
21	" " ..	..	18,	Piracy in Persian Gulf. Piracies committed by Ahmed-bin-Selmeen. Boat for police duty on Bahrein pearl banks. Transmits correspondence	20
22	Sir N. O'Conor ..	718	16,	Appointment of Political Officer at Dhala. Refers to No. 5. Deprecates	22
23	India Office ..	..	20,	Affairs of Bahrein. Views of Government of India as to relations between Chief of Bahrein and British Government	22
24	To M. Geoffray ..	..	24,	Muscat Arbitration Award. Suggests that M. Larmee and Major Grey be instructed to confer together for carrying out provisions of the Award	31
25	To Sir F. Bertie ..	679	25,	Muscat Arbitration. Transmits copy of Memorandum handed to French Ambassador re ..	33
26	India Office ..	..	25,	Muscat Award. Asks for observations on Viceroy's telegram of 16th October ..	32
27	" " ..	..	27,	Political Agent at Bahrein. Refers to No. 23. Concurs as to reply to Government of India	32
28	M. Cambon ..	..	25,	Application of Muscat Award. Refers to No. 18, Part IV. Certain reservations of French Government	32
29	Sir N. O'Conor ..	738	28,	Military operations in Yemen. Transmits Colonel Stoney's No. 34 reporting ..	33
30	To Sir N. O'Conor ..	393	31,	Piracy in Persian Gulf. Transmits further correspondence, and inquires as to result of representations	33
31	To India Office ..	..	31,	Application of Muscat Award. Refers to No. 26. Informs of communication to French Government, and suggests deferring action on Viceroy's telegram of 16th October pending receipt of reply	33

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
32	Admiralty	Confidential	Oct. 27, 1905	Action of His Majesty's ship "Fox" at Hodeida. Transmits report from Officer Commanding. Destruction of pirates' boats	34
33	India Office ..	..	Nov. 2,	Hanna mail. Transmits letter from Major Cox to Government of India, dated 5th October. There is no reason to doubt the good faith of Sheikh Mubarak	35
34	" "	..	2,	Hanna mail. Senior Naval Officer has proceeded to Koweit to interview Sheikh respecting conveyance of..	39
35	" "	..	2,	Muscat Arbitration Award. Refers to No. 31. Transmits copy of telegram sent to Viceroy informing him of proposals made to French Government for giving effect to provisions of the Award..	39
36	Sir N. O'Conor ..	762 Confidential	Oct. 31,	Germans at Koweit. Refers to No. 2. Transmits report on affairs of Koweit by His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah. Desirability of immediate return of Resident to Koweit	40
37	" " ..	763 Confidential	31,	Construction of a hospital at Dthala. Turkish Ambassador has been instructed to make representations to His Majesty's Government re. Arrangements made by Government of India in Nine Customs in no way concern Turkish Government	41
38	" " ..	765	31,	New Grand Shereef of Mecca. Refers to No. 16, Part IV. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Jeddah re candidature of Ali Pasha	41
39	" " ..	768	31,	"Alwaki" piracy case in Red Sea and proceedings of His Majesty's ship "Fox." Transmits detailed report from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Hodeida	42
40	" " ..	773 Most Conf.	31,	Causes of the Yemen rising. Transmits Mr. Drummond-Hay's No. 71 respecting ..	47
41	India Office ..	..	Nov. 6,	Aden. Transmits copy of despatch to Government of India dated 3rd November on the subject of railway construction in Aden hinterland	50
42	To Sir F. Bertie ..	703	8,	Muscat Arbitration Award. Conversation with M. Geoffray. List of French protégés will be forwarded to His Majesty's Government when completed	51
43	To India Office ..	..	9,	Aden. Turkish Ambassador has been instructed to make representations to His Majesty's Government re the construction of a hospital at Dthala and of a military road from Aden to Jebel Jihaf	51
44	India Office ..	..	13,	Flagstaffs in Persian Gulf. Transmits telegram from Viceroy dated 11th November reporting removal of flagstaffs from Sheep Island and Makish Isthmus	51
45	" " ..	..	13,	Germans at Koweit. Transmits telegram from Viceroy dated 11th November. Statement by Sheikh of Koweit that no German engineers had been there recently, nor were any expected	52
46	To M. Paoua ..	..	13,	Jibuti arms traffic. Senior Naval Officer at Aden reports that canoes carrying arms frequently leave Obokh for Kaddaha ..	52

FO 406 24

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
47	To Sir N. O'Conor ..	429	Nov. 16, 1905	His Majesty's ship "Fox" at Hodeida. His Lordship's approval should be conveyed to Vice-Consul Richardson for his conduct, and Turkish Government should be thanked for the co-operation of Field-Marshal Shakir Pasha and Khalid Bey	53
48	To Admiralty ..	..	17,	His Majesty's ship "Fox" at Hodeida. Refers to No. 32. Transmits report by Vice-Consul Richardson on the incident. Requests that his Lordship's appreciation of his services may be conveyed to Captain Eustace ..	53
49	Sir N. O'Conor ..	754	7,	Hanna mail. Refers to No. 18. New arrangement relative to conveyance of mail via Koweit appears to be in force	53
50	" " ..	792	10,	Rising in the Yemen. Transmits report by His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Hodeida on the progress of military operations ..	54
51	" " ..	803 Very Conf.	14,	Kaza of Katif. Disturbed state of. Exit of population from. No steps being taken for defence of coast, &c.	56
52	" " ..	811	14,	Rising in the Yemen. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Jeddah reporting proposed withdrawal of troops from the Yemen	56
53	" " ..	817 Secret	15,	Rising in the Yemen. Transmits despatch from Colonel Surtees reporting suppression of the revolt	58
54	" " ..	818 Secret	15,	Rising in the Yemen. Transmits despatch from Colonel Surtees reporting organisation of Yemen Coast in coast-guard districts ..	57
54*	Signor Tittoni to M. Rouvier	..	23,	Red Sea arms traffic. Memorandum from Signor Tittoni to M. Rouvier, calling attention to the lack of surveillance on the French Somali Coast..	59*
55	India Office ..	..	22,	Construction of hospital at Dthala. Refers to No. 43. Concess in terms of answer which it is proposed to give to Turkish representations	59
56	" "	..	27,	Muscat Arbitration Award. Transmits letter from Major Cox to Government of India, pointing out that if "removalments" are granted they will delay fulfilment of the Award for a year	59
57	" "	..	28,	Proposed reorganisation of Muscat Customs. Transmits letters from Government of India respecting	62
58	" "	..	29,	Koweit. Transmits Major Cox's report to the Government of India regarding situation at..	65
59	Sir N. O'Conor ..	199 Tel.	Dec. 2,	Koweit. Refers to No. 73, Part I. Abdul Aziz, Sheikh of Koweit's agent, released by Vali and sent to Koweit	73
60	" " ..	840	Nov. 27,	Hodjaz and Yemen Vilayets. Quarterly report on economic and administrative situation ..	71
61	" " ..	843	27,	Ahmed-bin-Selman. Transmits copy of *note verbale* addressed to Porte respecting acts of piracy committed by	76

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
60	To India Office ..	..	Dec. 6, 1905	Muscat Customs. Refers to No. 57. Suggests that question of loan should not be raised until after conclusion of negotiations now proceeding between Major Grey and M. Laronce	76
60a	„ „ ..	..	9,	Red Sea arms traffic. Refers to No. 55, Part IV. Suggests that Aden Resident be instructed to furnish a report on the export of arms from French territory to the Arabian coast with a view to making renewed representations to the French Government ..	76a
62a	To Colonial Office ..	..	9,	Red Sea arms traffic. Requests that British authorities in Somaliland be instructed to furnish a report on with a view to making renewed representations to the French Government	76a
63	Sir N. O'Conor ..	878		Sadoun Pasha. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah reporting return of Mouklis Pasha from punitive expedition against	76
64	India Office ..	..	11,	Proposed loan to Sultan of Muscat. Refers to No. 62. Transmits telegram to Viceroy dated 7th December. Inadvisable to raise question of loan until conclusion of negotiations regarding Arbitration Award ..	77
65	„ „ ..	..	12,	Visits of His Majesty's ships to Koweit. Transmits letter from Government of India respecting	78
66	„ „ ..	..	13,	Attitude of Sheikh Mubarak and Turkish authorities towards Sadun Pasha Mantifik. Transmits letter from Government of India respecting	78
67	Sir N. O'Conor ..	890	8,	Yemen. Transmits Memorandum by Mr. Lamb on the state of affairs in	79
68	„ „ ..	902 Confidential	11,	Central Arabia. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah reporting on political situation in	80
69	„ „ ..	915	12,	Piracy in the Red Sea. Reports departure from Golden Horn of three Turkish destroyers and two small cruisers intended to act against pirates in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf	81

Printed for the use of the Foreign Office. January 1906.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Arabia.

PART V.

No. 1.

Sir N. O'Conor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 135.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, October 1, 1905.*

HIS Majesty's Consul at Bussorah, under date 30th ultimo, has sent me following:—

"Vali has, I learn, made private arrangements with Sheikh of Koweit that Hasa post shall be conveyed through Koweit overland.

"All facilities having been granted by the Sheikh, the contractor will be established as an official of the Ottoman Post-office at Koweit.

"I have informed Bushire."

No. 2.

Sir N. O'Conor to the Marquess of Lansdowne—(Received October 1.)

(No. 136.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, October 1, 1905.*

HIS Majesty's Consul at Bussorah has sent me following telegram dated the 30th ultimo:—

"Some German engineers are, I am informed, expected to arrive at Koweit viâ Bombay. Their servant has already arrived to make the necessary arrangements. An inquiry into the possibilities of railway construction is stated to be the object of their visit. I have informed Bushire."

I think it would be advisable to instruct Major Knox to return as soon as possible to Koweit.

No. 3.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 2.)

WITH reference to this Office letter of the 31st August, the Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a letter from the Government of India, Secret, dated the 31st August, and inclosures, relative to piracies committed in the vicinity of Bahrein by Ahmed-bin-Selman.

India Office, September 30, 1905.

Inclosure 1 in No. 3.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Secret.)

Simla, August 31, 1905.

Sir,

WITH reference to his Excellency the Viceroy's telegram of the 22nd July, 1905, we have the honour to transmit, for your information, copies of correspondence relative to a recrudescence of piracy under the leadership of Ahmed-bin-Selman in the vicinity of Bahrein.

2. Attention is invited to the fresh evidence of the complicity of the local Turkish authorities, which has been accumulated since we addressed you on the 8th December last, and especially to the statement of Salem-bin-Mubarak, an escaped slave of the pirate, corroborated in certain details by the son of the owner of one of the attacked boats, which confirms us in our view that Ahmed-bin-Selman is allowed to live undisturbed in Turkish territory and to make it the base of his piratical attacks.

3. At the present moment, when the Political Agent at Bahrein is endeavouring to acquire influence over Sheikh Esa, in accordance with the scheme laid before you in our Secret despatch, dated the 21st April, 1904, it is in our opinion highly important that we should be in a position to guarantee to the latter the safety of his subjects while engaged in maritime trade, especially as the Sheikh is specifically bound by his Treaty obligations to refrain from reprisals. It is understood that a *pro-memorid* was presented to the Porte in January last, demanding energetic measures for the suppression of Ahmed-bin-Selman's piracies, as well as for the restoration to the victims of the value of the property plundered; and we would request to be informed whether any assurances have been received in reply, or any steps taken by the Turkish Government to indicate that they realize the gravity of the situation.

4. The proceedings described in the correspondence now submitted show clearly how much the Political Officer at Bahrein is hampered by not having at his own disposal some suitable vessel with which he can ward off and punish such small piratical attacks in the neighbourhood of the island as do not warrant an appeal to the Senior Naval Officer for the dispatch of a gun-boat, and we would therefore urge the advisability of supplying him at an early date with the special vessel, to which reference was made in our Marine despatch of the 3rd November, 1904, regarding the future sphere of operations of the subsidized ships in Indian waters.

We have, &c.

(Signed) CURZON.
KITCHENER.
E. R. ELLES.
A. T. ARUNDEL.
H. ERLE RICHARDS.
J. P. HEWETT.
E. N. BAKER.
C. L. TUPPER.

Inclosure 2 in No. 3.

Major Cox to Government of India.

Bushire, July 16, 1905.

WITH reference to entry No. 14 of this office weekly diary for the period ending the 30th June, and in continuation of my telegram of to-day's date, I have the honour to forward a copy of the Political Agent's report, regarding the efforts made to capture the pirate.

I am in communication with the Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf, on the subject.

Inclosure 3 in No. 3.

Captain Prideaux to Major Cox.

Bahrein, July 6, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to report that the pirate, Ahmed-bin-Selman, has reopened his infamous career with two outrages committed on the 25th and 26th June, 1905.

2. In the first case he seized a small Tarut (Katif district) boat belonging to Hasan-bin-Abdul Amir, as it lay at anchor in Rufeah Bay, on the eastern side of Tarut Island, with two men asleep in it. The pirate leader was accompanied by eight other men, and though no violence was done to the three boatmen, they were compelled to work the boat until the richer prize was captured.

3. A few hours before dawn the pirates weighed anchor and proceeded until they espied a fleet of thirty pearling-boats which had temporarily taken refuge from a gale under the lee of the reef known as Fasht-al-Jarim, a few miles north of Bahrein. Here, too, was a "Mashuwa" (a faster type of sailing-boat) which had been sent out by a merchant of Bahrein, by name Ahmed-bin-Saad Madhahaki, to buy pearls of the divers.

4. The pearling-boats were the first to leave their refuge in the early morning, and then the pirates proceeded to attack the eleven unsuspecting occupants of the "Mashuwa." Too late the latter awoke to their danger, and though one of their men fired a shot at the pirates, the latter were able to reply with a volley which killed a youth, a son of Ahmed-bin-Saad, mortally wounded one man, who died subsequently in hospital at Bahrein, and seriously injured two others.

The pirates then jumped on board the "Mashuwa" and turned all the occupants of it, with the exception of Yusuf, the second son of Ahmed-bin-Saad, into the smaller boat, while Ahmed-bin-Selman ordered them to remain where they were until he had gone out of sight. The victims then came to Bahrein, and the three Tarut boatmen two days later took their boat to Katif and reported the matter to the Kaimakam. The pirates took Yusuf-bin-Ahmed away with them, saying that when they had done with the "Mashuwa" he would be able to sail it back to his home. Up to this time, however, no further information has been obtained regarding the fate of either Yusuf or his boat. The property plundered from the "Mashuwa" in pearls and cash is valued by Ahmed-bin-Saad at 3,000 rupees.

5. On receiving the news of these piracies, I at once communicated with the Chief of Bahrein, and after some consideration it was arranged that he should fit out and man three large "Mashuwas" to go in search of the pirates, and that as the Government of India do not approve of the trucial Chiefs sending out boats for warlike purposes under any circumstances unobserved, I should accompany the expedition to see that no improprieties occurred, and to assist in the capture or destruction of the pirates if they could be found.

6. In very dilatory fashion the three boats were got ready, and on the afternoon of the 28th June I went on board, accompanied by my interpreter and the Jemadar and twelve sepoys of the Agency Guard. There were twenty Arabs in my "Mashuwa," and about twenty-five in each of the other two.

7. In the course of the next three days we searched the coast of the mainland from Dohat Ain Al Seh to Ras Tanura, omitting the Katif Oasis, and if the wind had not been extremely unfavourable we would have gone still further north. In the circumstances, however, we turned back from this point and sailed into Katif Harbour, where I interviewed the Kaimakam, Ibrahim Effendi, as related in the Memorandum which accompanies this Report. I found the Kaimakam very civil in his attitude, though the Senior Military Officer was inclined to be discourteous, and was very officious in his inquiries as to my right to bring my three "Mashuwas" into Katif Harbour.

8. One of the leading Arabs on board my vessel had a wife and house at Darein, the place on Tarut Island which commands the south entrance to Katif. Opposite this place, therefore, he waded ashore, and at the time of my departure from Katif he returned with the information that the Kaimakam had only sent out his search-boat after hearing that I had started from Bahrein, and that besides doing this he had imprisoned the father-in-law of Ahmed-bin-Selman, who is a Notable of the Beni Hajir tribe, and was opportunely found in the town of Katif. This fact was concealed from me by the Kaimakam, probably because the Sheikh would eventually be allowed to buy his liberty. My informant also reported that the pirates were believed still to be in the vicinity of Bahrein, either on the Katr Coast or that of Dthaharan, south of Katif. I

therefore decided to return to Bahrein and to ask the Chief to get more definite information before I set out again.

9. Sheikh Isa talks a good deal about the rapidity with which he would destroy the pirates if he were given a free hand by Government, but my observations incline me to think that his servants are not whole hearted in their desire to fall in with them. On the recent expedition I advised the three commanders of the "Mashuwas" to cover as wide an area as possible each day, but found that they persisted in keeping together in spite of all that I said. A better result would probably be obtained if a few blue-jackets were sent out in each "Mashuwa" to cruise separately within defined limits for a lengthened period, but even then it will be very difficult to prevent the pirates escaping ashore if the identity of our boats is suspected. Our best chance of ending the career of Ahmed-bin-Selman I think lies in the Government of India setting a price of 1,000 rupees or 1,500 rupees on his head, and if this were done I believe the desired effect would soon be achieved, as there is probably no one who would take up the quarrel to make a blood-feud of it.

Inclosure 4 in No. 3.

Memorandum, translation of which in Arabic was given by Captain Prideaux to the Kaimakam of Katif, on July 1, 1905.

AT the request of the Kaimakam of Katif, I write the following Memorandum regarding my visit to Katif:—

I left Bahrein on the afternoon of Wednesday, the 28th June, 1905, in company with three boats ("Mashuwas"), manned by the Sheikh of Bahrein, to search for the pirate, Ahmed-bin-Selman, on the high seas. We first proceed southwards, and slowly, in consequence of the winds being unfavourable, worked northwards with many tackings, from Dohat Ain Al Seh as far as Ras Tannra. We arrived at the latter place about mid-day on the 1st July, and in this space of time only fell in with two suspicious-looking "Mashuwas," which, however, turned out to be innocently engaged. To-day, on account of the north wind having increased considerably in vehemence, and as I found myself comparatively close to Katif, I decided to visit this port in order to learn the latest news from the Kaimakam, and to hear the details of the first attack made by the pirate upon a Katif boat.

On arriving in the harbour, I sent a messenger to the landing-place to ask permission for me to land and visit the Kaimakam. On permission being granted I came ashore with a small retinue composed of my interpreter, the Indian officer of my escort, the nakhodas of the three boats (as representatives of Sheikh Isa), and four other men, their followers, who punted my boat ashore.

The Kaimakam had little information to give me except that he also had sent a boat out in search of the pirate, and was making all possible efforts to effect his capture. He agreed with me on the question of the Turkish and British Governments being both equally desirous of putting an end to the career of this pirate, and kindly promised that if he ever again heard of Ahmed-bin-Selman starting out to commit piracy, he would himself at once give me timely information.

I availed myself also of this convenient opportunity to discuss two other subjects in which the Government of India are much interested, viz., the chances of the Bahrain murderers of Sheikh Selman-bin-Diaij being captured, and the claims of certain Banyans for refunds of customs dues paid in excess. I am hopeful of considerable benefit accruing to the two Governments from this personal meeting between the Kaimakam and myself.

Inclosure 5 in No. 3.

Major Cox to Government of India.

Bushire, July 30, 1905.

IN continuation of my covering letter dated the 15th July, I have the honour to forward a copy of a further communication received from the Political Agent, Bahrein, on the subject of Ahmed-bin-Selman's piracies.

2. After writing his first letter, Captain Prideaux sent me, demi-officially, on the 8th July some suggestions for circumventing the pirates, which were to the effect that,

if a man-of-war was available at Bushire, it might hire and take over two Persian native craft and, placing some blue-jackets in them, cruise along the coast to the north and south just before coming in sight of Bahrein.

I communicated his suggestions to the Senior Naval Officer Commanding His Majesty's ship "Sphinx," which had recently returned to Muscat from Bombay, and asked him to let me know by telegram how far he thought it might be possible to comply, but after reference to his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, he replied, on the 23rd, that the Admiral would not approve; his Excellency's reasons in the present case no doubt being (apart from the views expressed in Sir Charles Drury's letter to your address of the 26th April, 1903)—

(*a.*) That it is difficult to spare blue-jackets from His Majesty's ships in the Gulf as at present manned;

(*b.*) That excessive exposure of the men to the sun cannot be avoided at this season of the year.

3. In the meanwhile I had received news of Sheikh Ali's contemplated surrender, and in communicating again with Captain Bowman, I asked him to proceed and take over Sheikh Ali, and at the same time confer with Captain Prideaux as to the best method of procedure against the pirates. The "Sphinx" should have arrived at Bahrein on the 28th instant.

Copies of the telegraphic correspondence are attached for information.

Since then Captain Prideaux has made another praiseworthy attempt to come in touch with the pirates, but with no better success, as will be seen from his Report now forwarded.

4. At the conclusion of his letter, while realising that the suppression of these acts of piracy constitutes a difficult problem, he mentions that he proposes to address me further on the subject at an early date. Meanwhile, it seems advisable that I should not delay in placing the Government of India in possession of such details as are available in case any communications are being made to the Turkish Government on the subject.

In this connection, I may mention that, on hearing from Captain Prideaux that Ahmed-bin-Selman was abroad again, I at once communicated with His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Bussorah, and I attach a copy of his reply, the terms of which do not, I fear, warrant the hope that the attitude of the Turkish authorities is likely to take any effective turn.

Until I receive the Political Agent's further report, and have consulted the Senior Naval Officer, whom I expect in a day or two, I hesitate to make any specific proposals, but I would venture to express the opinion that the fact of our endeavouring to take practical steps on the spot need not prevent our using this recrudescence of piracy under the leadership of Ahmed-bin-Selman to press other important matters upon the Turkish Government as suggested in my letter dated the 16th July, 1905, on the subject of Katr affairs (paragraph 5).

5. In conclusion, I would draw attention to the fact that the statement given to Captain Prideaux by Ahmed-bin-Selman's escaped retainer, Salim-bin-Mubarak, makes it clear that the pirate (a Bahrein subject) and his family have been persistently harboured in territory claimed by the Turks, and that the gang set out on their last venture from Anich, which is practically Katif, where Ahmed's family remained during his absence.

We have, therefore, a very strong case against the Turks.

(Most of the places mentioned in the inclosures will be found in Admiralty Chart No. 2857 B, "Persian Gulf, Western Sheet.")

Inclosure 6 in No. 3.

Major Cox to Senior Naval Officer, Muscat.

(Telegraphic.) *Bushire, July 17, 1905.*

PLEASE await my letter by mail, and then, if possible, proceed direct Bahrein, as Prideaux writes that Sheikh Ali is about to surrender himself. If he surrenders, please bring him over here for instructions.

Bahrein is now a clean port.

Inclosure 7 in No. 3.

Senior Naval Officer, Muscat, to Major Cox.

(Telegraphic.) *July* 18, 1905.

YOUR telegram 17th July received.

Either "Sphinx" or "Redbreast" will proceed Bahrein after receipt of your letter. May I be informed probable date of Ali's surrender, as by Admiral's orders ships are to be at Bahrein as little as possible.*

Inclosure 8 in No. 3.

Major Cox to Senior Naval Officer, Muscat.

(Telegraphic.) *Bushire, July* 19, 1905.

ALI expected to be at Bahrein when you arrive. If not you need not remain, but, after communicating with Prideaux, proceed on business mentioned in my letter by last mail.

Inclosure 9 in No. 3.

Senior Naval Officer, Muscat, to Major Cox.

(Telegraphic.) *July* 23, 1905.

ADMIRAL will not approve Prideaux's suggestions.

Inclosure 10 in No. 3.

Major Cox to Senior Naval Officer, Muscat.

(Telegraphic.) *Bushire, July* 23, 1905.

YOUR wire of to-day.*

I presume you still propose proceeding Bahrein in connection with Sheikh Ali? You might then consult Prideaux as to best method of procedure regarding pirates.

If "Sphinx" sick, can "Redbreast" go on from Henjam?

Inclosure 11 in No. 3.

Consul Crow to Major Cox.

Bussorah, July 21, 1905.

I HAVE duly received your letter dated the 11th July, 1905, with reference to the reappearance of Ahmed-bin-Selman in Bahrein waters.

In communicating the substance of Captain Prideaux' report to the Vali, I have reminded his Excellency that the pirate in question has now for many years caused loss and damage to the inhabitants of Bahrein and the neighbourhood, and has killed many people with impunity. In view of this last serious occurrence, I have requested the Vali to send stringent orders to the Mutessarif to exert himself more than before in this matter, and to take suitable and energetic measures to arrest the pirate.

I have also pointed out that the Mutessarif's only reply to the many representations from this Consulate is that he does not know where the pirate is, but nevertheless, and about the same time, he kills and robs people off the coast of Katif. I added that if the Mutessarif would bestir himself and co-operate with Captain Prideaux in the matter, perhaps some more satisfactory result might be obtained.

---

* As three of His Majesty's ships were supposed to have contracted beri-beri there.—P. Z. C.

Inclosure 12 in No. 3.

Captain Prideaux to Major Cox.

Bahrein, July 22, 1905.

WITH reference to my letter dated the 6th July, 1905, on the subject of the pirate Ahmed-bin-Selman, I have the honour to report that, in consequence of the receipt of authentic news that the boat of Ahmed-bin-Saad Madhahaki had been seen in Dohat Dthalum, I started out a second time with two "Mashuwas," hired and manned by the Chief, on the afternoon of the 15th instant.

2. Our informant had said that it would be possible, if we found the pirates still in the place indicated, to land a party behind a cape, which forms one of the sides of the bay, unobserved by the pirates, with a very good chance of taking them in rear as well as in front.

3. To this plan my Arabs had agreed before starting, but I subsequently found that they had no intention of carrying it out, and when the time came for action they asked me if I wished them all to be killed. Their one idea again was to show themselves as strong as possible, in order, if possible, to induce the pirates to abandon their boat and prisoners without firing a shot.

4. We entered the bay of Dohat Dthalum on the morning of the 16th, and found no boats there. We then sailed down the coast and proceeded as far as Dohat Zikrit, on the western side of the Katar Peninsula. There we learnt from an encampment of the Bedouin that Ahmed-bin-Selman had gone inland, and that the stolen boat had escaped to Bahrein. We accordingly started back for Manama, which we reached on the 18th instant.

5. Since my return I have seen Yusuf, the son of the owner of the stolen boat, and Salim-bin-Mubarak, the follower of Ahmed-bin-Selman, who assisted in bringing the boat to Bahrein. A copy of the latter's recorded statement is attached for your information, the account of events since the capture of the boat being corroborated by Yusuf-bin-Saad.

6. It is evident the pirates are befriended by the majority of the Bedouin—Beni Hajir and Al Morra—who frequent the Dthaharan (Hasa) and Western Katar coasts.

Until the attitude of both the Turks and Sheikh Esa towards these people is materially changed, there is little chance of piracy being stamped out. I propose, therefore, to address you further on this subject at an early date, in a letter dealing mainly with the case of the murder of Sheikh Selman-bin-Diaij by the Behaih section of the Al Morra.

Inclosure 13 in No. 3.

Major Cox to Government of India.

Bushire, August 2, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to forward the statement which was received as an inclosure to Bahrein letter dated the 22nd July, 1905.

2. I have to express regret that, owing to an oversight, it was omitted to forward this statement with this Office letter, dated the 30th July, to which it should have been a sub-inclosure.

Inclosure 14 in No. 3.

Statement of Salem-bin-Mubarak, Negroid enslaved Servant of Ahmed-bin-Selman, the Pirate.

I AM a free-born native of Wadi Dowasir in Central Arabia, and was kidnapped from there some years ago, when out collecting grass, by a party of the Al Morra. The latter sold me to the Beni Hajir, and they passed me on to Ahmed-bin-Selman as a slave.

My master is married to the sister of the Chief of the Al Muhammad,* Sheikh Muhammad bin-Madthi-bin-Taza. During the winter months he lives with his wife's relations in the desert between the Hasa Oasis and the coast.

* One of the two great clans of the Beni Hajir tribe.

On the 1st day of the month Rabi-al-Thani (4th June, 1905), my master set out on his piratical adventures from the encampment at Tubaat in the desert and came to Anich on the edge of the Katif Oasis with his family, myself, and seven men, who had promised to join him in his nefarious work. Many of the Beni Hajir also came to Katif, and some went to Bahrein ostensibly for the purposes of saluting Sheikh Isa and engaging themselves as pearlers.

Of the seven men who joined Ahmed-bin-Selman two belonged to the Al Jabir (section of Al Morra), one to the Al Fahaida (section of Al Morra), three to the Sahama (Beni Qahtan), and one to the Al Muhammad (Beni Hajir). There were only three rifles and one sword amongst the whole party.

Ahmed-bin-Selman installed his family at Anich, and he and I remained there six days, while the other men spread themselves along the coast looking for a boat that could be easily seized.

Eventually Ahmed-bin-Tami-bin-Taza, a cousin by marriage of my master, told us that a small boat was lying off Rufeah on Tarut Island, and the whole party of nine of us accordingly left Anich at sunset, reached Rufeah in two hours, swam off to the boat, and successfully seized it as the boatmen were asleep. We sailed at once towards the east, and in the morning found Ahmed Madhahaki's "Mashuwa" near the reef Fashi-al-Jarim. Ahmed-bin-Selman opened fire, killing one man, who fell into the sea, and wounding others, who were seen rolling about in the boat. We then boarded the boat, put the wounded men into the smaller one with the boatmen who belonged to it, and turned them adrift. Then we returned to the Dibabaran coast and anchored in Dohat Dibahan. From there my master sent men to Katif for news as to the action taken by the Katif and Bahrein Governments.

He first heard that his wife's uncle Tami-bin-Taza had been arrested by the Turks. He accordingly summoned his family from Anich, and on their arrival on two camels he set sail with them and his whole party, including four prisoners, for Dohat Salwa. There he heard about the three Bahrein boats being out in search of him, and thereupon he left me and two other men in charge of the boat and the captives, while he himself took his family and booty inland to the encampment of the Al Muhammad Sheikh, Muhammad-bin-Madhi-bin-Taza, and tried to get more men to join him in his piratical career. Seeing my chance of escaping from servitude I joined Yusf-bin-Saad and the other prisoners in throwing my two comrades into the sea, and when they got hold of the small jolly-boat which belongs to the "Mashuwa," we cut the rope and sailed away leaving them behind.

The principal person who gives Ahmed-bin Selman news about Bahrein is Hamad-bin-Tami, a brother of Ahmed, and son of the Sheikh who has been imprisoned by the Turks. This man is a frequent visitor to Bahrein and its Chief, with whom he contrives to be on good terms.

Recorded on the 22nd July, 1905.

(Signed) F. B. PRIDEAUX.

No. 4.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 346.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October 2, 1905.*

THE Turkish Ambassador spoke to me again to-day upon the subject of the presence of His Majesty's ship "Fox" at Hodeida. I told his Excellency that since my conversation with him on the 29th ultimo a report had been received from the naval authorities at Aden to the effect that the terms agreed to included the payment of claims for compensation, the capture or destruction of the pirate boats, and a written assurance that punishment should be inflicted upon the guilty persons. I told his Excellency that I had learned with satisfaction that the "Fox" had been supported by Turkish gun-boats and troops. I understood that some of the pirates' strongholds had been captured, but that others were still strongly held, and would shortly be attacked. His Excellency said that he had understood from my previous statement that we had already obtained the satisfaction of our demands.

I am, &c.

(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

No. 5.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir N. O'Conor

(No. 348.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October 2, 1905.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 269 of the 15th August, I transmi herewith copy of a letter from the India Office, inclosing a despatch from the Government of India relative to the arrangement to be made on the Aden frontier.* In this despatch, and the correspondence attached to it, the permanent appointment of a Political Officer at Dthala is recommended.

Mr. Brodrick concurs in the proposal, and suggests that the Turkish Government should be invited to agree to an arrangement under which the officer in question should be made the intermediary for communications respecting border disputes between the authorities on the British and Turkish sides of the recently demarcated frontier of the Aden hinterland.

Mr. Fitzmaurice, in paragraph 3 of his Memorandum of the 8th August, copy of which was forwarded to your Excellency in my despatch above mentioned, anticipated that considerable difficulties might be thrown in the way of this arrangement by the Turkish local authorities, and, before replying to the India Office, I should wish to have your opinion on the proposal.

I am, &c.

(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

No. 6.

Foreign Office to M. Carignani.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October 2, 1905.*

WITH reference to M. Pansa's note of the 17th July last, I have the honour to inform you that His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris has now received and forwarded to me the reply of the French Government to the representation made to them by His Majesty's Government in February last, respecting the alleged traffic in arms at Jibuti.

According to this communication, the Governor of the French Somali Coast has reported that the strict watch kept by the local authorities has failed to bring to light any act of contraband at Jibuti, and that the Decrees in regard to the suppression of smuggling are being scrupulously carried out.

In these circumstances the French Government consider that it is unnecessary to issue fresh regulations in the matter.

I should be glad if you would bring this reply to the notice of the Italian Government, with a request that His Majesty's Government may be favoured with any observations which they may have to make in regard to the attitude adopted by the French Government.

I am, &c.

(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

No. 7.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October 2, 1905.*

I AM directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to inclose, for the information of the Secretary of State for India, copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople,† repeating information received from Bussorah to the effect that German engineers are expected to arrive shortly at Koweit with the object of inquiring into the possibility of railway construction.

Lord Lansdowne would be obliged if this telegram could be repeated to the Government of India with a request that they will report as soon as possible as to the alleged departure of German engineers from Bombay, and his Lordship would further

* See Part IV, No. 69. † No. 2.

suggest that if the report is confirmed, Major Knox should be instructed to return at once to Koweit.

It is understood that Major Knox left England for Bushire last week, and it seems to Lord Lansdowne important that Major Knox should, if possible, reach Koweit before the German engineers.

I am, &c.
(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

No. 8.

Sir N. O'Conor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received October 4.)

(No. 137.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, October 4, 1905.*

MY telegram No. 134.
Piracy in Red Sea.
Following received from Vice-Consul, Hodeidah, to-day:—

"Have returned in His Majesty's ship 'Fox,' through whose co-operation Turkish troops captured ten pirate boats, which we have brought back.

"Having found strong pirate nest with many vessels, have returned for reinforcements.

"A settlement of both claims for compensation has been reached, and local authorities have given me an assurance in writing that they will arrest culprits, who shall be punished within two months.

"I am sending by post further details."

I have told His Majesty's Vice-Consul, that as he has satisfactorily attained the object in view, he should not detain longer than may be necessary His Majesty's ship "Fox."

The matter has, I consider, been well done by both Captain and Consul.

No. 8*.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 5.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 3rd instant, relative to the report that German engineers are expected at Koweit to inquire into the possibility of railway construction.

India Office, October 5, 1905.

Inclosure in No. 8*.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, October 3, 1905.*

KOWEIT.

Information has been received from Bussorah by His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople to the effect that German engineers, who are to inquire into the possibility of railway construction, are expected to arrive at Koweit at an early date. They are said to be proceeding viâ Bombay, and to have sent on their servant in advance to Koweit to make arrangements for their stay. Have you any confirmation of the report?

Should report be correct, it would be well for Knox to reach Koweit before the Germans, if possible. He is due to arrive at Bombay about the 12th instant.

No. 9.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 6.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 29th September, relative to the Muscat Arbitration Award.

India Office, October 5, 1905.

Inclosure in No. 9.

Mr. Brodrick to the Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *September 29, 1905.*

M. LARONCE has just started for Muscat to take up his post. The French Government have instructed him to cultivate most friendly relations with his British colleagues, and to co-operate loyally with the latter with a view to the settlement of any difficulties that may arise in Oman. Similar instructions should be given to His Majesty's Consul, in accordance with a wish expressed by the French Government.

No. 10.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 6.)

Sir, *India Office, October 6, 1905.*

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 2nd instant, inclosing copy of a telegram, No. 136, from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople on the subject of a report received by him that German engineers are expected shortly at Koweit to investigate the possibility of railway construction there.

In reply, I am to inclose copy of a telegram which, in accordance with the request contained in your letter, has been addressed to the Government of India,* asking them to inquire into the truth of the report, and giving instructions, in case the report proves true, that Captain Knox should, if possible, reach Koweit before the German engineers arrive there. Captain Knox is expected to reach Bombay about the 12th instant.

Mr. Brodrick observes that your letter under reply deals only with the question of the action to be taken in the event of the report as to the German engineers proving true. He would suggest, for the consideration of the Marquess of Lansdowne, that Captain Knox should in any case be instructed to proceed to Koweit on his arrival in the Persian Gulf. This course appears to be contemplated in Sir N. O'Conor's despatch No. 637 of the 18th September, on the subject of the evacuation of Bubyan Island by the Turks. A further reason which appears to make Captain Knox' presence at Koweit desirable is the arrangement, reported in Sir N. O'Conor's telegram of the 1st instant, for the establishment of a Turkish postal official at Koweit.

If the return of Captain Knox to Koweit is approved, Mr. Brodrick will request the Government of India to call his attention to the views expressed in Sir E. Gorst's letter of the 9th August as to the policy of His Majesty's Government in respect of Bubyan Island, and to the instructions on the subject contained in the telegram to the Government of India of the 17th August last.

I am, &c.
(Signed) HORACE WALPOLE.

---

* No. 8*.

No. 11

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 186)
(Telegraphic) P. *Foreign Office, October 6, 1905.*

A COMPLAINT has been received from the Turkish Ambassador in connection with the Hodeidah pirates referred to in your telegram No. 137 of the 4th instant. His Excellency says that the Commander of His Majesty's ship "Fox" has insisted on a large Turkish force being sent to punish the pirates, and, failing such action, has threatened to send British troops. The immediate withdrawal of the "Fox" is requested.

Would it, you think, be possible that the Consul Vice-Consul and let us know. The Admiralty have been asked to obtain a report.

No. 12

Sir N. O'Conor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 140)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, October 8, 1905*

YOUR Lordship's telegram No. 190 of the 6th instant.

Red Sea piracy case.

I had received similar complaint from Porte, and telegraphed therefore on the 6th instant to Vice-Consul, Hodeidah, for explanations.

No answer yet received. I reminded Porte, however, that it was agreed that pirate boats should be destroyed, if and when captured.

No. 13

Sir N. O'Conor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 141)
(Telegraphic) P. *Constantinople, October 8, 1905*

RED Sea piracy case.

My telegram No. 140.

Following just received from Mr. Richardson, Hodeidah:

"Your Excellency's telegram of to-day and my telegram of 2nd instant.

"Proposal to request reinforcements emanated from Commandant of Turkish troops deputed to capture pirates.

"We have captured twenty-six vessels, which will be burnt early to-morrow.

"His Majesty's ship 'Fox' sails this evening, satisfactory settlement on all points being now amicably arrived at."

No. 14

Sir N. O'Conor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 687)
My Lord, *Therapia, October 3, 1905.*

SINCE I had the honour to address my despatch No. 636 of the 18th ultimo to [illegible] Hodeida, giving an account of the recapture by the Turkish troops of the town of Sanaa, very little information has been received as to the progress of the military operations in the Yemen.

An official communiqué published in the "Ikdam" on the 2nd instant, gives the [illegible] 28th ultimo, announcing that the battalions of troops marching from Tuzx, entered

the town of Yezm, centre of the kaza of that name, in the Toaz Sanjak, on the 22nd ultimo, without encountering any form of resistance, and adding that the inhabitants had hastened to proffer their submission and pray for the Sultan's welfare.

I have, &
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

No. 15.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 11.)

[illegible] for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in letters from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 21th [illegible] and the 7th September, relative to the Muscat Arbitration Award.

India Office, October 10, 1905.

Inclosure 1 in No. 15.

Major Grey to Government of India.

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Muscat, August 15, 1905.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt this day of your telegram dated the 14th instant, and, as the mail for Bushire left yesterday, beg to submit the [illegible] remarks to [illegible]

The French Vice-Consul received the terms of the Award from Paris three days ago, and at once visited His Highness the Sultan, whom he informed, without explaining the terms at any length, that the British and French Governments had agreed that the *statu quo* was to be maintained until the arrival of M. Lorrain in October next. He then came to this Consulate and told me the same story, adding that I would no doubt receive instructions accordingly. The fact is that M. Billecocq is intensely disgusted with the result of the arbitration, and does not wish to be employed in any read justment of the situation.

3. I fear that it will be difficult to ascertain the dates of the grant of all the flags, and I foresee the same obstacles which we encountered in our efforts to obtain [illegible] how owners. I will endeavour to forward a statement by next [illegible].

4. With reference to the terms of the Award I would ask whether, in the case of [illegible] who were not under French protection prior to 1863, but were authorized [illegible] by her flag before the 2nd January, 1902, the authorization is held to have been given in respect of (1) all the dhows possessed by the owner, or (2) particular dhows only; and, if the latter, whether a dhow which has been destroyed or become worn out is allowed to be replaced and the French flag transmitted to it. From paragraph (2) of the Award, I infer that authorization is held to be in a general sense, whereas paragraph (5) clearly points to its being considered to relate to certain dhows only. Beyond this the terms present no difficulty to me except that the inviolability of the authorized dhows in the territorial waters of Oman might lead occasionally to unpleasant incidents. I do not, however, anticipate any trouble, either for myself or my successors, as long as M. Lorrain remains in Muscat. Paragraph (6) is most excellent, covering as it does by far the most important point.

5. I may observe that the Award is very favourably regarded in Muscat, and His Highness the Sultan has already expressed his satisfaction at the general result of the arbitration.

6. A copy of this letter will be forwarded to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. G. GREY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 15.

Major Grey to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Muscat, August 29, 1905.*

UNDER instructions from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, I have the honour to submit for the [illegible] taken in regard to the Arbitration Award, with the [illegible]paul's visit to the Sultan, already reported by me, and my explanation of the terms to His Highness in accordance with the [illegible] of the Secretary of State.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. G. GREY.

Views of the Terms of the Award.

Paragraph 1. Requires no remark.

Paragraph 2. I infer, from the wording, "owners of dhows who have," &c., that the authorization belongs to the owners, whereas paragraph 5 gives another impression: hence the question contained in my letter dated the 15th instant.

Paragraph 3. I think there are only two Omani subjects who will be able to establish a claim to having been under French protection prior to 1863.

Paragraph 4. —I fear that awkward incidents, on account of this Concession, will be of occasional occurrence—for example, such as that which took place in April last reported by Major Cox in his letter dated the 11th April, 1903.

Paragraph 5. If this is inclusive of (1) succession, and (2) replacement of worn-out or destroyed dhow, it means that the whole business will gradually die out.

Paragraph 6.—Is extremely satisfactory, and will go far towards enabling His Highness the Sultan to exercise that authority at Sûr which has been paralyzed for so long.

The terms of this Award I hold, with the exception of clause 4, to be in favour of His Majesty's Government, and it would seem that, if the practice does not die out of itself [illegible] in consequence of increasing danger in the Slave Trade, hardly make it worth while for them to retain it. On this account His Highness the Sultan expects that many of them will, before long, wish to give up their authorization of their own accord.

Steps to be taken locally.

I have already given by telegraph the opinion that, both for the sake of peace in the future and with the object of having an arrangement made which will prevent doubtful and disputed points cropping up afterwards, it would be better to induce the French Government to agree to a mutual settlement being come to locally.

If this is impossible, it is not easy to see what had better be done without French assistance. His Highness the Sultan [illegible] prefer to let the new state of things be announced to the Sûr community by his Wali there, and to see what the result will be. He is of opinion that many of the flag-holders will want to give up their flags at once, but that others will still hold out and refuse to recognize orders from any one but the French Consul. The question of coercion on His Highness' part will then have to be considered.

His Highness has asked me whether he will now be allowed to accept flags, &c., from those wishing to give them up. I presume, as all question of their not being his subjects is removed, the reply is an affirmative one.

After a settlement as regards the names of authorized persons and their boats has been arrived at, the following difficulties will necessarily remain:—

(1.) The possibility of unauthorized persons taking out flags and papers in the name [illegible]

(2.) The possibility of authorized flag-holders lending, giving, or otherwise disposing of their flags or boats to unauthorized persons.

To prevent (1) we shall require from the French an assurance that they will not issue renewal of authorization without careful inquiry, and with regard to both, a Proclamation should be issued by the Sultan threatening offending parties with severe penalties. In my opinion, until an arrangement has been made with the French with regard to the names, &c., no Proclamation should be issued by the Local Government.

Dates of the Grant of Flags to those on the French List, &c.

The attached statement is the result of inquiry made from Sûrs, and I think may be considered substantially correct. Where the flags were obtained in the first instance I have been unable to discover, i.e., as regards each separately. It appears that only two of the owners have any right to be considered French protegés according to the terms of the Award, and the case of one of those I consider to be very doubtful. [illegible] made inquiries on the subject, there are no subjects of His Highness holding French flags whose names are not in the attached list. I thought it possible that there might be some more who have been, or who claim to have been, under French protection prior to 1873, but [illegible] be that all the Omani flag-holders are included in the list. Should the French bring forward any more, I think it will be possible to collect sufficient evidence to decide the cases.

NAMES taken from the Revised List put in by the French with their Counter-Case.

Name of Owner.	[illegible] a French Colony.	When he first [illegible] as By a French Flag.	Remarks.
[illegible]	[illegible]	About 50 years ago	
[illegible]	[illegible]	Father died 40 years ago	Further enquiry will have to be made into this case.
[illegible]	[illegible]Obeh 17 years ago	Obtained 10 years ago from Ottavi	Will have to abandon authorization.
8. Salem-bun-Selim-oved-Sebeia	No	30 years ago	
9. Djouma-bun-Said	No	[illegible]	[illegible] gave it up after 18 years and then re-obtained it from [illegible]
[illegible] Salem-ben-Rabeh	[illegible]	[illegible]	Has given up
10. Salem-ben-Muhammed	Unknown	[illegible]	[illegible]
11. Said Ali-ben-Ahmed	No	30 years ago	
12. Salem-ben-M'Sellem	No	10 years ago from Ottavi	Has given up
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
13. Abdallah-ben-Muhammad	[illegible]	[illegible]	This man is also agent to the [illegible]
16. Mbarek-ben-Ahmed-oved-Rezig	Unknown	[illegible]	
[illegible] Ali-ben-Salem-oved-Tahib	Unknown	[illegible]	[illegible] have received authorization 30 years ago (See my letter of July 4, 1904.)
18. Abdallah-ben-Said	No	6 or 7 years ago from [illegible]	To be given up.

	Name of Owner.	Property possessed in a French Colony	When he first ... to fly a French Flag	
	Selim-ben-Djouma ..	Nil ..	.. 16 years ago	
2	Ahmed-ben-Sa[illegible]* ..	Unknown ..	Unknown ..	.. [illegible]
	[illegible]	[illegible]	30 years ago	.. Brother of No. 11
	[illegible]	[illegible]	10 years ago	.. Has been living in Zanzibar
	[illegible]	Unknown ..	.. Unknown ..	[illegible]
	[illegible]	Unknown ..	.. 20 years ago	[illegible]
	[illegible]	Nil ..	.. 8 years ago from	To be given up.
16.	M'sellem-ben-Ahmed ..	Unknown ..	.. Unknown	

In the above the French [illegible] were used to facilitate clearance.

* Supposed to be one Ahmed Saeed, who got his papers from [illegible]

No. 16.

Foreign Office to India Office

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 11, 1905

I AM directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to acknowledge [illegible]

Lord Lansdowne concurs in Mr. Brodrick's proposal that Captain Ke[illegible] Koweit on his arrival in the Persian Gulf, and that his attention should be called to the correspondence regarding Bubian Island, mentioned in the last paragraph of your letter.

I am, &c.
(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON

No. 17.

India Office to Foreign Office [*Received October* 12.]

Sir, *India Office, October* 11, 1905.

WITH reference to previous correspondence on the subject of the Aden Delimitation Commission, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Brodrick to enclose, for the information of the Marquess of Lansdowne, a copy of a letter from the Government of India [illegible] Major Fitzmaurice's final Report with accompanying [illegible] and improved edition [illegible]

The views entertained by His Majesty's Government with regard to the services rendered by the Commissioners were communicated to the Government of India in Mr. Brodrick's Secret despatch of the 7th April last, in accordance with the opinion expressed by Lord Lansdowne in Mr. Villiers' letter of the 6th January last. Mr. Brodrick concurs in the appreciation expressed by the Government of India of the [illegible] negotiations at Constantinople, and I am to suggest that, if Lord Lansdowne agrees in this view, Mr. Fitzmaurice should be informed accordingly.

I am, &c.
(Signed) HORACE WALPOLE.

* No print.

Inclosure 1 in No. 14.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick

Sir, *Simla, September* 14, 1905

WE have the honour to forward herewith [illegible] of the map which has been prepared for use by the British and Turkish Governments in ratifying the Aden [illegible]ary settlement completed in April last,* together with a copy of a letter from the [illegible]nt at Aden, forwarding the final Report of the British P[illegible]ndary [illegible] last April by the latter and his Turkish [illegible]

[illegible] which is in four sheets, is an improved version of that already signed [illegible]d Turkish Boundary Commissioners, a copy of which has already been sent to you direct from Aden, but it does not differ from the latter in any essential particulars. Six copies of the map have been sent direct to His M[illegible] Ambassador at Constantinople for his use and that of the Turkish Government [illegible]

[illegible]ur despatch of the 10th November, 1904, we have already drawn attention to the valuable work done by Mr. Fitzmaurice in connection with the delimitation proceedings: that officer is now, in our opinion, entitled to further credit for the patience and ability displayed by him while attending on the spot Sir N. O'Conor's successful negotiations at Constantinople.

We have, &c.
(Signed) CURZON
R. ELLES.
A. T. ARUNDEL.
H. ERLE RICHARDS.
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

Inclosure 2 in No. 17.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India

(Secret.)
My Lord, *India Office, April* 7, 1906.

I HAVE considered the Secret letter of your Excellency's Government in the Foreign Department, dated the 10th November last, forwarding, with a review of the results then accomplished, the Resident's Report on the proceedings of the Aden Delimitation Commission, and submitting to the notice of His Majesty's Government [illegible] by the officers concerned in the demarcation [illegible]

2. Since the date of your letter an agreement has been arrived at with the Porte which should lead to an early settlement of the remaining section of the line from Sheikh Murad to Madariba in respect to which unexpected delays have arisen owing to the attitude of the Turkish Government. The work of delimitation from the sea to the Wadi Bana will then be completed, and a definite frontier laid down between the Turkish dominions and the territories of the Subaihi, Haushabi, and Amiri tribes under our protection.

3. His Majesty's Government, while appreciating the difficult and complicated nature of the work intrusted to the Resident and the Commissioners, regret that it has been prolonged by the causes mentioned [illegible] They [illegible] view expressed by your Excellency of the services rendered by General Maitland and by Colonel Wahab, Mr. Fitzmaurice, and the officers employed in the work of the delimitation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ST. JOHN BRODRICK.

[illegible]

No. 18

Sir N. O'Conor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received October 16.)

No. 608.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 10, 1905*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 319 of the 26th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah, inclosing copy of a reply which he has received from the British India Steam Navigation Company through their agents at Bussorah, relative to the proposal that the vessels of that line should undertake to carry the Hasso mails to and from Ojeir.

If the arrangements made by the Vali of Bussorah with the Sheikh of Koweit for conveying the Hasso mails overland through the last-named place, as reported in my telegram No. 135 of the 1st instant, are carried into effect, I presume the proposal that the service should be undertaken by the British India Company's steamers as far as Ojeir or Bahrein will be abandoned.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR

Inclosure 1 in No. 18

Consul Crow to Sir N. O'Conor

(No. 60.)

Sir, [illegible]

WITH reference to my No. 51 of the 19th ultimo regarding [illegible] service I have the honour to transmit copy of a reply which I have received from the British India Company's agents on the subject, in which they state that their subsidiary Gulf steamers have already as much to do as they can undertake, and that unless the Turkish Government are prepared to pay a very substantial sum the Company are not anxious to take up the proposal.

In communicating the substance of the Company's reply to the Vali, I asked his Excellency to inform me what the Turkish Government were willing to pay for the service to and from Ojeir, and the Vali has promised to do so, after consulting with the Director of Posts and Telegraphs.

I have received no communication from the Indian Government on the subject, but I learn from the British Resident at Bushire that the question has been referred to them, and that, in his opinion, it would be inexpedient to have the Turkish steamers visit the Katif roads.

He recommends that the British India should carry the mail from Bussorah to Bahrein, and the Turks keep a mail sailing boat and mail officer to ply regularly between Ojeir and Bahrein. He thinks it unlikely that the British India could or would call in Ojeir as a port of call, owing to the shoal water all round that part of the coast. I infer from the answer of the British India Company's agents that they will ask more than the Turks are prepared to pay for the service.

I have, &c.
(Signed) P. R. CROW

Inclosure 2 in No. 18.

British India Steam Navigation Company to Consul Crow

Sir, *Bussorah, September 9, 1905*

PROPOSAL to convey Turkish mails to and from Ojeir.

Referring to previous correspondence on this subject, we now have the honour to inclose copy of our Bombay agents' letter *re* above.

We have, &c.
(Signed) GRAY, MACKENZIE, AND Co.,
Agents.

Inclosure 3 in No. 18

British India Steam Navigation Company to Messrs. Mackenzie and Co.

Dear Sirs, *Bombay, August 30, 1905*

REFERRING to yours of the 10th instant, the Managing Agents inform us they have been in correspondence with the Director-General of Post Offices in India on the same question. They consider the subsidiary Gulf steamers have no as much to do as they can overtake, and unless the Turkish Government are willing to make a very [illegible] El Hassa coast is very incomplete, and there are, therefore, considerations for consideration which will be brought forward through the official [illegible]

Yours &c.
[illegible] MACKINNON, MACKENZIE, AND Co.

No. 19

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 18.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 12th October, relative to the return of Captain Knox to Koweit.

India Office, October 17, 1905.

Inclosure in No. 19

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India

October 12, 1905.

[illegible] to my telegram of the 3rd instant. Knox should in any [illegible] immediately. I request, however, that you will call his attention [illegible] stated in my telegram of the 17th August last, and to the [illegible] 10th August from the Foreign Office, copy of which was inclosed in Political [illegible] letter of the 25th ult.

No. 20

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 18.

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, [illegible] herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 10th instant, relative to the Muscat Arbitration Award.

India Office, October 17, 1905.

Inclosure in No. 2

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick

(Telegraphic.) P. *October 16, 1905.*

MUSCAT Arbitration. Your telegram of the 10th August.

Award is, in our opinion, generally satisfactory. Subject to your approval, we propose to authorize Gray to invite the co-operation of M. Larnaca in drawing up [illegible] Sultan [illegible] for the Arbitration, and [illegible] list [illegible]

persons now authorized to fl[illegible]
course of preparation of the[illegible]
Governments, to whose ap[illegible]

Copy of letter containing opinion of Resident in Persian Gulf on the Award is being sent to you by mail.

No. 21.

India Office to Foreign Office — Received October 20

India Office, October 18, 1905

SIR,

WITH reference to Mr. Villiers' letter of the 29th Aug[illegible] a[illegible] particulars as to the piracies committed by Ahmed-bin-Selman in the Persian G[illegible] am directed by Mr. Secretary Brodrick to invite the attention of the Marquess of Lansdowne to the letter from the Government of India of the 31st August, containing [illegible]ormation on the subject, supplementing that which was inclosed in the letter from this Office of the 28th August. I am also to inclose further papers on the subject received, with letters, from the Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 31st August and the 14th September, 1905.

Mr. Brodrick will be glad to be informed in due course of the result of the action which is being taken by Sir N. O'Conor in accordance with the instructions contained in Lord Lansdowne's despatch of the 12th August last.

As regards the 4th paragraph of the letter from the Government of India, it will be remembered that the provision of a boat for the Political Officer at Bahrein was [illegible]ed, after consultation with your Department, in the despatch to the Government of India of the 5th August, 1904. Subsequently, however, the Government of India, in [illegible]our despatch in the Marine Department, of the 3rd November, 1904, to which they [illegible] commended as an alternative proposal that a light-draught vessel should be [illegible] to patrol the pearl banks in the vicinity of Bahrein, and to be available for service in the creeks and inlets at the head of the Gulf. The subject has been referred to the Admiralty in connection with the question, now under consideration, of the renewal of the arrangements for the maintenance of the subsidized ships of the Royal Navy in the Gulf, and no action can be taken in the matter till the general question has been settled.

In these circumstances, Mr. Brodrick has informed the Government of India by telegraph that, if it appears to them undesirable to postpone the provision of a vessel at Bahrein till a decision can be arrived at on the general question, they are at liberty to place at the disposal of the Political Agent a boat such as that already sanctioned.

I am, &c.

(Signed) HORACE WALPOLE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 21

Major Cox to Government of India

(Telegraphic.) *Bushire, August 23, 1905*

PIRATE AHMED-BIN-SELMAN. Please see inclosure to Bahrein letter, dated the 22nd July. Captain Prideaux reports that, without consulting him, the Sheikh of Bahrein has handed over the slave Salim Mubarak to the Kaimakam Katif, ostensibly for taking of evidence; the latter, however, has imprisoned the slave, and Captain Prideaux fears treachery.

Please urge Vali to hold Kaimakam personally responsible for the slave's safety and [illegible] return to Bahrein, informing [illegible] necessary His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

(Addressed to the Consul at Bussorah, and repeated to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 21

Extract from the Diary of the Persian Gulf Political Residency for the Week ending August 13, 1905

BAHREIN.

July 29 to August 4, 1905

NEWS has come from Katif that the Turkish officials of that place have arrested four Bedouins and put them into gaol. The Chief of the Al Muhammad section of the Beni Hajir, Bin Madhi, Bin Zaora, with thirty or forty men of his tribe, approached [illegible] would not give up the men until Ahmed-bin-Selman (*vide* entry No. 21 in diary for week ending 30th July, 1905) was brought to, in chains.

Inclosure 3 in No. 21.

Major Cox to Government of India.

Bushire, August 20, 1905

WITH reference to the correspondence ending with my letter of the 2nd August, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a letter, dated the 10th August, 1905, with inclosure, from the Political Agent, Bahrein, on the subject of a [illegible] Ahmed-bin-Selman and his Bedouin associ[illegible]

Inclosure 4 in No. 21

Captain Prideaux to Major Cox

Bahrein, August 10, 1905.

IN continuation of correspondence ending with my letter dated the 22nd July, 1905, on the subject of the pirate Ahmed-bin-Selman and his Bedouin [illegible] I have the honour to inclose, for your information, a copy of a statement [illegible] office relating to a fresh case of piracy committed this time from a [illegible] masted boat most commonly used by the pearl divers.

As no information has reached Bahrein concerning the loss of such a boat, I am sending copies of Nakhoda Abdal Latif-bin-Habib's statement to the Kaimakam of Katif and to Sheikh Ahme[illegible]

Inclosure 5 in No. 21

Statement of Abdal Latif-bin Habib, Nakhoda of the boat of Abdallah-bin-Alwan, of Katif and Bahrein, recorded on August 7, 1905.

NINE days ago we left Katif. We were six men and one woman, and had in our boat 200 packages of dates consigned to the name of Ahmed-bin-Selman, a merchant of Bahrein, also 162 rupees cash, 43 rupees of which were sent by Abdallah-bin-Faraa for the same Ahmed-bin-Selman. The day we left Katif we met on our way, near Keskus, a "shuei" boat which had the appearance of a pearling boat, and in which were some ten or twelve Bedus. But to our surprise, they fired at us, pulled round the nail of their boat and sailed fast towards us.

When they got [illegible] they again opened fire, hitting a boy some twelve years old, son of Isa Almukhnar, of Dalebia, with the result that he rolled down into the sea.

Then they jumped into our boat and wounded two of our company with their daggers, my son Jasim receiving two wounds in the face and in the hand, and Ali Al Hasan five wounds.

Afterwards the pirates put three of their men in our boat, and the rest sailed back. We went on for two days till we reached a bay. I do not know the name of this bay. Never before had I seen the place. We anchored near the sea shore.

Here the three men landed and took with them all our cash and the packages of dates, besides our sail-cloth, worth 100 rupees, and cooking utensils and coffee-pots, worth 20 rupees, and clothes of the value of 25 rupees, also the clothes of the woman with us. They let us go, after giving us all sorts of worries and troubles. The names of those three men are Ali, Jabr, and Jabir, and all the way they were using insulting expressions towards us, saying that some men of their party were in gaol in Katif, that they would chase any boat they saw, and that they were the followers of Ahmed-bin-Selman, the pirate.

We saw a small jolly-boat in that bay. We left there three days ago, directing our course to the north, aided by the Polar star. On the morning of the 6th instant we reached Budeya, and on the same afternoon, Manama.

Inclosure 6 in No. 21

Major Cox to Government of India

Bushire, August 27, 1905

IN continuation of my letter, dated the 2nd August, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter, with inclosure, in which the Political Agent, Bahrein, reports the committal of another piracy, not actually by Ahmed-bin-Selman himself, but by some of his confederates.

I have been in communication with His Majesty's Consul, Bussorah, on the subject, and he is doing his best to prevail upon the Wali to cause effective action to be taken in the direction of the capture of the pirate on land.

Beyond this, it is difficult to devise any efficacious plan of action. I have discussed the question with the Senior Naval Officer, and he is clearly of opinion that His Majesty's ships at present on the station can have little hope of success of running the pirate to ground, owing to the difficulty of navigation in the shoal waters of the Katif and Katr coasts.

3. By the employment of an armed dhow or sea-going launch, there would be a much better chance of putting a stop to the piracy, but for the former, his Excellency the naval Commander-in-chief is unable to arrange, and the latter is not yet available.

4. I have informed the Senior Naval Officer that, at all events, the presence of a ship in these waters is likely to have a deterrent effect; but at the present moment there may be difficulty in sending one, as His Majesty's ship "Redbreast" is detached for work in the Shatt-el-Arab; His Majesty's ship "Sphinx" has had a good deal of sickness on board, and requires a change to Karachi, and His Majesty's ship "Lapwing" is not at present in the Gulf.

5. Though we have not approved of the Sheikh of Bahrein using armed dhows on his own account, without close supervision, for several obvious reasons, *e.g.*—

(1.) That they could not be trusted to close with a pirate dhow if they fell in with it;

(2.) That they might even take to piracy themselves;

(3.) [illegible] with the other Trucial Chiefs might endeavour to take advantage—

yet it would be possible, theoretically, to overcome the above difficulties by letting Sheikh Esa man the dhow, and by putting a blue-jacket and a lascar or two on board.

The objections which the naval authorities would probably raise to this arrangement would be—

(*a.*) Neither the lascars nor the blue-jackets could understand the language of the Arab crew.

(*b.*) Blue-jackets have no training in the sailing of dhows, and would be in the hands of the Arab crew.

(*c.*) During the pearling season—the only time at which the arrangement would usually be required—it would involve great exposure to the men on duty in the dhow.

6. But both in the interests of the native sea-going community and of our relations with Sheikh Esa, the suppression of this piracy is a most important, as it is a most difficult, question, and it has my earnest attention.

Inclosure 7 in No. 21

Major Cox to Government of India

Bushire, September 2, 1905.

IN continuation of my telegram dated the 28rd August, 1905, I have the honour to forward, for [illegible] a copy of a letter from Captain Prideaux.

2. [illegible] I think I suppose that Sheikh Esa has acted in working over [illegible] in the belief that the affair was [illegible] taken [illegible] rescue [illegible] Captain Prideaux in any way before doing so, although he was well aware that the Political Agent was closely interested both in the piracy and in the circumstances of the slave, should not, in my opinion, be passed over without notice, and I have told Captain Prideaux to let the Sheikh know that I have heard with surprise of his having taken this action in respect of the slave so lightly, and without troubling to consult his Political Agent, and that he should spare no effort in effecting his recovery.

3. Apart from this, I think we have good cause to remind Sheikh Esa that though, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

as my office records give no information on the subject. My Munshi, Haji Abbas, however, states that Sheikh Esa's explanation is not in accordance with the truth, for he has never, to the Haji's belief, either applied to the Turks for the surrender of an absconder, nor has he previously returned any refugees to the Katif authorities. We [illegible] Esa has acted improperly in keeping me ignorant of the correspondence until the matter reached my ears from another source.

4. The action of the Kaimakam in ignoring my existence after our recent meeting at Katif is a matter for regret, but is hardly surprising, as the Turkish officials in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf object strongly to recognizing our position in Bahrein. I venture, however, now to express the hope that His Majesty's Government will see fit to consider that the time has come for issuing a stringent prohibition to Sheikh Esa against holding any correspondence whatever with any Turkish officials except through the medium of this agency.

I have written to the Kaimakam of Katif, asking him to return the slave Salim-bin-Mubarak to Bahrein as soon as he can dispense with his services as a witness, but I have [illegible] Kaimakam will eventually give up the slave to the Al Muhammad Sheikhs when the latter have bought their liberty from him, and in that case the unfortunate Salim will probably be put to death.

I therefore hope that the Government will make a special urgent representation to the Porte on this subject, and that the Kaimakam will be held personally responsible for the man's safety. I venture to suggest that on this point, if you see no objection, the Government of India might be addressed by telegraph.

Inclosure 9 in No. 21

Statement of Ahmed-bin-Saad Al Mazahaki, recorded on August 9, 1905

SOME twelve days ago Khalifa-bin-Ahmed-bin-Ghattam told me that Sheikh Esa-bin-Ali Chief of Bahrein, wished to see me and my son and the escaped slave of Ahmed-bin Selman, who was staying with me. Two days later I presented myself, along with my son Yusuf and the slave to Sheikh Esa. Yusuf and the slave were left outside, and I alone entered, and then the Chief told me that he had received a letter from the Kaimakam of Katif to the effect that the Kaimakam desired to take the statement of Yusuf and the slave, and that, therefore, either I should in person attend on him, or, preferably, I should send my son and the slave. I replied that, in compliance with the order of the Political Agent, our statements had already been recorded in the Agency. The Chief said that did not matter, and that he had an engagement with the Kaimakam of Katif for a reciprocity of good offices between them. Then he read out to me the letter from the Kaimakam, the purport of which was that Yusuf and the slave were required to give their statements to the Kaimakam, that they should therefore come to Katif, and that they would be under a safe conduct.

I told the Chief that I could not possibly disobey his orders, and that I would send both my son and the slave.

The Chief then advised Yusuf and the slave to be in readiness, and to come to him the next day to take his letter to the Kaimakam. Yusuf and the slave accordingly took the letter and proceeded to Katif.

Inclosure 10 in No. 21

Statement of Yusuf-bin-Ahmed-bin-Saad Al Mazahaki, recorded on August 9, 1905.

TEN days ago I appeared before the Chief, accompanied by the slave of Ahmed-bin-Salman. The Chief read out to me the letter he had written to the address of the Kaimakam.

The letter said that we were being sent to the Kaimakam in order that he might take our statements as he desired. We left Bahrein and presented ourselves with the letter to the Kaimakam. He read it and then he recorded our statements, which were the same as we [illegible] and then he forthwith ordered the slave to be put in gaol. Shortly after he wrote a letter to Sheikh Esa, and asked me to return to Bahrein and to the Chief with the letter. I told him that the slave was in nowise at

fault and that he should not have been put in gaol. He replied that I had nothing to do with that, and [illegible] home with the letter. He did not read to me the letter he wrote to the Chief of Bahrein. I returned to Bahrein and handed over the letter to the Chief. I should have previously stated that when I left the Kaimakam's quarters the Redus turned upon me, but I was rescued by the Turkish soldiers. The Kaimakam also put some soldiers in my boat and said that they were under my orders, and that if I was afraid I could take them as far as Darin or even to Bahrein. I left them, however, in Katif.

Inclosure 11 in No. 21

Captain Prideaux to Sheikh Esa-bin-Ali

Bahrein, 5th Jamadi-al-Thani, 1323
(After compliments.) (*August 9, 1905*)

I HAVE learnt that, about twelve days ago, you received a letter from the Kaimakam of Katif requesting that Yusuf-bin-Ahmed Al Mudhahaki and Salim-bin-Mubarak, the escaped slave of Ahmed-bin-Selman, the pirate, be sent over to Katif for examination; that you complied with this request, sending a written reply at the same [illegible] letter from the Kaimakam for you, but that the slave was detained in custody at Katif and has not yet returned from there.

2. To the complying with the request of the Kaimakam under [illegible] regarding the safety of the two persons asked for, I see no objection, but it appears that [illegible]

[illegible] I am greatly surprised that you should have departed from [illegible] and I request to be informed of your reason for doing this. I shall also be glad to see the letters from the Kaimakam and copies of your letters to him at your earliest convenience.

4. I hear, also, that the Sheikhs of the Fahaida and Behaih sections of the Al Morra have come to Bahrein with a view to negotiating a settlement of your blood-feud with the Behaih.

You have given me no information also on this subject.

5. Both the cases of Ahmed-bin-Selman and of the Behaih blood-feud are matters [illegible] most extraordinary that you should not have kept me fully informed regarding events which relate to them.

Inclosure 12 in No. 21.

Sheikh Esa-bin-Ali to Captain Prideaux.

(Translation.) *9th Jamadi-al-Thani, 1323* (*August 11, 1905*)

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated 5th instant (5th Jamadi-al-Thani), which dealt with five questions.* First, about the letter of the Kaimakam of Katif and [illegible] Ahmed-bin-Selman the pirate. I beg to inform you that it has come to be a customary practice with me and the Representatives of the Turkish Government that if one of their culprit subjects comes to Bahrein and they ask for his surrender, I [illegible] and likewise too, I return my culprit subjects who come to Hasa or to Katif, whenever I am asked for. This practice [illegible] the treaty engagement I have with the British Government, for that has a position of its own (is a different thing altogether). You tell me that you desire to see the letters from the Kaimakam and a copy of my letter to him. I have no objection in observing, and inclosed herewith I send you the desired papers, but please return them to me after you have read them.

* Contained five paragraphs.—P. R. P.

As for the news you say you have heard about the Sheikhs of the Al Faheds and Behaih, of the tribe of Al Morra, having come to Bahrein in order to settle the blood claim that I have on them, I beg to inform you that that is wrong, and none of these sections have come here. The Sheikh who has come is Abdul Rahman-bin-Naqadan, one of the Chiefs of Al Adhba, a section of Al Morra. I have no blood-feud with the Al Adhba, and they are friendly to me.

Inclosure 13 in No. 2.

Kaimakam of Katif to Sheikh Eesa-bin-Ali

(Translation.) 17*th Jumadi-al-Awwal*, 1323 (*July* 21, 1905).

I HAVE heard that the boat which the pirate Ahmed-bin-Selman seized from the people of Bahrein and carried off to the Island of Zakhnoniya, whence he passed on to mainland (has been recovered), and also that the men in the boat, availing themselves of the opportunity, got out of the said island and threw down two of the comrades of the said Ahmed-bin-Selman, who were Bedouin of the sea, and got hold of the Zanzibari slave of Ahmed-bin-Selman, and returned safe to Bahrein. Send* the said slave over to me under proper guard and trustworthy custody, for I have to make certain inquiries about the said pirate, and about the Bedouin and residents (town-people or opposed to nomads) that were with him and as to what and how much the said pirate plundered on land and sea. I shall be obliged for this. On account of the bonds of friendship and regard (between us) I hasten to say this.

Inclosure 14 in No. 21

Sheikh Eesa-bin-Ali to Kaimakam of Katif

(Translation.) 21*st Jumadi-al-Awwal*, 1323 (*July* 25, 1905).

YOUR letter of the 17th Jamadi al-Awwal to hand, and I am duly informed [illegible] following of Ahmed bin-Selman, in order that you may take his statement and learn more about the pirate Ahmed-bin-Selman, and, secondly, about how much property he has plundered

Herewith I send Yusuf-bin-Ahmed Al Maithahari, the owner of the boat and the brother of the person, with whom were others who were attacked, also I send the case and a paper, in which is an account of the property plundered. I expect from your strength of purpose a perfect arrangement for the recovery of the things robbed. As for the said pirate Ahmed-bin-Selman, he is just now in Katar with the Al Mohamed section of the Beni Hajir, and certainly it is not difficult for the Kaimakam to arrest him in Katar and to put him in gaol, and so get out of him the booty

I have written these words of friendship for your information.

Inclosure 15 in No. 21.

Kaimakam of Katif to Sheikh Eesa-bin-Ali.

(Translation.) 26*th Jumadi-al-Awwal*, 1323 (*July* 29, 1905).

YOUR letter of friendship, dated the 21st Jamadi-al-Awwal, 1323, dealing with the case of your subjects that were plundered, gave me pleasure, and Yusuf-bin-Ahmed, the proprietor of the boat, and the slave Salim both have reached here, and we are greatly obliged to you for your courage and kindness. I have considered over what necessary measures should be taken in the interests of all, and, after completing my [illegible] I shall inform you of the results, and in order to apprise you of this and for the sake of a continuity of our friendship for ever, I hasten to write this to you.

(Signed) Wakil† Kaimakam KATIF

---

* In peremptory language.—E. B. P.

† Officiating

No. 22.

Sir N. O'Conor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(*Received October* 23.)

No. 718.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October* 16, 1905

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 348 of the 2nd instant, asking for my views on the suggestion, made by the Government of India and indorsed by the Secretary of State for India, that a Political Officer should be appointed permanently at Dthala, and that the Turkish Government should be invited to agree to an arrangement whereby communications respecting border disputes between the authorities on the British and Turkish sides of the newly demarcated frontier of the Aden Hinterland should be made through this Political Officer

In reply, I have the honour to express the opinion that it would be preferable that such minor and subsidiary questions should not be raised until the settlement of the Aden Protectorate frontier has been officially placed on record by an exchange of notes [illegible] will be best to wait till we have some concrete case in hand before asking the Porte to recognize the Political Officer at Dthala as the intermediary for communications respecting border disputes between the authorities on the British and Turkish sides. The Porte is always suspicious of new proposals of a general character, and uneasy as to how far they may be found to be to their advantage when they come to be actually applied. They will not, I think, question the Political Officer's right of interference when a definite case arises on the frontier.

I have, &c.

(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR

No. 23

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received October* 23.)

Sir, *India Office, October* 20, 1905.

WITH reference to previous correspondence relative to the affairs of Bahrein, ending with my letter of the 11th May last, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Brodrick to inclose, for the information of the Marquess of Lansdowne, a copy of a letter from the Government of India on the subject.

Lord Lansdowne will see that, before issuing definite instructions for the future guidance of the Political Agent, the Government of India have submitted the draft of a letter embodying those instructions for the approval of His Majesty's Government.

The Secretary of State for India, as at present advised, is doubtful whether the time has yet arrived for defining in strict terms the position of the Chief of Bahrein towards the protecting British Government; and the attributes of suzerainty set forth in the draft letter, both in regard to the native States of India and the State of Bahrein, are described in terms which the Secretary of State for India cannot unreservedly accept as correct. In present circumstances, and in view of our recent authoritative interference in Bahrein, it seems to Mr. Brodrick sufficient that the Political authorities should be directed to act, as is proposed by the Government of India in paragraph 6 of their draft letter, by steadily and as far as possible unobtrusively, increasing their influence, and the confidence of the Sheikh in their advice and power to direct and control his external affairs. As regards the management of the Customs, it is observed that the Government of India will further consult the Resident in the Gulf, and on the receipt of his reply, their specific recommendations can receive full consideration.

Should the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs concur in these views, the Government of India will be addressed accordingly.

I am, &c.

(Signed) A. GODLEY

Inclosure 1 in No. 23

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Secret.)

Sir, *Simla, September 14, 1905.*

WE have the honour to transmit copies of correspondence* on the subject of affairs in Bahrein.

2. It will be seen that, as a sequel to the naval demonstration which took place in February last, owing to the unsatisfactory attitude adopted by the Sheikh in regard to the punishment of the authors of certain outrages on foreigners in the island, Major Cox made certain recommendations, with a view to securing guarantees for the more satisfactory administration of affairs in the future. The measures which he proposed were:

(*a.*) The appointment of a Wazir selected for him by the Government of India to carry on the Government of Manama, under the immediate guidance of the Political Agent.

(*b.*) The creation of a small police force under a native police officer of the Government of India.

(*c.*) The warning of the present Ruler's heir, Sheikh Hamed, that, in spite of the recognition given by the Government of India to his right to succeed, their ultimate acquiescence in his succession will depend entirely on his satisfactory demeanour from this day forward.

(*d.*) The exercise by the Political Agent of his influence with Sheikh Isa, in order to prevail upon him to allow his grandson, Khalifa, to be sent to India for a time for education and training, in view of the possibility of his eventual selection to succeed in place of Sheikh Hamed.

In accordance with instructions, the Political Agent has delivered the warning suggested under (*c*). Major Cox' proposal as to (*d*) has also been sanctioned.

3. As regards the proposed appointment of a Wazir, Major Cox' attention was drawn to some of the difficulties which stood in the way of carrying out the suggestion, and he was reminded that the reform of the Customs Administration was still the first question to which the Political Agent should address himself. A further report was also called for, and in reply Major Cox submitted certain proposals by Captain Prideaux, which may be summarized as follows:—

(*a.*) That it would be better that, until the Political Agent has acquired adequate influence over the Sheikh, no steps whatever should be taken to press upon Sheikh Isa the proposals recommended originally in the Resident's Confidential letter of the 11th March last, and referred to in this Department letter of the 17th May.

(*b.*) That the Political Agent should be authorized to intervene with direct advice to the Chief in the following matters, namely:—

(1.) The oppression exercised by the Al Khalifa family, the Magisterial and Revenue officials, and the Kazis.
(2.) The extravagant entertainment of Bedouins.
(3.) The reform of the Land Revenue Administration.
(4.) Legal disputes between the Sheikh and his subjects.

Major Cox concurred in the advisability of adopting Captain Prideaux' first suggestion; but before submitting any definite opinion on his other proposals he [illegible] British Protectorate, (2) as an independent Principality. A reply [illegible] have the honour to inclose, has now been drafted to Major [illegible] laying down what are considered in practice to be the approximate [illegible] British Protectorate in Bahrein, so far as it has yet been developed; the principles are also defined by which Captain Prideaux should be guided in his relations towards the Ruler of the island. As, however, the points dealt with in the draft letter involve the consideration of important questions of international law, and, moreover, bear indirectly

* Not printed.

on the general subject of the British position in the Persian Gulf, we are postponing its issue until His Majesty's Government have had an opportunity of considering it and of stating whether they approve of its terms.

We have &c.
(Signed) CURZON
E. R. ELLES
A. T. ARUNDEL
H. ERLE RICHARDS.
J. P. HEWETT.
E. N. BAK.
C. L. TUPPER.

Inclosure 2 in No.

Draft of Letter from Government of India to Major Cox.

Confidential.

Sir,

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 16th July and your telegram of the 2nd August, on the subject of Bahrein affairs.

2. I am to convey to you the satisfaction of the Government of India at the surrender of Sheikh Ali. It is hoped that this event will remove a disturbing factor [illegible] of Sheikh Isa.

3. As regards the question of our future relations with Bahrein, you submit certain proposals by Captain Prideaux, which may be summarized as follows:—

(*a.*) That it would be better that, until the Political Agent has acquired adequate influence over the Sheikh, no steps whatever should be taken to press on Sheikh Isa the proposals recommended originally in your Confidential letter of the 11th March last and referred to in this Department letter of the 17th May.

(*b.*) That the Political Agent should be authorised to intervene with direct instructions to the Chief in the following matters, namely:—

(1.) The oppression exercised by the Al Khalifa family, the Magisterial and Revenue officials, and the Kazis.
(2.) The extravagant entertainment of Bedouins.
(3.) Reform of Land Revenue Administration.
(4.) Legal disputes between the Sheikh and his subjects.

Captain Prideaux appears to hope that, by consistently adopting this policy, the Political Agent will gradually be furnished with a status in the island independent of the Sheikh, that the Sheikh will thus be cowed into an attitude of general amenability to reasonable suggestions, and that the termination of the present system of exactions will result in so much loss of revenue to the Sheikh that he will, in his own interest, desire the reform of his Customs.

4. You concur in the advisability of adopting Captain Prideaux' first suggestion; but before submitting any definite opinion on his other proposals, you [illegible] a pronouncement of the Government of India on the proposition that there is no middle course between the two policies of treating Bahrein (1) as a full British Protectorate; (2) as an independent Principality.

It is clear to the Government of India that such a middle course does exist, but before replying to your inquiry, I am to point out, with reference to your [illegible] a full British Protectorate as involving the right to interfere in the [illegible] administration of Bahrein to the extent contemplated by Captain Prideaux, [illegible] is no authority for the supposition that Great Britain would necessarily possess such a right, even were she formally to notify a British Protectorate over Bahrein to foreign Powers. This misconception is due to the assumption which has been made that the alternative to regarding the Sheikh of Bahrein as an independent Sovereign is to treat [illegible] its uses as indicating the methods which, in the light of Indian experience, may successfully be employed in dealing with the Chief, must be regarded as misleading in several important respects. For, even assuming that the measure of interference advocated by the Political Agent would be legitimate in an Indian Native State, a proposition which needs some reservations in the instance of such Chiefs as enjoy a full

in nature of internal autonomy), it must be borne in mind that in the case of N[illegible] States in India, the British Power is the Sovereign, and not merely the Protecting Power, and that, in the same degree as they have lost the majority of the attributes of sovereignty as well as of independence, reciprocal rights and obligations have been created between them and the Government of India, which as yet have no exact counterpart in the relations of Great Britain to Bahrein.

5. The exact interpretation of a Protectorate is a general question of international law, into which the Government of India see no necessity to enter on the present occasion. But, as regards the case of Bahrein, the facts appear to them to be sufficient to establish the following conclusions. They are of opinion that Great Britain is the Protecting Power of Bahrein, and that Bahrein is therefore, in the present state of affairs, under the Protectorate of Great Britain in the following sense:

(1.) The British Government, and they alone, as distinct from Turkey, Persia, or any other Power, control the foreign relations of Bahrein. The Sheikh has bound himself not to enter into relations with any other Power. The British Government therefore undertake the protection of foreigners in Bahrein.

(2.) The reciprocal aspect of this obligation is that Great Britain is bound to protect the islands from any external aggression or assault.

(3.) From these circumstances it results that British influence and authority are and must be in the ascendant in Bahrein. Primarily, this influence is political both in character and origin, and it gives Great Britain the right to claim that, in any matter to which she attaches high importance, her advice must be followed. The acceptance of British advice in such circumstances is the return paid by the State for the advantages which British protection confers. British rights in this respect were explicitly stated in the recent ultimatum which was presented by you to the Sheikh on the 24th February, 1905, in compliance with instructions. Further, if British advice must be accepted, it follows that action in contravention of it, whether it takes the form of vacillation, of bad faith, or of open contumacy, cannot be tolerated, the Protecting Power being the judge of the manner in which it will prohibit, reprimand, or punish such action.

(4.) The British paramountcy in Bahrein is commercial as well as political in character. This follows partly as a consequence of political predominance, but still [illegible] the case of Bahrein, from the undisputed commercial predominance of Great [illegible] the islands and ports of the Persian Gulf.

[illegible] of Great Britain in Bahrein has given her not merely a [illegible] preference in the succession. It was at the [illegible] eldest son. She holds herself [illegible] bank it [illegible] already assumed.

(5.) The case of the Customs may be brought within the prerogative of the Protecting Power, under more than one of the above-named heads, according to the point of view from which it is regarded. Originally the appointment of a British Customs officer was advocated by British Residents in the Gulf as a mark of British authority. Then it was recommended in the interests of the Sheikh and the [illegible] his son, whose future position our recognition of his claims to the succession required us to safeguard. Whichever of these views be adopted, the insistence of Great Britain upon the measure may be regarded as an illustration of the advice which, in virtue of her general controlling authority she deems it necessary to give, and which the Sheikh is not at liberty permanently to disregard.

6. The above are, in the opinion of the Government of India, approximately the limits of our Protectorate, so far as it has as yet been developed. It follows from this that for none of the claims put forward by the Political Agent is there any justification, and that he should not attempt to apply interference or pressure in the various forms which he suggests with a view to forcing the Sheikh to adopt premature reforms,

but that he should devote himself to the business of acquiring the confidence of the Ruler. Instructions in this sense should be given to Captain Prideaux, with a view to his building up a position which will enable him to tender advice for the gradual amelioration of the internal administration. The one point upon which the Government of India are compelled at the present stage to offer authoritative advice is that of Customs reform, which, after the previous declarations made to Sheikh Esa on the subject, is not a matter which can be allowed to rest until the Chief chooses to take action. On this matter they are prepared to await your advice as to the manner in which, and the moment when, a communication should be made to Sheikh Esa, and it will be for you to consider whether the best course would not be to have a frank explanation with the Chief, and to let him know that his dependence upon the British Government is not consistent with the permanent disregard of the advice so frequently tendered to him in this matter, advice which, when thus seriously repeated, must be regarded as possessing the authoritative character referred to in the ultimatum presented to him in February last.

I have, &c.
(Signed)
Officiating Secretary to the Government of India.

No. 24

Memorandum communicated to M. Geoffray, October 24, 1905.

ON the 18th September last a communication was addressed to the French Minister regarding the situation created by the Muscat Arbitration Award, in which His Majesty's Government agreed to the proposal made by the French Government that the *status quo* should be maintained at Muscat pending the return of M. Lamonce.

His Majesty's Government understand that M. Lamonce will shortly arrive at his [illegible] Majesty's Consul should be authorized to confer in a friendly manner as to the steps to be taken locally for carrying out the provisions of the Award.

His Majesty's Government would therefore propose, for the consideration of the French Government, that the British and French Consuls at Muscat should be instructed to concert together (1) as to the best method of making known the [illegible] tion to the subjects of the Sultan, and (2) as to the drawing up of a list of the subjects of the Sultan who are still entitled to fly the French flag. The result of this conference should be referred by the two Consuls to their respective Governments for approval.

[illegible] French Government agree to this proposal, instructions will be sent to M. [illegible]

No.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir F. Bertie.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October 25, 1905.*

I GAVE the French Ambassador to-day a Memorandum running as follows upon the subject of the Muscat arbitration:

"On the 18th ultimo a communication was addressed to the French Minister regarding the situation created by the Muscat Arbitration Award, in which His Majesty's Government agreed to the proposal made by the French Government that the *status quo* should be maintained at Muscat pending [illegible] of M. Lamonce.

His Majesty's Government understand that M. Lamonce will shortly arrive at his [illegible] if he has not already done so, and they consider it very desirable that he and His [illegible] Consul should be authorized to confer in a friendly manner as to the steps to [illegible] necessary for carrying out the provisions of the Award.

His Majesty's Government would therefore propose, for the consideration of the French Government, that the British and French Consuls at Muscat should be instructed to concert together (1) as to the best method of making known the results of the arbitration to the subjects of the Sultan, and (2) as to the drawing up of a list of the subjects of the Sultan who are still entitled to fly the French flag. The result of

this Conference should be referred by the two Consuls to their respective Governments for approval.

"If the French Government agree to this proposal, instructions will be sent to Major Grey accordingly."

I am, &c.
(Signed) LANSDOWNE

No. 26

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 27.)

Sir, *India Office, October 25, 1905.*

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Brodrick to invite the attention of the Marquess of Lansdowne to the telegram from the Viceroy of the 16th instant, stating that the instructions which they propose should be issued to Major Grey, the Political Agent at Muscat, with a view to giving effect to the Award of the Arbitration Tribunal on the question of the grant of the French flag to Muscat dhows.

Mr. Brodrick will be glad to be favoured with the views of Lord Lansdowne on the instructions which the Government of India propose should be issued.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY

No. 27.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October [illegible].*

I AM directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 25th instant forwarding papers received from the Government of India, relative to the instructions which they propose to issue for the future guidance of the Political Agent at Muscat.

Lord Lansdowne concurs in the terms of the reply which Mr. Secretary Brodrick proposes to return to the Government of India on this subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON

No. 28

M. Cambon to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received October 28.)

M. le Marquis, *Londres, le 25 Octobre, 1905.*

M. GEOFFRAY avait fait connaître au Gouvernement Français, d'après les indications contenues dans la note de votre Seigneurie en date du 18 Septembre, que le Gouvernement [illegible] proposée par M. Rouvier pour l'application de la Sentence arbitrale relative aux boutriers Muscatais. M. le Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, vient de me prier d'annoncer à votre Seigneurie qu'il a donné au Consul de France à Muscate [illegible] sur la décision arbitrale.

M. Rouvier me charge, toutefois, d'ajouter qu'au cas où l'enquête effectuée actuellement par les autorités Coloniales et Consulaires Françaises sur le statut personnel des boutriers Français établirait que certains de ces indigènes peuvent [illegible] revendiquer la qualité de Français, ils devront jouir du bénéfice de l'Article III du Traité de 1844. Des indications précises et individuelles seraient [illegible] le Muscate qu'au Gouvernement Britannique.

J'ai transmis à M. Rouvier la note que votre Seigneurie m'a remise hier au sujet des instructions qui devraient être envoyées à nos Agents pour les inviter à s'entendre en vue de la mise à exécution de la Sentence arbitrale.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) PAUL CAMBON.

No. 29

Sir N. O'Conor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 736.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, October 24, 1905.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, [illegible] the Military Attaché of this Embassy, reporting the capture of Zafr and the military operations taking place in the Yemen.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 29

Colonel Surtees to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 54.)
Sir, *Constantinople, October 20, 1905.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that a telegram bearing date the 17th instant has been received from F. M. Ahmed Feizi Pasha, the Acting Vali and Commandant of the Yemen, to the effect that after a continuous bombardment of the castle known as Zafr for some seventy-two hours, an assault delivered in three columns by the Ottoman troops on the night of the 16-17th October was completely successful, the castle being taken and one third of the rebel garrison killed or wounded.

The position of the castle is described as being an exceedingly strong one, and in 1890 it underwent a siege of nine months.

In conclusion, the Pasha states that the whole Kaza of Haya has now been [illegible] of rebels, and that as the Taiz and Sanaa columns have effected a junction [illegible] returning forthwith to Sanaa with a view to commencing operations in Jebel Sheban and Sonde.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. CONYERS SURTEES
Colonel, Military Attaché.

No. 30

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir N. O'Conor.

No. 301.
Sir, *Foreign Office, October [illegible].*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 301 of the 12th ultimo, forwarding particulars of the most recent outrage committed in the Persian Gulf by the [illegible] Alamel bin-Selman, I transmit herewith copies of letters from the India Office enclosing further correspondence received from the Government of India on the subject.

I should be glad to learn whether your Excellency has received any reply to your latest representation in regard to this question.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

No. 31

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October 31, 1905.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 25th instant, I am directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to state for the information of the Secretary of State for India, that he has had under his consideration the telegram from the Government of India of the 16th instant, relative to the instructions which they propose to issue to His Majesty's Consul at Muscat with a view to giving effect to the recent Arbitration Award.

It appeared to Lord Lansdowne desirable that an understanding should first be

* Nos. 5 and 21.

arrived at with the French Government in the matter, and, on the 25th instant, his Lordship communicated a Memorandum to the French Ambassador in London, proposing that the British and French Consuls at Muscat should be instructed to concert together (1) as to the best method of making known the results of the Arbitration to the subjects of the Sultan, and (2) as to the drawing up of a list of the subjects of the Sultan who are still entitled to fly the French flag. The result of the conference to be referred by the two Consuls to their respective Governments for approval. A copy of this Memorandum is inclosed herewith.*

Lord Lansdowne would suggest, for Mr. Brodrick's consideration, that no action should be taken on the Viceroy of India's telegram of the 16th instant, pending the receipt of a reply from the French Government.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

No. 32

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 1.)

(Confidential.)

Admiralty, October 27, 1905

Sir,

WITH reference to previous correspondence, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners [illegible] to transmit herewith, for the information of Marquess of Lansdowne, copy of a report which has been received from the Officer Commanding His Majesty's ship "Fox," on the subject of his recent proceedings at Hodeidah.

I am, &c.
(Signed) C. I. THOMAS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 32

Captain Eustace to Admiralty.

"Fox" at Hodeidah, October 2, 1905

Sir,

IN accordance with Article 2026 of King's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions, I have the honour to transmit direct, for the earliest information of their Lordships, the duplicate of my report of proceedings at Hodeidah, undertaken in accordance with Admiralty telegram of the 24th September, 1905.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. B. EUSTACE, *Captain,*
Senior Naval Officer, Aden Division.

Inclosure 2 in No. 32

Captain Eustace to Rear-Admiral Pod

"Fox," at Hodeidah, October 7, 1905

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that, in compliance with Admiralty telegram of the 24th September, 1905, I proceeded to Hodeidah, and on the 26th held a consultation with Mr. G. A. Richardson, His Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul here.

A summary of the official correspondence on the subject of the piratical attack and destruction of the British sambok "Alwani" on the 16th June, 1905, is inclosed. I also gathered that not only did the local authorities refuse justice, but that they would not obey the orders given to them by the Sublime Porte.

To emphasise my demands, no troops were allowed to land from the steam-ship "Recon" until our terms were dealt with. This had an immediate effect upon the military Pashas, who virtually control Yemen and ignore the civil authorities. After twelve hours' delay these troops were permitted to land.

An exchange of complimentary visits with his Excellency Hifzi Pasha, the

* Not printed.

Governor of Hodeidah district (which includes the territories of the Zaranikha and Karashans) was made, and I then called formally to present the following terms:

1. Compensation

[illegible] ing to Nakhoda and

[illegible]

At the request of the Resident, Aden, a further claim for 490*l.*, by Shereef Mahomed Hasan Rifai, a British subject and merchant at Aden, for the value of his cargo in the "Alwani," was then presented. This action has since been approved by His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople.

[illegible] e district on of all piratical boats between Hodeidah and Ras Mateina, belonging to Zaranikha or Karashans.

3. An assurance in writing that the culprits, who are well known locally, will be arrested and punished as soon as possible.

The first part of the compensation, viz., 5,717 dollars, was then paid.

The particulars of the expedition to seize the pirates' boats, as detailed by his Excellency Fuzi Pasha, Vali of Yemen, were then discussed. My opinion that 100 troops were insufficient was replied to by Commodore Arif Bey that his gun-boats could go close to the shore and prevent losses; and as his opinion was backed by Hussni Bey, Chief of Gendarmerie and Officer in Military Command, I waived my objection.

An assurance in writing was then given to His Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul that within two months the culprits will be arrested and punished. He also informed me that these pirates have committed further piracies on Turkish vessels, and that he will certainly see this order is carried out.

On the 28th, at 9 A.M., his Excellency Hifzi Pasha returned my visit, and was [illegible] Majesty's ship "Fox" with thirteen guns.

[illegible] the 28th Commodore Arif Bey left for Khor Ghuleifaka in the T[illegible] with the "Galata" gun-boat, the two big s[illegible] of the khor [illegible] W[illegible] M[illegible] on [illegible] proceed[illegible] boats, manned and armed, to co-operate with the Turkish forces. At 7 A.M., finding [illegible] pirates were rapidly removing their boats before the Turks could reach them, we pushed ahead and captured one sambok off Nigara.

When 400 yards from Taif rifle fire was opened upon our boats. We then fell back, and piloted the Turkish gun-boat "Galata" near enough to enable her to use machine-guns. The pirates then retreated, and the Turkish sailors and soldiers landed and seized four boats.

The "Galata," with Lieutenant Wolfe Murray in a cutter, with thirty troops in a sambok were then sent to remove the boats off Nigara. They captured five after some opposition.

The "Colzu" with the remainder of the force meanwhile had endeavoured to reach Ghuleifaka, but was forced to anchor 5 feet from the head of the khor owing to shallow water.

At dawn on the 30th the flotilla weighed and proceeded, but the "Colzu" could only advance 1,000 yards and the "Galata" 2,500 yards. The "Fox's" steam- and pulling-boats then towed the Turkish troops in two big sambuks through a narrow and shallow channel that was found on the west side of the khor. The deeper channel on the east side is commanded by the low hills (60 feet to 100 feet) covered with trees and scrub.

* Not printed.

When within 800 yards of Ghuleifaka (10·30 A.M.) rifle fire commenced; our pulling-boats were then withdrawn to 1,200 yards. They then formed line, in a north-easterly to south-westerly direction, on the western flank of the Turks.

The steam-cutter was then placed on the "lee" side of the leading sambok, and I prepared to tow the soldiers into close action, or to land them on the flank of the village.

The Military Officer Commanding, Hussni Bey, Chief of Gendarmerie, then begged to be taken out of action; he produced orders in Turkish, which, he said, forbade any serious fighting, and required him to return to report if he found Ghuleifaka too strongly held.

Seeing that our forces were inadequate, while the Turkish troops were panic-stricken and their officers useless afloat, I was forced to withdraw.

Ghuleifaka lies on the eastern side of the khor, and could not be effectively shelled from seaward by a ship, owing to mirage and the range. The strong southerly winds now prevailing, and heavy seas, also the unsurveyed nature of the adjacent waters, render it unsafe to anchor in less than 5 fathoms.

The attack on Ghuleifaka must therefore be by land, with a small contingent of light boats able to operate inside the khor, an operation well within the [illegible] of the garrison and naval forces stationed at Hodeidah, from which it is [illegible] by land, with frequent watering-places or wells [illegible].

The troops in the "Colan" being short of water and demoralized, on my advice Commodore Arif Bey ordered the return of the expedition to Hodeidah.

On the 1st October, the authority to press the further claim of 800*l.* having arrived, I did so, and gave his Excellency twenty-four hours in which to comply, pointing out that the transports "Mecca" and "Khamil Pasha" are still in the roadstead, while two more troopers with troops are due shortly.

His Excellency, who fears any responsibility, tried to refer authority for this [illegible] local pirates. Eventually, under pressure, it was paid, as was also a further amount for the piracy on the "Fath-al-Bahari," off Ras Muteina, about the 20th July.

The failure of the expedition to capture or destroy the pirates' boats was then discussed.

The incompetency and cowardice of Hussni Bey was also reported.

I also requested that Seyyid Sherai Pasha, Mayor of Hodeidah, and contractor to the Turkish troops in Yemen, should be ordered off to His Majesty's ship "Fox" as my guest until the conclusion of the operations against Zaranikhs. My reason was that this Pasha had sent a letter to the Chief of Zaranikhs warning him to withdraw all his boats, also giving particulars of the expedition, and advising him to raise the tribes to kill the British Consul. The Zaranikhs sent him 150 camels for transport purposes on the 30th.

Being contractor to the Turkish troops in Yemen, Seyyid Ahmed Pasha has to keep on intimate terms with all Arab tribes, and does this by giving them a timely warning of any operations.

His Excellency Hifzi Pasha, who lives in this traitor's house, and lately received a valuable Arab horse as a present, would believe no evil of him. My information was through Ali, naval interpreter, who knows Hodeidah well, and was also confirmed by business friends of the British Consul. It was also admitted by his Excellency's Confidential Secretary, Khalid, who also warned his Excellency the previous day of this treachery.

His Excellency objected to the dispatch of reinforcements without the sanction of the Commander-in-chief, now eight days' distant in the interior. Eventually, after a long conference with Commodore Arif and Hussni Bey, he promised that within four days further troops would be sent.

The "Colan," with 100 men, and an armed cutter, under Lieutenant Wolfe Murray, was then sent to blockade the khor and seize any boats they could. Her departure on the 2nd October was delayed four hours by Ahmed Pasha, General Officer Commanding Troops, Hodeidah, who throughout has proved a litigious and obstructive person.

As the Commodore wanted to withdraw the "Galata" from these operations, Mr. Nicholas, gunner, and seven men were sent to her to stiffen the crew and prevent their bolting. The "Galata" was then sent to strengthen the blockade in Khor Ghuleifaka.

On the 5th I left at 7 A.M., in His Majesty's ship "Fox," with Commodore Arif

Bey, Suleiman Hafiz, late Kaimakam of Zebid, also Nafi Bey, of the gendarmerie, to [illegible] and destroy the pirates' boats between Ras Muteina and Majemala.

The "Galata," with despatches, was met 5 miles south of Hodeidah. Lieutenant Wolfe Murray reported that fighting had occurred on the 3rd and 4th while seizing [illegible] boats had proved sufficient. He [illegible] Galata," for landing under a heavy [illegible] ned fire upon the gun-boats, which they returned, and then shifted berths. There had been no casualties afloat. The fire of a Maxim in our cutter had undoubtedly saved the lives of the Turkish sailors who landed with Captain Asim.

Commodore Arif and myself then visited the khor and arranged for further operations. We then proceeded in the "Galata," with thirty Turkish troops and a big sambok, to rejoin the "Fox" at Majemala. His Majesty's ships "Fox" and "Galata" then proceeded to Ras Muteina. Signal fires upon the hills and along the shore were observed, showing that the tribes were on the alert.

At 5 A.M. on the 7th the "Galata," with troops, and all boats manned and armed, visited Rokka, 8 miles south of Muteina, and then steamed near to the shore to the northward, while the "Fox" kept as close as practicable.

When near Fasa (Ras Zalok) rifle fire was opened upon the Turkish officials [illegible] overhauling the sambok "Motassahil," belonging to the Chief of the [illegible] As she had evidently just landed a cargo of arms (an arm chest with [illegible] bullet was found in her), at the request of Commodore Arif I ordered [illegible] To prevent casualties, fire from "Fox's" boats was opened, for owing to [illegible] Galata" could not effectively help us.

Subsequent information at Hodeidah showed that this sambok "Motassahil" is a well-known gun-runner. When searching her the Turkish officials with me told the interpreter not to report or see any of the evidence of gun-running. I, however, personally assisted, so they were unable to deny the facts I pointed out.

Over the Turkish Custom-house at Fasa an Arab flag was seen, and I hear that the Turkish official was driven away after being robbed about a year ago.

It is near this place that the piracy on the "Fath-al-Bahari" occurred about the 20th July, 1905.

Except one able seaman in the galley, who was grazed by a bullet across his shoulders, no one was hit.

Until these tribes are reduced to order by the Turks, it will be unsafe to land, and no dhows should anchor near the shore.

The local Habja fishermen use rafts, several of which were seen, but they were not molested by the expedition. Suleiman Hafiz, late Kaimakam of this district for [illegible] me that these pirates are not due to these fishermen, but are [illegible] land tribes, who visit the coast to procure arms, and, when there, [illegible] to commit piracy upon any sambok anchored near the shore. The fearlessness with which these fishermen came close to us and continued their fishing showed that they had not the guilty fears which induced the Zaranikhs in Khor [illegible]faka to fly whenever we approached.

No sambuks or canoes were seen anywhere upon this exposed section of the coast. It is highly possible that, being small, they have been carried inland and [illegible] require a very considerable military force on shore.

Commodore Arif Bey informs me that all Turkish gun-boats in the Red Sea are in urgent need of repairs, that he has made repeated representations to Constantinople. In consequence, the "Mecca," "Galata," and "Pera" have done no patrol work, although of a type well suited for this duty in these waters, and there has been no check to the piracies of the Zaranikhs and Kamahas.

After a few trifling repairs to stop leaks, the "Galata" has proved an efficient boat for all the services that we required. I am sure that with capable officers a great deal could have been done to avert these piracies, and also to stop the smuggling of arms into Yemen.

[illegible] only by associating them with British officers and seamen that any results have been achieved.

His Excellency Shakir Pasha, Field Marshal, for reforms in Yemen, arrived at Hodeidah from the interior *en route* to Macedonia on the 7th. After two

extremely cordial interviews, he acceded to my request that the twenty-six captured boats should be burnt, and not disposed of locally.

Any further captures of pirates' boats is now out of the question, without a considerable force to search the date-groves and hills on the coast.

The dispatch of troops to bring South-west Yemen under effective Turkish control has been settled, and they will probably start within two months. When this takes place, the capture of the pirates' boats near Ghuleifaka will not be overlooked, nor the punishment of the culprits and their friends at Hodeidah.

An intercepted letter from the Zaranikhs at Taif to Seyyid Ahmed Sherat Pasha, reporting the "piratical" seizure of their boats on the 29th and 30th by Turks and British, &c., was shown to his Excellency in further proof of the treachery of the Turkish contractor.

His Excellency Shakir Pasha was most grateful for my information upon the arms traffic and smuggling of arms now going on into Yemen. Upon my showing him a telegram from Perim of the 6th October, with the names of two dhows carrying [illegible] the "Galata" to endeavour to capture them.

His Excellency fully agrees that by the use of patrol-boats to stop the smuggling of arms and ammunition all piracies will cease, and has ordered both the "Colne" and "Galata" to be detailed for this duty.

Two other old outstanding claims against the Turkish Government were then adjusted.

[illegible]

I would also mention Khalid Bey, the Permanent Confidential Secretary to the Governor of Hodeidah, who has evinced no obstructive spirit, but has helped us in many ways by his tact and local knowledge.

Unless one examined every detail and checked every statement made by Turkish officials in Yemen no real progress was possible.

My thanks are due to the officers of this ship for their zealous co-operation [illegible] Mr. G. A. Richardson, for his local knowledge and assistance.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. B. EUSTACE, *Captain,*
Senior Naval Officer, Aden Division.

No. 33

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received November 3.*)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosure in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 12th October, relative to the conveyance of the Hasa post.

India Office, November 2, 1905.

Inclosure in No. 33

Major Cox to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Bushire, October 2, 1905.*

THE Consul at Bussorah telegraphs:—

"The following has been sent to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople:—

"No. 32. I am informed that the Vali has [illegible] with the Sheikh of Koweit for conveying the Hasa post overland through Koweit. It is stated

that the Sheikh has granted all facilities, and that the contractor will be established as an Ottoman postal official at Koweit. I have informed Bushire."

The Senior Naval Officer has proceeded to Koweit to ascertain the facts of the case and to interview the Sheikh on my behalf. I will report the result of his inquiries.

No. 34

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received November 3.*)

IN continuation of this Office letter of to-day's date, the Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosure in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 12th October, relative to the conveyance of the Hasa mails.

India Office, November 2, 1905.

Inclosure in No. 34

Government of India to Secretary of State.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Persian Gulf, October 5, 1905.*

I HAVE to report as follows in continuation of my covering telegram, dated the 2nd October, 1905:

The Senior Naval Officer has had a satisfactory interview with Sheikh Mubarak, who was quite frank.

The Sheikh asserts that he refused all connection with the Turkish post, and emphatically denies slightest intention of allowing any Turkish official to be established in connection therewith.

My personal opinion is that statements of Mr. Crow's informer are quite unreliable, and that Sheikh Mubarak, whom I see frequently, has given us no reason up to date to doubt his good faith.

(Repeated to His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Bussorah.)

No. 35.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received November 4.*)

Sir, *India Office, November 3, 1905.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 31st ultimo, on the subject of the Muscat Arbitration Award, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Brodrick to forward herewith, for the information of the Marquess of Lansdowne, copy of a telegram which has been sent to the Viceroy, informing his Excellency of the proposals which have been made to the [illegible]

I am, &c.

(Signed) HORACE WALPOLE.

Inclosure in No. 35.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *October 31, 1905.*

OUR telegram of the 16th instant as to instructions to His Majesty's Consul at Muscat in regard to arbitration.

His Majesty's Government have proposed to French Government that instructions should be sent to Grey and Laronce to confer together, and to report to their respective Governments for approval the results of their conference, on the following subjects.

viz. :—(1) The best method of making known to subjects of the Sultan the results of the Arbitration; and (2) the compilation of a list of subjects of the Sultan who are still entitled to fly the French flag.

Instructions in this sense will be sent to Grey if the above proposal is accepted by the French Government.

No. 36

Sir N. O'Conor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 762. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 31, 1905.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 136 of the 1st instant, reporting the impending arrival of a party of German engineers at Koweit, I have the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship copy of a confidential despatch which I have received from Mr. Crow, British Consul at Bussorah, reporting on the present state of affairs at Koweit generally, and the present attitude of Sheikh Mubarek towards Great Britain.

While it would be well to discount a good deal of what is stated in this confidential report, there would still appear reason to desire the return of the British Resident to Koweit at as early a date as possible.

I have, &c.

(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure 1 in No. 36

Consul Crow to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 63. Confidential.)

Sir, *Bussorah, September 30, 1905.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a report of a confidential nature which I have received regarding the affairs of Koweit, dealing with the alleged arrangements for a postal service between Bussorah and Hassa viâ Koweit, and the establishment of an Ottoman postal official at Koweit. The report also draws attention to the proposed visit of German engineers to make a railway survey, and to the Sheikh of Koweit's growing Anglophobe tendencies.

I have sent a copy to Bushire.

(Signed) F. E. CROW.

Inclosure 2 in No. 36

Report respecting the Affairs of Koweit.

AFTER some communication with the Vali the Sheikh of Koweit has guaranteed the safety of the Turkish post from Bussorah to Koweit and from Koweit to Hassa. He seems to have said that he is quite ready to give any help the Turks may require. The contractor for the post intends taking the post from Koweit to Hassa by motor carriages, but awaits the Vali's consent to this. At present arrangements are made to carry the post by camel. In fact, everything is ready, and he only awaits the return of the Vali's messenger from Hassa to start. The post contractor now takes the post by sea. When the post contractor presented the letters of the vilayet to Mubarek, the latter is stated to have said that he was very glad to make it easy for the post to Hassa, and that as he belonged to the Turkish dominions he was in every way bound to serve and obey the Sultan rather than another. The contractor was instructed by the Vali to remain at Koweit as a Turkish official. His name is Ali.

Sheikh Mubarek proposes to levy harbour dues on all steamers anchoring at Koweit. The Sheikh was quite annoyed at seeing them there. The Sheikh has increased the customs duty and the tax on property to enable him to pay off the English loan and to free himself. When the "Redbreast" visited Koweit on her way to Bussorah, the son

of Mubarek seems to have said that, as there was no Consul or anybody else there, what business had the man-of-war to come. Did they do so in order to inquire about the arrangements for the post with the Turks?

Mubarek's Turkish flag is only hoisted when any steamer is in sight, and lowered when it leaves. Otherwise the flag is not flown.

The Sheikh has given express orders against Koweitis engaging themselves as servants to the English.

It is said in Koweit that the Russian line of steamers will touch there.

People going to purchase skins and hides in Koweit speak of the Russian goods being cheaper than the English.

Since the Sheikh's visit to Sheikh Khasal of Mohammerah, and since the Bahrein incident, Mubarek seems to be dead against the English, and does not speak well of them.

There is a native agent for the German firm of Vankos [sic] there. This firm has agents in Bahrein, Lingah, and Bushire. It is said they will give their goods to the German African line, which, it is alleged, will come up the Gulf some day. At present some German engineers are expected in Koweit from Bombay, and a servant of theirs has actually arrived to make arrangements for their stay there. The engineers will apparently come to inquire into the possibilities of building a railway.

There is a man named Khachuk, an Armenian, agent for Messrs. [illegible] and Co. This man is taking a lead in giving news to Koweit people, and is always against the English and favourable to the Russians. He takes papers into the coffee-house. [illegible] Armenian paper. He is in correspondence with Zaytoun at Bushire, an Armenian, who in turn communicates with the Customs at Bushire. The agent, Khachuk, is much occupied in writing to him and to other places. Two of his letters were seized by Mubarek and sent to Bunder Abbas for translation.

Haji Ali, the agent for Goguyer, the Russian spy, also gets and supplies information, and spends a lot of money over it. He sends his reports to Muscat, and Goguyer himself is expected in Koweit shortly.

Mathoo Effendi, the dismissed dragoman of the Consulate, has, it appears, asked Mubarek to write to Lord Curzon to take him back into the English service, and promises to give Mubarek all information he requires.

No. 37

Sir N. O'Conor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 763. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 31, 1905.*

I HAVE been confidentially informed that the Ottoman Government has been instructed to make representations to your Lordship concerning the construction of a hospital at Lahaj and a "military" road from Aden, along the coast, to the [illegible] ment that a high Indian official has recently visited Aden to confer with the Resident.

I venture to think that, if Musurus Pasha should be held enough to act on these instructions, it is desirable that he should be given [illegible] the internal arrangements which the Government of India may think it advisable to make in the Nine Cantons are matters which are in no way the concern of the Porte.

I have, &c.

(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

No. 38

Sir N. O'Conor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received November 6.)

(No. [illegible])

My Lord, *Therapia, October [illegible], 1905.*

With reference to my despatch No. 699 of the [illegible] the appointment of Mr. Grand Secretary to the Embassy at Vienna, I have the honour to transmit to your

Lordship copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Jeddah, reporting that Ali Pasha, who has been temporarily acting as Grand Shereef, has now been definitely appointed to the office

The rival candidate for the Grand Shereefate and the next in the line of succession was Abdullah Pasha, the uncle of the present nominee, reported to be a pious and somewhat fanatical Moslem, who resides at Constantinople, but of whom otherwise little is known.

[illegible] as far as our present information goes, would seem to be the better [illegible] judging by the action which he has taken in reinstating the Mutawaf or Representative at Mecca of the Cape Mussulman pilgrims who had been dismissed from that office by the late Emir, and from other indications, there are reasons for thinking that his attitude in matters affecting British interests will not be of an unfriendly character

I have, &c
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR

Inclosure in No. 38

Consul Devey to Sir N. O'Conor

(No. 108.)

Sir, *Jeddah, October 15, 1905*

I HAVE the honour to report the nomination of Shereef Ali Pasha to the Amarat-i-Jelile, while the rank of Vizier has been bestowed upon his Highness. His Excellency the Vali will be leaving for Mecca in about a week's time, and in due course the two Firmans will be read in the precincts of the Haram-i-Shereef

I believe this appointment is giving universal satisfaction

I have, &c
Signed) G. P. DEVEY

No. 39

Sir N. O'Conor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 708.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 31, 1905.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of a despatch which has been forwarded to me by His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Hodeida, recording the proceedings of His Majesty's ship "Fox" on her recent visit to that place in connection with the demands of His Majesty's Government for compensation for the piracy committed on the British sambuk "Alwani."

I think that Mr. Vice-Consul Richardson's conduct throughout this affair is deserving of commendation, and I am sure that he would highly appreciate an expression of your Lordship's approval.

I have, &c
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR

Inclosure in No. 39

Vice-Consul Richardson to Consul Devey.

(No. 122.)

Sir, *Hodeida, October 9, 1905.*

I HAVE [illegible] report [illegible] of His Majesty's ship "Fox" to Hodeida in connection with the demands of His Majesty's Government with [illegible] by Zereneek Arabs, and dealt with in my despatches to you, Nos. 83 and 103 of this year

Repeated representations made by this Vice-Consulate to the vilayet for compensation [illegible] the inadmissible delay on the part of the authorities to execute the terms of the Imperial Iradé issued last month, His Majesty's Ambassador informed me, on the 25th ultimo, that it had been decided to send His Majesty's ship "Fox" to Hodeida.

Further, that the Commander of the vessel had received orders to confer with me on arrival.

His Excellency's instructions to me were that our demands should be framed on the following lines:—

1. Compensation for the loss of the British vessel, and for the money and effects robbed from its crew, &c., and

2. Seizure without delay and destruction of all boats belonging to the Zereneek Arabs that were generally utilized for piratical purposes.

I was also authorized to obtain an assurance that the culprits concerned in this outrage, who, there is reason to believe, are known to the authorities, would be arrested and punished, when a favourable opportunity presented itself for doing so

The "Fox" anchored in the roadstead on the afternoon of the 26th ultimo, and I proceeded on board immediately to interview the officer commanding

I proposed to Captain Eustace that we should present the demands of the British Government conjointly on the following afternoon, and if they were not accepted forthwith [illegible] as far as the [illegible] was concerned, which pressure I considered sufficient to meet the requirements of the case.

I was opposed on political grounds to the resort to such extreme measures as a bombardment of the town, although same was not suggested at all. The Turkish Government owns no property at Hodeida other than a brick structure, known as "the fort," and a few unimportant and dilapidated buildings. Three only demonstrations of this nature, afforded by the precedent of the Turco-Italian question regarding piracies in October 1902, are, in my opinion, an incentive to local fanaticism against all Europeans. The relations between natives and foreigners are most friendly in this district, and the former entertain a very high opinion of the British Government. A [illegible]ened bombardment would create an unnecessary panic and [illegible] whereas, if such were carried out, would not much affect the Ottoman Government [illegible] property, foreign subjects, and Britishers in particular, who own large interests [illegible] be the principal losers. Further, it would be unfair to punish the Arab population of this town for the misdeeds of their fellow-countrymen in other parts, with whom they are not in sympathy, or under circumstances for which the local Government is alone responsible

Early on the following morning I received an official communication from the Mutessarif stating that orders had at last been received from the Acting Vali to the effect that two Turkish armed vessels, the "Coslu" and the "Galata," were to be dispatched without delay to Ras Majemala to apprehend piratical boats. This was followed by a telegram to me from the Acting Vali informing me that, under orders from the Minister of the Interior, the claim for compensation submitted by the Vice-Consulate would be settled by the Hodeida Treasury.

In the meantime, to expedite compliance with our demands, and execution of the orders received from the Porte, pressure was applied by the "Fox" in the shape of refusal to allow troops to land from the transport "Mecca," that had just arrived.

At 6 A.M. His Majesty's ship saluted the port, which was returned from the shore.

Ceremonial visits were exchanged with the Governor and the Commodore of the Southern Red Sea Division.

The whole of question of this piracy was then discussed with Captain Eustace, to [illegible] to the utter disregard of the Yemen officials to our representations, and their misguided determination not to grant reparation. I had now ascertained the real facts of the occurrence at Ras Majemala, where the authorities had hitherto denied that an attack was committed on the British boat. It would appear that the two passengers, when questioned, gave in detail the true circumstances of the case, viz., that piracy had been perpetrated by Zereneek tribesmen. The local officials drew up false statements, purported to have been made by these two witnesses, who, though surprised when they were read out to them at the inquiry referred to in my despatch No. 103 of the 17th August, had no alternative but to admit the same.

At 3 o'clock we presented our demands together formally to the Mutessarif.

The claim for compensation for 3,717 Maria Theresa dollars (370*l.*) for the loss of the "Alwani," and incidental expenses, &c., was admitted forthwith, and I was invited to receive the amount, which I did on the 2nd instant.

The second claim for 400*l.* for the cargo that was pirated, the property of the Aden merchant, was mentioned by the Captain, who had brought details from the Aden Residency. The Governor contended that, as there had been no communication from the Consulate officially hitherto on the subject, it would be necessary to refer to Sana'a to [illegible] Pasha, the Inspector of Reforms in the vilayet. I pointed out that, although such was the case, the local officials were aware that the property in question was owned by a merchant in Aden. I produced a copy of the Petition that was addressed in June last by the claimant's father, to both the then Mutessarif and to Fezi Pasha, to bear out my contention. I agreed, however, to reserve this for subsequent discussion, as I had not yet received orders from His Majesty's Ambassador to press this claim.

Our other demand was for the apprehension of all craft lying between Hodeida and Ras Mutema, about 50 miles to the south, proved to belong to Zeroneck and Kurraiba Arabs. The latter were implicated in the piracy on the dhow "Patal Bahree" (see my despatch No. 114 of the 14th September last). The Governor promised that we should receive complete satisfaction on this point. When pressed for details, His Excellency stated that 100 troops under a Major and two junior officers, with [illegible] gendarmes, would embark on the armed vessel "Cozlu" [illegible] convenient, and, accompanied by the patrol-ship "Galata," would proceed down the coast to capture all piratical boats. The local Commandant of Gendarmes, Major Hussni Bey, would represent the Government, whereas the Commodore and Colonel Arif Bey, would supervise the naval operations.

We remarked that the force intended for the purpose was insufficient, as there was certain to be some resistance from the shore, in view of the fact that the local Government had never attempted hitherto to take punitive measures by this means against repeated acts of aggression on the part of these powerful and predatory tribesmen inhabiting the seaboard in the vicinity of Hodeida. On an assurance being given that the forces, naval and military, would suffice, we did not raise further objection.

I also received a verbal and later an official assurance in writing from the Mutessarif that it was intended to punish the Zeroneck tribe later on, and that the culprits concerned in the attack on the British vessel would be seized and brought to justice in the course of two months.

Having thus far received satisfaction, the troops on the "Mecca" were permitted to disembark at 4 p.m.

I embarked on the 28th afternoon on His Majesty's ship "Fox," that proceeded to the southern entrance of Ras Majemala with the object of intercepting boats trying to escape. She had to anchor about 10 miles from the shore.

It was arranged that the Turkish vessels and troops would operate from the northern entrance.

The next morning the captain and myself set out in the "Fox's" steam-launch, accompanied by two of her boats that were armed, to witness the Turkish operations, and to co-operate if necessary. Opposite a small village on the mainland, called Nejara, inhabited by Zeroneck pirates, a single sambouk that lay at anchor was captured by one of the British boats.

Shortly afterwards fire was opened on us from another adjacent village, Taif, where there were several boats and canoes. It was replied to by two Maxims and fifteen rifles. It was impossible to see the men on shore, who were hidden among low scrub and behind sand-heaps, and the damage done was not known. The "Galata," that had a British officer on board, now came up and shelled the Arabs on shore, compelling them to flee. Eight other boats lying near the shore were then secured by the Turkish vessel, three being from Nejara and five from the village of Taif. I am informed that pirates from the latter were implicated in the attack on the "Alwani."

The next day it was decided to effect captures of all boats at Khor Ghalefica, about 8 miles further south of the anchorage taken up by the Ottoman gun-boats during the night. The "Cozlu" and "Galata," owing to the shallow water in the khor (coral-reef formed), were unable to approach except to a distance of nearly 3 or 4 miles from the village that was situated amongst a grove of date palms.

The "Fox's" steam-cutter, with the two sambouks, conveying Turkish troops in tow, and accompanied by three other armed boats from the ship, proceeded up the khor in the direction of the village. When about 500 or 600 metres from the latter, fire was opened on us from the shore, and returned by the British Maxims and rifles, which partially silenced the shore. The Turkish troops were thrown into utter confusion and panic-struck, and did not fire a shot. This was mainly due to their officers not issuing orders, but who concealed themselves at the bottom of the boats. On remonstrating with Hussni Bey, the commander, the latter replied that his orders were not to

meet any attack from the shore, owing to the smallness of his force. He added that, in case of opposition offered from the shore, he was to return and report to the Mutessarif, who would, in that eventuality, march three or four battalions overland. He begged Captain Eustace to tow the two sambouks of troops out of the range of fire, which the latter was obliged to do.

Under the circumstances there was nothing to be done but to return to Hodeida with the ten prizes, and sound the authorities as to their intentions with reference to this strong piratical nest that we had struck, where there were many boats.

The "Fox," with the "Cozlu" and "Galata" and all troops, arrived the same evening at Hodeida, the latter for the purpose of taking in water and provisions.

Captain Eustace and myself called on the Mutessarif the next morning and complained of the cowardice of the officers and troops, and reported the neglect of the official deputed to carry out the instructions that we were given to understand were actually issued to him.

His Excellency denied that he had promised to send troops overland, or that the officer had orders not to return the fire from the shore, and produced a copy of the instructions issued.

A pressing demand was made by the captain that the village of Gonfica be punished for the attack on both the Turkish troops and British boats, and that all boats it harboured should be seized. It was pointed out that, owing to the Ottoman vessels being unable to approach near enough to cover the operations of the troops and boats by sea, it would be necessary to have recourse to the co-operation of troops by land.

Hussni Bey had estimated the strength of the Arabs on shore at about 5,000, although this estimate was much exaggerated. Captain Eustace considered that it would take about three battalions to cope with the situation.

It may be remarked that there were at this time more than six battalions of infantry and 250 cavalry lying idle at Hodeida, irrespective of some 1,500 troops that [illegible] Mutessarif proposed to communicate with the Porte and with Fezi Pasha, with reference to the movement of troops by land.

In the meantime, to expedite the action of the authorities, pressure was applied at sea by detaining the two Turkish transports.

The same evening, Sunday, the 1st, the "Cozlu" was again despatched to blockade Khor Ghalefica, taking with her the 100 soldiers that were sent on the first occasion. She was reinforced by the "Galata" and some gendarmes the following morning.

[illegible]

I took into consideration the fact that the local authorities, in making their demands with reference to the arrest of the piratical craft, apparently were not in a position to carry out the operation effectively on account of the insufficiency of their ships and men, and the incompetence of their officers intrusted to do so. Further, some satisfaction had already been obtained by the capture of ten boats, and now the Government settled the second claim of 400*l.* No inconvenience was therefore suffered by the "Kiamil Pasha." There was still the "Mecca" in port, which would afford a sufficient guarantee for the good faith of the local authorities.

Anticipating further delay, I proposed to the captain of the "Fox" that, pending the decision of the Commander-in-chief concerning further measures to be taken against Ghalefica, that the capture of boats between the latter place and Ras Mutema, [illegible] of our original programme, might be advantageously carried out in the [illegible] The "Cozlu," I added, might be left to blockade Ghalefica, while the "Galata," with the co-operation of His Majesty's ship, effect the captures along the coast. This was agreed to.

While steaming out on the 5th the "Galata" was met returning with three prizes. The Turkish vessels had shown greater activity than on the previous occasion, and had taken thirteen boats and canoes during the 3rd and 4th instant. They were exposed to heavy fire from the shore near Taif, but had suitably responded to the occasion, no doubt profiting from the example of the British blue-jackets.

The "Fox" fell in with a large dhow, that was suspected for arm-running, near Fara, the Arabs opening fire on our boats, but were soon dispersed by the "Galata." One canoe was taken by the "Cozlu" the same day, and a small sambouk by the "Galata" on the 6th instant, close to Nejara, opposite to Ras Majemala, bringing the total [illegible]

Though it is known that the Zerenecks own about thirty or forty sambouks and nearly 100 canoes, only ten in all were apprehended as the result of the first two days' work. Information had been sent to them, it is no secret locally, by Syyed Ahmed-es-Shirai Pasha, the President of the Municipality here and contractor for the troops in the Yemen, who is in a large measure responsible for Zereneck marauders being at large. Under the guise of assisting the Turks, by accompanying them on expeditions against these tribesmen, he actually sends secret information to the latter to serve his own ends.

The Chief Secretary to the Government at Hodeida, on learning of the secret intrigues of this wily Arab Pasha in the present case, brought the facts to the knowledge of the Mutessarif, representing that such reprehensible conduct on the part of Syyed Hamed-es-Shirai would create unpleasant complications. Later, I received news of the above effect from a confidential, but reliable, source, and so did Captain Eustace independently.

A letter from Arabs who had attacked the combined Turkish and British forces at Ghalefica was intercepted and brought to me, which goes to prove that the above-mentioned Pasha was in secret communication with pirates (they cannot be called by any other term), and was actually endeavouring to baffle the good intentions of his own Government.

We informed the Mutessarif, a friend of the Pasha's by the way, of the above facts, who promised to report the circumstances to the Acting Vali.

His Majesty's ship lay in the roadstead for two days more waiting for the dispatch of troops to Ghalefica that had been promised a week previously.

On Saturday morning, in company with Captain Eustace, I called on Shakir Pasha, the Inspector of Reforms in this vilayet, who had just arrived from Sana'a, *en route* to Constantinople.

We discussed [illegible] His Excellency [illegible], but that as the Commander-[illegible] in the interior some distance from the telegraph-line, this would require a little time.

Shakir Pasha thereupon wired to Fezi Pasha recommending the movement of four or five battalions.

After some consultation together, we decided to consider the present incident as far as the demands of the British Government were concerned, on the following terms—viz., a further assurance that the culprits would be apprehended and punished when the situation in the vilayet would allow of the same; secondly, that twenty-six piratical craft be destroyed by fire at Hodeida without delay; and thirdly that the troops already sent be kept at Ghalefica to execute further captures, and that the two Ottoman [illegible] patrol the coast for a similar purpose.

Shakir Pasha accepted our terms without reservation, and immediately issued categorical instructions for their compliance to the local authorities in the above [illegible].

His Excellency, appreciating the fact that we had materially assisted his Government in bringing the present question to a satisfactory and amicable conclusion, by patience and desisting from hampering its action by unreasonable demands, very [illegible]usly agreed to settle two important long-standing claims of British subjects presented to me. The settlement has since been carried out as arranged, and which I shall report on separately.

Captain Eustace placed his steam launch at the disposal of Shakir Pasha, and [illegible] his Excellency on board the "Mecca." A salute was fired by His Majesty's ship "Fox" in his Excellency's honour before the vessel weighed anchor, followed by another for the Ottoman flag.

His Majesty's ship sailed for Perim the same night (Saturday), having completed its mission most successfully and satisfactorily.

The piratical vessels, with other property captured, were burnt during the course of yesterday and to-day by the port officials with the attendance of my Dragoman.

The Turkish troops and vessels are still away, the latter cruising between Zebeed and Ras Majemais.

The amicable conclusion to the present incident, added to which the compliment paid to Shakir Pasha by His Majesty's ship "Fox," is considered most satisfactory.

Besides tending towards removal of the sting out of the unpleasantness caused by the visit of a British ship of war under the circumstances, it has, I can safely predict, helped to strengthen my position at Hodeida.

The Mutessarif has thanked me for my humble exertions in effecting so friendly a settlement mutually, and I am glad to say that I think that the events of the past ten [illegible]ed my relations with the Yemen officials.

[illegible] my best thanks are due to Captain Eustace for the valuable assistance received, and his hearty co-operation given in the negotiations with the local [illegible] the British naval officers and men who so ably and bravely assisted [illegible]ons by sea.

Khalid Bey, the Chief Secretary to the Mutessarifik, used his kind offices, and offered his local knowledge and experience to Hafi Pasha, the Governor, and to whom [illegible] is attributed for the success attained.

The Turkish Commodore, Colonel Arif Bey, afforded facilities to His Majesty's cruiser and to its Commander, and endeavoured to expedite the movements of the Turkish vessels.

I have, &c.
[illegible] G. A. RICHARDSON.

[illegible]

Sir N. O'Conor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(*Received November 6.*)

(No. 773. Most Confidential.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, October 31, 1905.*

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Beyrout, transmitting copy of a letter from the father of the Imam of Yemen to Mohammed Effendi Hariri, which alludes to the causes of the Yemen rising.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure 1 in No. 40.

Consul-General Drummond Hay to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 71. Most Confidential.)

Sir, *Beirout, October 28, 1905.*

WITH reference to private correspondence regarding affairs in Arabia, I have the honour to transmit to your Excellency herewith a translation of a letter from Mohammed Johia Hamid-ed-Din father of the present Imam of the Yemen, to Mohammed Effendi-el-Hariri, Mufti of Hamah.

I can vouch for the authenticity of the document, having obtained it through the medium of Faris Effendi Khouri, dragoman of the British Consulate at Damascus.

As the Constantinople post leaves to-morrow I have only time to inclose the original draft translation and a copy for transmission to the Foreign Office.

Although the letter is prosy and replete with quotations from the Koran, there are several passages of special interest, as coming from the pen of the father of the Imam who divulges to his correspondents the true origin and cause of the rising in the Yemen against the Turks.

I have &c.
(Signed) R. DRUMMOND HAY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 40.

Mohammed Johia Hamid-ed-Din to Mohammed Effendi-el-Hariri.

(Translation.) [*Undated.*]

THE victorious by Allah, Mohammed Bin Johia Hamid-ed-Din, my refuge and stay is Allah, and my success can only be through Allah.

In the name of the Clement and Merciful.

Oh, Allah! consolidate thy old Faith through the actively learned, and unveil through their blessed work the darkness of the ignorant, and lift up through their [illegible] endless seas of knowledge, and the brilliant stars that lead to faith, and the ornament of religion of this world and the one hereafter, as well as the possessors of abundant virtues, of whom is the Sheikh of exalted glory and noble pedigree, the garden of whose learning is luxuriantly fruitful, Saied Mohammed-el Hartri, in whose countenance beams the refulgent light of peace and exalted dignity. May Allah send down his prayer on Mohammed, the last of His prophets, on his family the ark of deliverance, and on the interpreters of the Book, and his adherents and supporters—as Suhaba and Anacy who followed him in his lifetime and after his death

We praise Allah, than whom none can be hoped in, or feared, or worshipped And there has reached us from you, oh, Saied, an esteemed letter nobly worded, and purely conceived, showing thy erudition in all that relates to the Prophet's pedigree and the Alsan lineage, as evidenced by Coranic texts and the vouches of tradition, and explaining that "the motives of affection led to this correspondence, and the promptings of brotherly love attracted you thereto," and that "the dictates of these things and the Faith require the counselling of brethren, especially the rulers to whom Allah intrusted the fate of his people;" and the said letter, may Allah bless it, goes on to say that what took place of strife and conflict between us and the Governors delegated by the Ottoman Government and the Imperial Throne was wrong, wherefore it suggested reconciliation, and the removal of all that may lead to war and the evils thereof, quoting the texts and ordinances of the Book to that effect, and further commenting that loyal submission and allegiance are due to the ruler of the people, and that the great Sultan was appointed by Allah to raise the standard of the Faith and consolidate the power of Islam; that he is honoured with the service of two sacred shrines, and has always performed the task of fighting the infidels and opposing the evildoers; and that, therefore, it was his desire to pacify the world [illegible] the Faith, and exterminate the corrupt aggressors; and, finally, that the Yemen Province, being guarded by Allah, and being the centre of the Faith, as recorded by our lord the descendant of Eduan, his object in all this was a religious counsel and the love of his Faith; to all of which we say in reply:

It is true that there has occurred all that you say between us and those that are connected with the supreme and virtuous Sovereign (may Allah through him exalt Islam, and extirpate the ignorant infidels). But our object was in no wise worldly [illegible], nor ultimate bodily comfort and luxury, nor do we rely on the hoarded [illegible] abundance of gain, nor aspire to more than we already possess of nobility of [illegible]; but we have seen that the officials were not giving Allah His due, nor respecting His laws nor those of the Prophets of Allah, but they have rather set up unto themselves a religion that was offensive to the sight of Allah and antagonistic to His laws, committing every kind of transgression, and leading to the participation therein all those of our people who came in contact with them, violating Allah by the drinking of wine, obscene relations with males, and every kind of fornication; they have oppressed the weak, insulted and degraded the noble, until posterity was corrupted, and the worst of the Jews and Christians rose high, and the Kurds and Ethiopians ruled the people They have discarded every regard for the faithful, and lost every feeling of benevolence and pity towards the Moslems. Therefore, seeing that the will of Allah was unavoidable, we have invoked His help, and putting our trust in Him, we began earnestly the fight, acting thus in accordance with the command of Allah the Most High, "And fight [illegible] there should be no more conflict, and the Faith remain for Allah alone [illegible]ing: "And let it be a nation calling unto righteousness and preaching [illegible] wrong, and these shall prosper," and His saying: "You were the best nation ever produced on earth, ordering good, and warning against evil;" and in fear of what Allah the Most High has threatened us with in His saying: "He cursed by the tongues of David, and Esau, the son of Miriam, the unbelievers through their transgressions. They would not refrain from evil, nor stop thereat, cursed be their doings." Also the saying of him on whom be the prayer and peace of Allah; "Thou shalt order good, and warn against evil," and "May Allah place over you the wicked among you, the good and righteous shall cry, but they shall not be heeded

And at the end thereof the letter argues in its own favour, and espouses its own cause. For we cannot too vitally believe that if the victorious Sovereign (may Allah thereby exalt Islam) were to be acquainted with those outrages, about the reality of which no one can differ, he would be moved by the noble zeal of the Faith and retrieve the past, and redress the wrong that has been committed against the Prophet's

descendants, without whom no intercession can be worthy. As it is, they—meaning the Government officials—get alienated more and more from the Faith, and indulge more grossly than ever in every form of vice

And if thou shouldest say, oh Saied, that these outrages are fearfully permitted to Islam, and that the commission thereof is allowed to the followers of the law of the Lord of Creation, yet none but the blind can assert this, and if thou shouldest deny, [illegible] Saied, that the heirs of the Prophet are themselves the evidence in essence and [illegible], the saying of the Most High cries to thee, "and we have bequeathed the Book to those whom we have chosen of our servants. Some of these have wronged themselves, [illegible] to follow, would never [illegible] people of my house. The All Kind and Omni[illegible] never separate even until the last day." And his saying (may the prayers, &c.): "The people of my house are peace unto the world" And his saying (may the prayers, &c. "The people of my house are as the Ark of Noah," and many other sayings which the present circumstance does not admit of quoting. Concrete reality is the best proof and leader to the right path, not what thou hast threatened us with, of slaughter and coercion, for we are the people of the house of the Prophet, who are not shaken and disheartened by frustrated hopes, and we do not consider the sacrifice of ourselves in the way of Allah, but as the noblest of virtues, and we dread naught but Him of the noble and awful countenance, and to Him alone do we turn ever at dawn and dusk

And my people consider death as the booty.
And flight from the foe as the worst indignity.
Will he who defeated you have victory without the Merciful?

The infidels are deluded, for if Allah be on your side none shall conquer you, and if he defeats you, who will grant you a victory after Him? "If you support Allah He will support you, and make firm your feet," "and we desire the help of those who had [illegible] them on the earth, will keep up prayers, make [illegible] people away from evil, and to Allah is the end [illegible]

[illegible] mission of our Lord is firm, and the end is for the pious. How dost find in our land but the faithful, bent on the worship of Allah when the night [illegible] its wings, or reading the Book of Allah when the dawn raises its sheet of light upon the world

Our places of worship are always full of men of learning and action, and our hearts are devoid of conceitedness, and do not know discomfiture. Still do we not boast as others do of the costly and fine appliances of war, or of training legions of soldiers, who, however, succumb under our onsets; but rather do we discard the pride of power [illegible] hug humbly to the sacred folds of the robe of the Imamet and the [illegible]

Saplings that throve on the soil of virt
Then blessed by the Prophets and Califs of Allah
Their banner is their column of dust upwards
High emblem of powerful protection and friendship.

We have exposed to thee, oh, Saied, our way as well as the [illegible] enemies: "Who of the two parties is deserving peace, if you know? [illegible] believed, and veiled not their faith with injustice, these have peace, and they are rightly led And if the great Sultan were to know the reality of things he would hasten to our assistance now and always and withdraw all his servants from the Yemen Province to [illegible] would forbid them to fight [illegible] part of the sacred person [illegible] holy ancestor, as ordained [illegible] of you," &c. And let not the saying of the last of the Prophets be applicable to him; "He who shall fight against us in latter days shall be as him who shall fight with the infidels." Nor the other saying of the Prophet "I am war to those whom you fight, and peace to those with whom you are at peace." And Allah has ordained that one should be on the side of the righteous by His saying "Oh, you who believe, fear Allah and be with the righteous." The believers are those who believe in Allah and His prophets, and who do not doubt, but have sacrificed their belongings and their persons in the way of Allah. Those who are the righteous say this

...y path, I call unto Allah with enlightened eyes and mind, I, and those who follow me. May Allah be praised, and I am not of those who include others than Allah in their worship. Oh, people, answer the call to Allah, and believe in Him. He will forgive you your sins and deliver you from eternal torture. And he who will not respond to the call unto Allah will be among the weak of the earth, for no other servant will he have ... or. "Oh, people, why do I call you to deliverance and you call me unto ... If thou dost see, oh, Saied, any escape from the commandments of Allah, ... Book ... d the law of the Prophet of Allah, and put aside fear and intimidation, for then the following saying would apply to the circumstances:

"A brother came with brandished sword,
Thy cousins, too, some swords possess."

As to union and solidarity based on truth, how are we to get that? It is the most ... and arresting the progress of evil, but we can only ask the Most High to turn away from the Mahommedan nation all those evils and trials, and cause it to rally round the Book and the House of the Prophet, intrusted with the message of Allah unto man, ... from the strifes and divisions of Satan the hateful.

May Allah be our only Guide, and blessed is such guidance. And it would have better behoved the great Sultan to consider the Yemen Province as one of the many provinces that he has left in the hands of the infidels, and which he has not since recovered.

But it is to the Yemen Provinces that we see them now hastening with arms, the province which lies in the hands of the children of the Prophet of Allah, who maintain therein the laws of Allah, and oppose the deeds that He has forbidden by His law. If they had only treated the people of the Prophet as the many infidels to whom they have abandoned their kingdoms.

Oh, Allah, I take Thee for witness, and Thou art an all-sufficient one.

No. 41

India Office to Foreign Office. (*Received November 7.*)

THE Under Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a Secret despatch to the Government of India dated the 3rd instant, relative to projects of railway construction in the Aden Hinterland.

India Office, November 6, 1905.

Inclosure in No. 41

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Secret.)

My Lord, *India Office, November ... 1905.*

MY attention has been drawn to the correspondence regarding railway construction in the Aden Hinterland, printed in the proceedings (railway projects) of the ... 1905. It is stated in Mr Fraser's letter to the Government of ..., 1905, that the Government of India are prepared to ... by proposals for the construction of a railway by private enterprise ... into the interior.

2. The subject, as the correspondence shows, involves many questions of policy which require careful consideration, including that of the responsibility for, and the measures necessary for, the protection of the line when laid. Apart from ... of policy, the conditions of any Concession, should the Sultan have the power to ... it, will require careful scrutiny. In these circumstances I request that I may be furnished with a statement of your views on the whole subject before any steps are taken in connection with the offers which may be received.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ST. JOHN BRODRICK.

No. 42

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 7...

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 9, 1905.*

M. GEOFFRAY called upon me to-day on behalf of the French Ambassador and stated that the communication which I had made to M. Cambon on the 24th ... as to the steps to be taken for carrying into effect the arbitral decision on the Muscat dhows question, had been duly submitted to M. Rouvier.

M. Rouvier had instructed the French Consul at Muscat to communicate to his British colleague, with the necessary explanations, the list of French protégés, as soon as completed, by means of the part ... which were shortly awaited from the ... Colombo and from Zanzibar. When the two officers had come to an agreement ... matter, the list would be forwarded to His Majesty's Government through the ...

M. Laroche had also been directed to concert with Major Grey as to the best means of bringing the results of the arbitration to the knowledge of the subjects of the Sultan of Muscat.

... not have been more ... to, if the decision of The ... had been carried ... effect by means of a direct agreement between ... and the French Government. In accepting my proposals M. Rouvier had desired to give a fresh proof of the loyal and conciliatory spirit in which he intended to bring the question of the Muscat dhows to a definite settlement.

I am, &c.

(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

No. 43

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 9, 1905.*

I AM directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, copy of a despatch from His Majesty's ... Consul-General in Lord of his ... representations to His Majesty's Government respecting ... of a hospital at Dthali, and of a military road from Aden to the summit of Jebel Jihaf. Sir N. O'Conor suggests that, should Moosurus Pasha act on these instructions, he should be informed that the internal arrangements which the Government of India may think it advisable to make in the nine Cantons, in no way concern the Porte.

... Moosurus Pasha has not as yet made any such representations, ... will be answered in the sense suggested by Sir N. ...

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

No. 44.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received November 13.*)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 11th instant, relative to the removal of the flag-staffs from the Maklah Isthmus and Sheep Island.

India Office, November 13, 1905.

Inclosure in No. 44.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick

(Telegraphic.) P *November* 11, 1905

YOUR telegram of the 16th August last.

Flag staffs on Sheep Island and Maklab Isthmus were removed on the 18th ultimo.

No.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received November* 13.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 11th instant, relative to the report that German engineers were being sent to Koweit in connection with the Bagdad Railway

India Office, November 13, 1905.

Inclosure in No. 45.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick

November 11, 1905.

(Telegraphic.) [illegible] of the 3rd ultimo, as to Germans at Koweit. Political Resident [illegible] that Sheikh, in reply to question put by Senior Naval Officer [illegible] stated that no German engineers had been at Koweit [illegible] expected, but he promised at once to report anything [illegible] vernment state that, so far, they have heard n[illegible] on the 17th October, and left for Kurrachee [illegible] Some German, French, and [illegible] ships passing Muscat, a[illegible] engineers were met by Dr[illegible] months in surveying Bregli-Bussorah [illegible] way, it is possible that the same men are now returning to K[illegible] the work

---

No. 46

The Marquess of Lansdowne to M. Paneo

(Confidential.)

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, November* 1

WITH reference to my note of the 2nd ultimo respecting the joint representation which the Italian and British Ambassadors at Paris have recently made to the French Government respecting the export of arms and ammunition from Jibuti, I have the honour to state that a report on the subject has recently been received from the Senior Naval Officer on the Aden Division of the East Indies Station.

From this it would appear that canoes leave Hodeh frequently for Kaddaha, northward of Mocha, with from 80 to 100 rifles on each, and although no arms can officially leave Jibuti, there is said never to be any difficulty in obtaining a clearance [illegible] such by vessels engaged in this trade.

Captain Eustace adds that, owing to the disarmament of the Arabs in Yemen by the Turks, the former are now endeavouring to rearm themselves, and find Kaddaha a very suitable place, as the Turkish troops did not stop at Mocha, and never visited Kaddaha.

I have, &c.

(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

No. 47

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 129.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 16, 1905.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 768 of the 31st ultimo, relative to the proceedings of His Majesty's ship "Fox" on her recent visit to Hodeida in connection with the "Alwan" piracy case.

I concur in your commendation of Mr. Vice-Consul Richards's conduct throughout this affair, and I request that you will convey to him an expression of my approval.

I transmit herewith, for your information, copy of a letter from the Admiralty enclosing a report from the Officer Commanding His Majesty's ship "Fox" on his proceedings at Hodeida. You will observe that Captain Eustace calls attention to the manner in which Field Marshal Shakir Pasha and Khalid Bey contributed towards bringing matters to a successful conclusion. You should, if you consider it desirable, return thanks to the Turkish Government for the assistance [illegible].

I am, &c.

(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

No. 48

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 17, 1905.

WITH reference to your letter of the 27th ultimo, I am directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople forwarding a report from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Hodeida, relative to the recent visit of His Majesty's ship "Fox" to that place in connection with the "Alwan" piracy case.

I am to request that you will convey to Captain Eustace an expression of Lord Lansdowne's appreciation of the good services rendered by him on this occasion, which contributed largely towards bringing matters to a successful conclusion.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

No. 49

Sir N. O'Conor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(*Received November* 20.)

No. 784.

My Lord, *Pera, November* 7, 1905.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 608 of the 10th ultimo, I have the honour to report that the new arrangements relative to the conveyance of the Hasa mail via Koweit appear to be in force.

His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah reports that the post arrived at that place on the 2nd instant, having been carried for the first time via Koweit, and that the journey from Hasa to Bussorah occupied fourteen days.

It is reported that the journey was only a tentative one, and that the postman was engaged by the Mutessarif of Hasa. The Sheikh of Koweit having, according to the Contractor's statement, guaranteed the safety of the post across the desert.

Mr. Crow is proposing to the Turkish authorities the adoption of the [illegible] route proposed by Sir George Mackenzie, and mentioned in your Lordship's despatch No. 310 of the 20th September, but it appears doubtful whether it will be preferred to the present arrangement.

I have, &c.

(Signed) N. O'CONOR.

No. 30

Sir N. O'Conor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 702.)
My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 730 of the 31st ultimo, I have, &c.

Inclosure in No. 30

Vice-Consul Richardson to Consul Doran

(No. 129.)
Sir,

Hodeida, October 16, 1905.

I HAVE now received reliable information regarding the operations of Feri Pasha against Sana'a, reported on in my despatch No. 108 of the 31st August. The accounts of the various engagements with the rebels between Menakha and [illegible] in the above referred to despatch, are, in fairly correct.

It would appear that, though the [illegible] the brunt of the fighting fell to the lot of the [illegible] near the [illegible] attained may be attributed.

The battle that took place near Buan [illegible] continued, the Arabs displaying great bravery. They were [illegible] with heavy loss, leaving behind two cannon, 100 rifles, and a [illegible]

The Turks were molested on their march between Senam Pasha and Sana'a, and some fighting resulted at the two or three villages on the way.

The heights overlooking Sana'a from the south-west were reached on the 28th August by the Imperial troops, and the descent towards the town commenced on the 30th, when a discharge of shrapnel was poured into the principal fortress and the barracks that were occupied by the insurgents. Fighting continued during the greater part of the 31st, Bir-el Azzab (the portion of Sana'a outside the native town, with which it is [illegible] by a gate) being captured the same evening. The gates of the town were [illegible] hours later (Thursday night), and the city itself entered on the following [illegible] anniversary of the Sultan's accession to the throne. The [illegible] thereupon evacuated, and made good their escape, abandoning a considerable [illegible] quantity of ammunition and [illegible].

The Imam and his entourage had, on the night of the 29th or 30th, without the knowledge of his troops, fled to the [illegible].

Sixteen cannon that the Arabs [illegible] [illegible] have been captured. The [illegible]

The capital is fairly ruined, and the majority of the shops and depôts have been [illegible] looted. The Turkish military hospital and the municipal pharmacy had been [illegible]. The [illegible]

Many of the principal Sheikhs implicated in the present revolt are still at large at Sana'a, having tendered their submission to Feri Pasha.

I learn that the Imam has lost a great deal of his influence, and his followers are fast forsaking his cause. It is believed that he is at present at Jebel Shara, in the mountains to the north of Sana'a, and about three days' journey from the latter place.

The neighbourhood was soon brought under subjection, the Chiefs coming in voluntarily and surrendering rifles.

The towns of Amran and Tawela were occupied by Feri Pasha without opposition on the [illegible]th September, and a few days later Kaukaban also, which is a most impregnable mountain fortress.

The army next advanced towards Hajje, that was taken on the 7th instant. It is rumoured that the loss on the Turkish side in the fighting that took place was nearly 2,000 killed and wounded before the whole district was subdued. This intelligence [illegible], not been confirmed.

[illegible] of, it is believed, will return to Sana'a for the month of [illegible] reinforce, after which his objective will be the Hadjal [illegible].

[illegible] operating from Ta'iz, is now at Damar, [illegible] completely restored communication with Sana'a. The country between Ta'iz [illegible] has been pacified, principally owing to the Arabs having got tired of [illegible].

A friend of mine who recently [illegible] the interior for over twenty years, informs me [illegible] is abominable, most of the roads *en route* have been [illegible] [illegible], and the population generally dis[illegible]. And last, but not least, [illegible].

[illegible] at large military camp at Beit el Mahdi, near Menakha, the former head-quarters of Feri Pasha and the General Staff.

Since the beginning of September 9 to 10,000 troops, including Redifs chiefly, and 450 Hamidieh cavalry from Asia Minor with abundant supplies and transport animals, have been disembarked at this port.

[illegible] are now 2,100 troops at Abou Arish waiting to advance and join hands [illegible] when the next move is begun.

[illegible] of Asayr is scarce, but everything points to a more settled [illegible] under the administration of General Assim Pasha, the Military [illegible].

[illegible] left for Constantinople on 6th instant. It is supposed that his Excellency has been recalled by the Sultan to take up the appointment of Inspector-General of the Macedonian vilayets, and [illegible] rumoured that he may be asked to fill the post of Grand Vizier. He [illegible] was a most enlightened, just, and honourable officer, and perhaps the [illegible] that has yet been sent out to this province. It was hoped that he would have remained, and been appointed Vali and Commander-in-chief of the Yemen.

Most of the civil administrative posts are now being refilled, and the majority of [illegible] returned to Sana'a, where Mahmoud Medim Bey, the adjutant of the [illegible]ral, has been officiating in charge.

Big remittances are received more or less every fortnight from [illegible] meet the cost of maintaining the large army in the field and the expenditure of the vilayet generally, as there is not much revenue coming in at present on account of the unsettled affairs of the country.

[illegible] import of food-stuffs is not so great now, except for the Turkish troops, [illegible] throughout the province, but unfortunately a good portion of the land hitherto under cultivation has been laid waste and neglected.

The prospects of the coffee crop for the approaching season are not unfavourable. [illegible] native grown dhurra (millet) is replacing the Indian imported article in the [illegible].

The conditions of life in the mountains have been rendered very difficult by the military operations, and ordinary necessities are outside the reach of the average person, as famine prices still prevail, and supplies are very scarce. The military authorities monopolize all available transport for the movement of supplies to the large bodies of troops stationed everywhere, causing great hardships to the starving [illegible].

[illegible], has made very little progress owing to the failure on the part of the Ottoman Government to pay the arranged instalments to the contractors as they fall due.

The setting in of the south-east winds in this part of the Red Sea next month will still further delay operations. In the meantime, trade and merchants in general will be subjected to the usual losses and inconveniences, in spite of the payment of per dues.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. A. RICHARDSON.

No. 71

Sir N. O'Conor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 807 Very Confidential.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, November 14, 1905.*

I LEARN from a very confidential source that, according to information which [illegible] the Kaimakam of Hodeida and Mansour Pasha, employé of the Civil List, stating that the condition of the caza is very disturbed, and the population is entirely abandoning it. The Vali observes that as these telegrams have been sent viâ Bushire and Fao, the contents are necessarily known abroad; yet though he has appealed twenty-one times for steps to be taken for the defence of the coast and for the adoption of the necessary measures nothing has been done, and the state of affairs is getting more and more serious.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR

No. 72

Sir N. O'Conor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 811.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, November 14, 1905.*

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Jeddah, reporting the proposed withdrawal of certain troops from the Yemen.

I have, &c.
[illegible] N. R. O'CONOR

Inclosure in No. 72.

Consul Derry to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 112.)

Sir, [illegible]

I LEARN that the Ottoman Government are making inquiry for transports to carry troops from Hodeida to Acaba, and it is intended to send away some 10,000 or perhaps so many as 15,000 within the next ten or twelve weeks.

This confirms recent news that the Yemen revolt is now cowed, and that the Turks are masters of all the country from Sana to Sada, while the Imam is being driven from hole to corner. But doubtless the Hodeida Vice-Consul will be reporting the exact state of affairs.

[illegible] despatch No. 26 of the 9th March was reported the chartering of some ships, including one Italian and one French, for the conveyance of troops from Acaba. On this occasion the Bombay and Persia Steam Navigation Company are offering some of their ships on time charter, and if an agreement be concluded I will not fail to report further. These steamers would also be used for moving drafts from one port to another on the coast.

[illegible]

No. 73

Sir N. O'Conor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 817. Secret.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, November 15, 1905.*

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith a despatch from the Military Attaché to His Majesty's Embassy, reporting on the suppression of the Yemen revolt.

I have, &c.
[illegible] R. O'CONOR

Inclosure in No. 73

Colonel Surtees to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 58. Secret.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November 15, 1905.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that there are indications that the Yemen revolt has been practically suppressed.

Recent information shows that the Ottoman troops are now masters of all the country between Sana'a and Soda, and that the Imam is being driven from place to place.

An Irade has been issued for the disba[illegible] fourteen battalions of Jerusalem and Tripoli tr[illegible] They will not return via the Suez Canal but be l[illegible]

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. CONYERS SURTEES, *Colonel,*
Military Attaché.

No. 74

Sir N. O'Conor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received November 20.)

[illegible]

My Lord, *Constantinople, November 15, 1905.*

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith a despatch from the Military Attaché at this Embassy, reporting on the organization of the Yemen coast into coast-guard district[illegible]

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR

Inclosure in No. 74

Colonel Surtees to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 59. Secret.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November 15, 1905.*

RELIABLE information has been obtained that it is proposed to reorganize the Yemen Littoral, with a view to the protection of the seaboard as well as of certain railways, which it is contemplated to construct from the coast to the interior.

To this end, it is said that the coast is to be divided into three zones of observation:

1. From Bab el-Mandeb to Camaran.
2. From Camaran to the port of El Yesm.
3. From El Yesm to the station of El Ashera.

With head-quarters respectively at (1) Jebel Sefer, (2) Farsan Island, (3) some suitable island, not yet decided upon.

Each zone is to be provided with a small steamer of not less than 12 knots speed, and carrying two Q.F. guns of 30-40 millim. calibre.

With each steam-boat will be an auxiliary flotilla of four or five sambooks—the whole to be under the supervision of the Commodore at Hodeida, who is to have a special steamer for the purpose.

Each sambook is to carry a small Q.F. gun. The crews of these as well as of the steamers will be natives, but when on duty soldiers will be embarked.

The flotilla will be employed principally in preventing the importation of arms and other contraband articles into the Yemen.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. CONYERS SURTEES
Military Attaché.

No. 55

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 24.)

Sir,

India Office, November 22, 1905

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 9th instant, forwarding copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, in which he reports that the Turkish Ambassador in London has been instructed to make [illegible] as to His Majesty's Government respecting the construction [illegible] of a military road from Aden to the summit of Jebel Jihaf.

In reply, I am to say that Mr. Secretary Brodrick concurs in the answer which the Marquess of Lansdowne proposes to give [illegible] make any such representations.

I am to add that, as will be seen from the correspondence communicated to the Foreign Office on the 11th instant, the establishment of a hospital and dispensary at Dhala has been sanctioned tentatively for a period of four months by the Government of India. The construction of a road from Nokat Dakam to Dhala [illegible] letter from the Acting Resident at Aden of the 27th August, which was included in the correspondence forwarded to the Foreign Office on the 31st ultimo.

I am &c.

(Signed) A. GODLEY

No. 56.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 28.

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, [illegible] for the information of the Secretary [illegible] of the letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 19th October, relative to the Muscat Arbitration Award.

India Office, November 27, 1905.

Inclosure 1 in No. 56.

Major Cox to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) *Bushire, September 18, 1905.*

PLEASE see your telegram of the 11th instant. I venture to point out that French Government "renouvellement" document is specifically valid for one year. [illegible] stipulation to the contrary is made forthwith, both mitigate the effect of the Award and delay its fulfilment for a year.

Inclosure 2 in No. 56.

Government of India to Major Cox.

(Telegraphic.) *Simla, September 20, 1905.*

PLEASE refer [illegible] French Government propose only temporary renewal of navigation licences. Have you reason to believe that "renouvellements" for full twelve months are being granted by the C[illegible]?

No. 54*

Signor Tittoni to M. Rouvier.—(Communicated by Signor Pansa, November 23.)

M. le Ministre

JE remercie votre Excellence de la communication qu'elle a bien voulu m'adresser le 13 Septembre au sujet de la répression de la contrebande des armes dans la zone prohibée reconnue par l'Acte Général de Bruxelles.

Vous me faites l'honneur, M. le Ministre, de me rappeler qu'en répondant à ma communication du 14 Février relative à l'accord intervenu à ce sujet entre l'Italie et la Grande-Bretagne, votre prédécesseur m'a informé, sous la date du 11 Mars, des mesures prises par le Gouverneur de la Côte Française des Somalis afin de prévenir le trafic illicite des armes dans les eaux territoriales de la Colonie. J'avais, en effet, d'abord reçu, sous la date du 27 Février, une lettre par laquelle son Excellence M. Delcassé m'annonçait que ma communication du 14 avait [illegible] Ministère des Colonies et qu'une réponse me serait [illegible]

Plus tard, sous la date du 11 Mars, en réponse [illegible] reçus le 18 Décembre, 1904, relativement aux [illegible] de Tadjourah trouvant à se procurer des armes à feu [illegible] Etrangères me faisant savoir que le Gouverneur du Protectorat Français avait rappelé récemment aux négociants de la Colonie qu'ils s'exposeraient, s'[illegible] vendissent des armes et des munitions aux indigènes de la région de Tadjourah, aux pénalités prévues par le Décret du 18 Octobre, 1894, et que, d'autre part, les autorités locales veillaient attentivement à l'application d'un Arrêté du 24 Octobre, 1904, aux termes duquel les boutres partant de Djibouti étaient tenus d'aller se faire visiter à Obokh, de sorte que les négociants ne pouvaient, sans grande difficulté, livrer aux indigènes des armes et [illegible]

Mon Gouvernement a été dans le temps informé du contenu de ces deux communications, mais il m'a fait observer qu'elles ne répondaient qu'imparfaitement à celles que, d'après ses instructions, j'avais eu l'honneur de remettre successivement au Département que votre Excellence dirige actuellement.

Malgré tous les efforts employés jusqu'ici pour obtenir le respect des dispositions de l'Acte Général de Bruxelles, il a été en maintes circonstances constaté que les populations indigènes du Somaliland Italien ont réussi à se procurer une quantité importante d'armes et de munitions, et que les Danakils vivant dans la contrée qui sépare l'Erythrée du Protectorat Français, disposent également d'un armement qu'ils ne peuvent s'être procuré que par des moyens illicites.

Un des moyens employés fréquemment pour échapper à la surveillance des autorités Coloniales Françaises consiste à exporter des dépôts de Djibouti les armes et les munitions, en les dirigeant d'abord à la côte d'Arabie, d'où elles viennent ensuite réexportées pour être débarquées sur les points non surveillés du littoral Africain. Il y a lieu pour le Gouvernement Français de s'enquérir de ces manœuvres frauduleuses que les mesures adoptées à Djibouti ne suffiraient point à déjouer. Le Gouvernement [illegible] de prendre, [illegible] la région de Tadjourah, finirait par menacer la tranquillité aussi bien des possessions Italiennes que des Françaises.

Il paraît qu'en dehors de Djibouti et de l'Obokh, les côtes de la Colonie Française manquent totalement de postes de surveillance, et que dans les eaux territoriales du Protectorat aucun service de police maritime n'est organisé. Ces circonstances seraient de nature à faciliter le débarquement et le passage des armes que les indigènes de la contrée de Tadjourah cherchent avidement à se procurer.

Le Gouvernement Italien, en appelant amicalement l'attention de celui de la République sur ces circonstances de fait, est persuadé d'avance de pouvoir compter sur tout son concours pour aboutir à l'application nécessaire et sévère des clauses par lesquelles les Puissances réunies à Bruxelles en 1890 ont voulu que le trafic des armes avec les indigènes Africains fût interdit.

Veuillez, &c.

(Signé) TITTONI.

Inclosure 3 in No. 56

Major Cox to Government of India.

(1.) *Bushire, September 23, 1906.*

I SENT you my telegram of the 15th September without reference to Major Grey, who was absent in Bombay. On receipt of your telegram of the 20th September I referred to him, and he replied as follows:—

"There appears to be no doubt that the 'renouvellements' recently granted were according to the usual form and were available for one year. Personally, I do not think this of much importance, as when M. Laronce arrives and matters are settled, persons concerned, if not entitled, will have to give them up. At the same time there appears to be a breach of the *status quo* involved.

My point was that the dhows concerned, having set out with their "renouvellements" for their annual voyages, cannot ordinarily be dealt with again until their return just before or just after next south-west monsoon.

Inclosure 4 in No. 56.

Major Cox to Government of India.

Bushire, September 17, 1906.

IN Foreign Department telegram dated the 14th August I was directed to submit my views with regard to the Muscat Arbitration Award, after consultation with the Political Agent, Muscat.

In my telegram of the 24th August I asked permission to delay my final reply pending receipt of the printed copies of the complete proceedings and their accompa[illegible] despatches.

These documents have now reached me under Foreign Department endorsements, marginally noted,* and I have the honour to submit my views as directed.

Meanwhile, the Government of India have received Major Grey's letters, Nos. 407 and 410, and copies of the Memoranda of his views and their accompaniments, which he subsequently forwarded to me.

2. The full text of the preamble to the actual terms of the Award presents the latter in a much more favourable light that did the first telegraphic summaries, and at all events places it beyond doubt that the Sultan's position is considerably benefited by the result of the arbitration, and that neither His Highness nor we have any reason to regret having committed the issue to the Tribunal.

Apart from the last item of the Award, which is, of course, most important, there are three points in the preamble to the Award which seem to me especially satisfactory —

(1.) That the Court have decided that France is bound, in the grant of her flag, by the provisions of the Brussels Act, especially Article 32.

(2.) That they have decided that it is undeniable that the practice pursued by the French Authorities of trafic in slaves.

(3.) That they have given the French Government a very strong hint that they are morally unjustified in persisting in their reservation of Article 42 of the Brussels Act.

3. Were the present Ruler a stronger character and his administration more effective and civilized, and could we hope with any confidence that French Consuls and French Colonial party would be proof against temptation to circumvent them, then the terms of the Award would be all that we could reasonably want, and the privilege of inviolability in Muscat waters with which the protected vessels have been endowed would have been a consideration of minor importance.

As things are, however, the decision of the Tribunal on this point will, I believe, affect the results a good deal, and what past experience teaches me to fear is that as long as there are ten or a dozen flag-holders who can sail into Muscat Harbour, or out defiantly across the bows of the "Nur-ez-Bahr" at sea, under the French flag, they will

* Dated August 31 and September 6, 1906.

still ignore the Sultan, at Muscat, and will form a disturbing leaven among the population at Sur

His Highness Seyyid Faisal is so prone to let things drift for the sake of a quiet life that unless we are constantly vigilant in helping him to maintain his authority, and improve his administration at Sur, it is possible that he may, in spite of the terms of the Award, continue to allow the French flag element to defy his local representatives, and defraud him of his Customs revenues, sooner than have unpleasant half-hours with Consuls or naval commanders of the French Government. It remains to be seen what steps we can devise to prevent such a contingency

4. A great deal, of course, depends on the number of protegés who survive the investigation of their claims to protection.

In this connection Mr. Ronald Graham estimates ten or twelve * Major Grey thinks only two, but, judging from the list of names and approximate dates which he furnishes, there will be a good many more than that who have received papers between 1863 and 1892. This can only be ascertained by thorough investigation, and the dates cannot be stated authoritatively pending M. Laronce's return

5. Then there are two points which I think might have been settled more explicitly in the Award—

(*a*.) As to whether there is any inheritable right to carry the flag. (I gather from the terms of lines 9 and 10 from the bottom of p. 6 of the Award that there is not.)

(*b*.) As to the manner in which the claims are to be investigated. Definite instructions on the latter point would have eliminated a fruitful source of difficulty Thus, clause 3 of the first part of the actual Award provides that the title to fly the flag is conditional on the applicant being able to establish that he had been treated as a protégé before 1863.

But establish before whom?

6. Lastly, with regard to measures to be taken to make the Award effective—

(*a*.) Major Grey writes that the Sultan is averse to the issue of a Proclamation at Sur, but I think this hesitation is only due to the fact that the Sultan had not then seen the complete Award, and did not fully understand it. I quite agree, however, that any notification would be premature until the titles of all the claimants have been investigated and decided

Once that is done, I am of opinion that the issue of a written notification explaining the Award is indispensable, and that it should not be left to the ignorant mercies of the Wali of Sur—a very humble person at present.

If this course is not taken, the French Dragoman will be in a position to misrepresent the terms of the Award to the Suris to any extent, and keep alive their [illegible]

What I fear is that, owing to M Laronce's delay, all the French dhows and their sea-going owners will have left Sur and be absent for the next six months. If that proves to be the case, I think the broad terms of the Award should be pro[illegible] known forthwith, and repeated in great detail later when the claims ha[illegible]

The notification might be issued by the Sultan in consultation with, and "with the concurrence of," the Consuls of England and France, and should specify the names of those persons entitled and those not entitled to fly the flag on their dhows

It should also contain the threat suggested by Major Grey that the use of the flag by unauthorized persons or dhows would be punished with the utmost rigour

(*b*.) On M Laronce's return he will no doubt enter into communication with the Sultan or Major Grey.

(1.) The first thing to be done is to see how many persons on the list the French are prepared to eliminate forthwith. The titles of the remainder should then be thoroughly investigated, and any case with regard to which the Consuls and the Sultan cannot come to an agreement, should be referred to London and Paris.

(2.) Next, a draft notification for the Sultan to issue should be drawn up and approved by both Governments. It should include a list of approved protégés.

(3.) Any doubtful points coming to light during the above negotiations, such as the

* This estimate was made after going through the lists with Mr Graves, but it is, if anything, over the mark.

question of inheritable title, should be referred to London and Paris and authoritatively settled.

(4.) It is presumed that any person found flying the French flag unlawfully or running contraband under it will be punished by the Sultan if caught in Muscat waters.

7. I have the honour to offer two suggestions for the consideration or reconsideration of Government—

(1.) That it should be decided between us that the creek which divides the two Settlements of Sur, and which at high water makes the Mugrammatein half almost an island, is within the territorial limits of Sur town, and the French flag shall not be flown there. If this is not done, cases of so-called violation of the flag during the tribal [illegible] of the inhabitants will be likely to recur

(2.) That when we see what the result of the Award amounts to, after settlement of the [illegible] points of disputes, the question of the dispatch of a Vice-Consul or Consular Agent to Sur after a convenient interval should again be taken into consideration, with a view to keeping the Sultan up to asserting his position there and realizing his revenue. The presence of an intelligent officer would, I believe, materially conduce to the spread of civilizing influence and to the reduction of the Sur community to order. His presence would at the same time encourage French Consuls to adhere to the terms of the Award and prevent flag-holders from assuming any unauthorized privileges on land.

Inclosure 5 in No. 56.

Government of India to Major Cox

(Telegraphic.) *Simla, October* 16, 1905.

WE have sent the following telegram to the Secretary of State, dated the 16th October, which is now being repeated for your guidance and that of Major Grey :—

[illegible] of the 10th August.
[illegible] in course of preparation."

A letter will be sent to you on the subject

Inclosure 6 in No. 56.

Government of India to Major Cox.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Simla, October* 17, 1905.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your [illegible] I [illegible] to the [illegible] to arrive at [illegible] Mr. Laronce on [illegible] Award.

2. The Government of India agree with you that it may ultimately be [illegible] to [illegible] of his full rights under the Award, but, as you will have seen from the telegram to the Secretary of State of the 16th October, 1905, which was repeated to you for guidance, the first step should, in the opinion of the Government of India, be for Major Grey and M. Laronce to endeavour to arrive at an understanding on all points of doubtful interpretation [illegible] When necessary, reference can be made to the Government of India for guidance.

3. The Government of India hardly see their way [illegible] to form, to expressing any opinion on your proposal that the French flag shall not be flown [illegible] Sur. The [illegible] will [illegible] and [illegible] the French [illegible] are [illegible] of [illegible] a [illegible] of [illegible] I am [illegible] of [illegible] would justify the raising of this question; the advantages which are likely to accrue to the Sultan from the adoption

of your suggestion, and the likelihood which there is of its being agreed to by M Larence.

4 The Government of India propose to await your final recommendations before considering the question of appointing a British officer at Sur. An essential element in the situation will be the probability of such a step being followed by similar action on the part of the French; it would, therefore, be of assistance if you could state in due course your opinion not only on this point, but also as to whether a regime under which a British and a French Vice-Consul might be stationed at Sur would be preferable to one involving no foreign representative at that port.

I have, &c.
Signed) S. M FRASER,
Secretary to Government of India.

No 57

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 30.)

Sir, *India Office, November 28, 1905*

IN continuation of the letter from this Office of the 30th ultimo, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Brodrick to inclose, for the information of the Marquess of Lansdowne, copy of further papers received from India relating to the reorganization of the Muscat Customs by placing them under an officer to be lent by the Government of India, and to a proposal for a loan to the Sultan in connection therewith, as part of the scheme for a general settlement of His Highness' finances.

[redacted] lent by the Government of India is in accordance with the views expressed in Sir E. Gorst's letter of the 23rd March last. But as regards the loan, Mr. Brodrick would be glad to be informed whether, in the opinion of Lord Lansdowne, there is any objection to the proposal of the Government of India in view of the present state of the negotiations with the French Government as to the Award of The Hague Tribunal in the recent arbitration.

I am, &c
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 57

Major Grey to Government of India

(Telegraphic.) P. *Muscat, October 1, 1905*

I HAVE to-day sent the following to Major Cox:—

"Please refer to your letter to the Foreign Department dated the 24th September, and its inclosures.

"Taimoor is not going to the Hajj, but the Sultan still would be glad of the money to finance some female relations who wish to go. I would recommend its grant only on condition of Sultan's acceptance of such proposals as Government of [redacted] might be advisable to tell him that Government of India desire him to adhere to the undertaking to borrow only from them.

Inclosure 2 in No. 57.

Government of India to Major Cox

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Simla, October 21, 1905.*

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of the papers on the subject of the reform of the Customs of Oman and the proposed loan to the Sultan of Muscat.

2. In reply, I am to state that the Government of India approve your view of the situation, and that if the Sultan again mentions the subject of a loan, the Political Agent should explain to His Highness the conditions upon which they are prepared to lend. These are—

(1.) That a trained Customs official be borrowed from the Government of India, and placed at the head of the Oman Customs; and

(2.) That any loan shall form part of a satisfactory scheme for the adjustment of the Sultan's finances generally.

3. I am to add that, should the Sultan be prepared to entertain the idea, you should submit to the Government of India the scheme for the adjustment of the Muscat finances, which appears to you to be practicable. Until this has been considered, no promise of pecuniary aid should, of course, be made to His Highness.

I have, &c
Signed) C. SOMERS COCKS

Inclosure 3 in No. 57.

Major Cox to Government of India.

Bushire, September 24, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of Foreign Department letter, dated the 6th instant, asking me to state my views upon the points raised in the marginally-[redacted] he Political Agent, Muscat *

[redacted] a subsequent telegram of the 22nd September, intimating a request by the Sultan for a further loan of 20,000 rupees has since been received, and can be dealt with at the same time.

2. In connection with the first two paragraphs of Major Grey's letter, I would invite reference to the record of the private interview which the Sultan had with his Excellency the Viceroy on the 18th November, 1903, in which the state of things now existing was discussed by his Excellency.

3. From Major Grey's subsequent report, it appears that the individual mentioned [redacted] Dharamsee. I gather that he is at present only supervising accounts, but I am a little apprehensive of the re-entry of the Banian element into the working of the Customs, and at the same time disappointed at Seyyed Faisal having taken the two important steps of suspending his Superintendent, Mahomed Ibrahim, and taking on Damodhar Dharamsee under such conditions, without fully consulting his Political Agent before the fact, as has ap[redacted]

4. For Mahomed Ibrahim [redacted] old Banian regime.

5. Referring to the Political Agent's statement of debts in paragraph 4; from his [redacted] rating items (1) and (2), I gather that item (2) represents customs duty taken in advance from merchants recently; and does not include outstandings from the old farming days. If this deduction is correct, then I should mention that Damodhar Dharamsee is not the only one who claims to have an unsettled account from the days of the farm. If I am not mistaken, other quondam participators in the farm, [redacted] Goyal Waljee, and I think Ruttonsee Purshotam and possibly others, have similar [redacted] were so recognized, they would require to be carefully gone into and substantiated prior to being liquidated with money lent by the Government of India.

6. I now turn to Major Grey's telegram of the 22nd instant, intimating that the Sultan seeks another loan of 20,000 rupees; this time for the purpose of enabling Seyyed Taimoor to perform the Hajj.

Neither the loan nor the object for which it is desired, altogether commend themselves to me; with regard to the latter, I attach a separate Memorandum, as my [redacted] opinion that if Seyyed Taimoor can be prevented from performing the Hajj now, so much the better.

* Major Grey to Government of India, August 14, 1905.

7. Speaking from a financial point of view, I think we may claim to have lately stretched several points for the Sultan in order that no monetary difficulty might arise between us pending the issue of the decision of The Hague Tribunal in the [illegible] the expediency of giving his Highness any more small loans for specific purposes for the present. [illegible] *quid pro quo* for them, and if his Highness still persists in spite of our advice in allowing his finances to remain in this unsatisfactory state, and if there is no specific political advantage to be gained from the loan in question further monetary favours on our part will tend to encourage him in his thriftlessness. I have little doubt that this is Major Grey's opinion as well as my own.

8. The only basis therefore, upon which I would recommend compliance with his Highness's request would be supposing that the loan were considered as part of a satisfactory scheme for the adjustment of his finances generally, and his application for it gives us a good opportunity for reverting to this question.

9. His Majesty's Government do not like the idea of our offering him a definite guarantee, on the grounds that the measure might be considered incompatible with His complete independence. But without formally guaranteeing any specific amount either monthly or yearly, we might perhaps explain to his Highness that he must now see for himself that he cannot expect absolute honesty in the administration of his Customs from any roving outsider whom he may appoint, and that under present [illegible] until he makes up his mind to take our advice and place his finances generally on a surer footing, it will be impossible for us to encourage him to throw good money after bad, by advancing small loans on easy terms for every unforeseen expense that he from time to time has to meet; that if he will borrow from us three thoroughly trained Customs officials for Muscat, Gwadur, and Sur from our Customs service, we shall then know that he is getting the most advantage possible from his rightful revenue, and shall be in a much better position to help him with an occasional advance when takings are short, and to allow him to recoup us through his Customs Superintendent when trade is brisk. We shall, in fact, be more sure of our security than we can be at [illegible].

If He will not accept this proposal, then the only alternative would be to fall back [illegible].

I [illegible] would explain that if the first and preferable arrangement is, for [illegible] introduce him to a reliable bank which would administer his Customs for him for a reasonable commission, say 5 per cent. and being thus aware of the security which they had, would no doubt lend him money when he had pressing needs, if indeed such a course were necessary; but that as a matter of fact, if his revenue were collected in a systematic and business-like manner, there would probably be no need after a time for his having to resort to loans.

In any case, I think we should use the present opportunity to make another attempt to make him see the error of his ways, and if he shows an inclination to accept our advice, we could modify our proposals in order to follow the line of least resistance.

Inclosure 6 in No. 57

Memorandum regarding the reported ultra-religious tendencies of Seyyed Taimoor-bin-Feisal.

On my [illegible] last November after a three months' [illegible] I heard [illegible] the [illegible] Seyyid Feisal had on one occasion [illegible] was referred [illegible] had [illegible] would [illegible] It was also [illegible] the White turban worn by the Mullah (or "Mutowwa") element in Oman, and was being cultivated by some of his father's fanatical enemies in the Sharkiyah, such as the sons of Saleh-bin-Ali, the rebel of 1895.

I was [illegible] to take Seyyid Taimoor's [illegible] and seriously and [illegible] but when I [illegible] Muscat later on

in connection with [illegible] were again pointedly mentioned to me by nat[illegible]

[illegible] paying a friendly visit with him to His Highness the Sultan, I told the latter of the rumours which I had heard while touring in the Gulf, and which had now been repeated to me by friends here. I went on to remind him that Taimoor was still young and impressionable, and urged him to be vigilant in regard to him, and not to let him get out of hand—a result which he would surely regret. I added that I was [illegible] forbear Sultan Seyyid Salim would be very out of place as Ruler of Muscat in these days.

His Highness replied that he did not regard the matter seriously, and that the reports were a good deal exaggerated. Nevertheless, he sent for Taimoor and asked him to listen to what I had to say to him—evidently glad to have the opportunity.

I repeated the purport of what I had said to the Sultan to the boy himself, and said that I had always spoken well of him to Government, and hoped that he would not give me reason to alter my opinion of him, and that these reports that I had heard of his priestly tendencies need not be taken seriously.

He replied that he had no greater wish than to continue to deserve the good opinion of Government and their Representatives, and asked me not to believe that he was doing any more than trying to fulfil the ordinary requirements of his religion.

He sent me a message to the same effect later on. I asked Major Grey to [illegible] serious to think it necessary to report specially on the subject to Government.

Recent entries, however, in the Muscat diaries regarding Es-Sheikh-Saleh's movements, and the mention that he has given up to Seyyid Taimoor a sword of his father's, which was looted from him in the attack of 1895, and now the news that Taimoor wants to perform the Hajj, all tend to make me fear that he has not [illegible] his ultra-religious tit, nor his Mutowwa friends, and that his perseverance [illegible] line of conduct is by no means to be encouraged. He is quite young yet and very impressionable, and if the Sultan could be advised in a friendly way to dissociate [illegible] would be a good thing. It is quite probable that while on the Hajj, evil-wishers of his father would try to work on his present weakness and get him away from his father.

(Signed) P. Z. COX,
Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

No. 58

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 30.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 2nd November, relative to the affairs of Koweit.

India Office, November 29, 1905.

Inclosure 1 in No. 58.

Major Cox to Government of India.

Bushire, October 7, 1905.

WITH reference to Consul Crow's telegrams of the 1st October, which were reported to the Government of India with my covering telegrams of the 2nd and 5th [illegible], I have the honour to forward, for the further information of the Government of India, copies of the communications which have since passed on the subject.

2. From the fact that Mr. Crow, in addressing His Majesty's Ambassador is silent

on the subject of the identity and reliability of his confidential informant, I infer that he is inclined to treat the latter as a reliable authority, and to give credence to his statements, and I fear that His Majesty's Embassy may do the same. I have therefore marked certain passages of Inclosure 3 with marginal numbers, and venture to offer the following observations apart from the Senior Naval Officer's Report, which deals only with the items of news which Mr Crow reported briefly by telegram:—

3.—(1.) *Sheikh Mubarak's annoyance at seeing ships in Koweit.*—I was myself in Koweit when the "Turkestan," "Baluchistan," and "Lotus" were at anchor there. The latter is a Bussorah tug, and the two vessels of Messrs. Strick and Co.'s line being unable to emerge from the Bussorah River fully loaded, and finding a choppy sea running outside the bar, came round to Koweit to complete their loading work. The British India Steam Navigation Company's steam-ship "Goalpara" was in at the same time. The presence of these ships was alluded to in conversation between myself and Sheikh Mubarak, but on both sides from the point of view that the presence of so many merchantmen was an auspicious indication of the security and prosperity of the Port of Koweit.

(2.) *The Sheikh's efforts to free himself from the English Loan.*—This is obviously fanciful, there not being any loan.

(3.) *Treatment of His Majesty's ship "Redbreast" at Koweit.*—His Majesty's ship "Redbreast" called at my request with a letter or message on her way to Bussorah. I have been in communication with her Commander since, and he has been back here [illegible]ship, but I have received no report from him, private or official, which would [illegible]g of the kind alleged.

[illegible] ships come in.—The Political Agent will [illegible] respect. If he does not fly the flag daily, it is simply for the sake of economy in hunting. I do not quite see what this item of the report is intended to suggest.

(5.) *The Sheikh has forbidden his subjects to take services with Englishmen.*—This seems extremely unlikely. He has never made any difficulty in placing retainers at our disposal—for instance, in the cases of Captain Knox, Mr. Lorimer, and Lieutenant Gabriel. He gave them whatever they wanted in the matter of servants with the utmost readiness.

(6.) *The results of Sheikh Mubarak's visit to Mohammerah.* Please compare with this statement of Mr. Crow's Agent the report sent me by Mr. Gaskin, and forwarded with my letter, dated the 30th August, to the Government of India. See also my earlier letter, dated the 13th idem. Judging from the attitude of both Sheikhs, when I visited them at Sheikh Khazal's Palace at Fuelieh on the 11th July, I am much more inclined to accept Mr. Gaskin's version as the more probable one. As to the reference to the Bahrein incidents, I am disinclined to place any reliance on the informant's statements. Anglophobes, like Goguyer and Mahomed Alsiful Wahab, will inevitably endeavour to make capital out of any action of the British authorities in the Gulf which they can possibly manipulate for their own purposes; but, as far as Sheikh Mubarak is concerned, I have always from the beginning discussed Bahrein affairs with him with the utmost freedom for two reasons—firstly, that he might have full particulars of the facts and of our intentions, and, secondly, that I might have his assistance and co-operation in reforming Sheikh Esa.

I attach a copy of a letter which I received from him after the conclusion of the [illegible] Sheikh Esa, who thought a good deal of his opinion. Sheikh Mubarak's reply speaks for itself.

7.) "Vanhos" is doubtless intended for "Wonckhaus," the name of the German merchant now in Bushire. Herr Bahnson, Assistant to Herr Wonckhaus, crossed over to Koweit by the steam-ship "Goalpara" while I was there on the 19th September, and came to see me on landing. He said his principal had sent him over to see if there were any openings for trade.

When in conversation with Mubarak later on, I mentioned Herr Bahnson's arrival. Sheikh Mubarak, in reply, volunteered the remark that he had not seen Bahnson yet, but had no desire to have Germans in the place. I had no conversation with Assistant Surgeon Daud-ur-Rahman regarding the German's arrival, but in the Agency diary for the week ending the 22nd September he reported, with reference to Herr Bahnson, that the Sheikh apparently "declined to give him permission to open any German concern in Koweit."

I have heard nothing, nor could the Senior Naval Officer obtain any information,

of the expected advent of German engineers, or of the presence of their servant. Probably the statement is founded on Herr Bahnson's visit only, or perhaps the latter [illegible] I doubt this.

(8.) *The doings of the Armenian Agent of the British India Steam Navigation Company at Koweit.*—Captain Knox is well acquainted with this man. I do not remember his saying anything against him. The Koweit Agency Head Clerk has been in Bushire lately, and while here has received Koweit news-letters from Mr. Khachick, and the latter may be sending the same to Mr. Zeytoon, the British-protected merchant of Bushire. I will draw the Political Agent's attention to this.

(9.) Goguyer, whom Mr Crow's informant refers to as "Russian spy," is well known to Government. He is now in Bahrein.

4. I think the Government of India will agree that the foregoing observations tend to show that some of the statements of Consul Crow's informant are so ill founded as to make it impossible to place much credence on any portion of it. In fact [illegible]ests to me like the work of some one with a personal animus against the Sheikh, whose desire is simply to make mischief between Sheikh Mubarak and ourselves. That, however, is a personal impression, which may be quite wrong.

5. In view of the cautious and non-committal policy which we are obliged to [illegible] in the treatment of Sheikh Mubarak and his affairs, the latter is obliged sometimes to "hedge" in order to discount the oppression of the Turks, and frankly admits it; but though I have been in close touch with him since Captain Knox went on leave, I have seen no reason whatever to doubt his general good faith in his relations with us—in the fact, quite contrary.

In any case, Captain Knox will be back now in a few days, and it will be easy for him to notice and gauge any change of attitude which he may find in the Sheikh, but I very much doubt if anything of the sort exists, and meanwhile I hope that the Confidential report forwarded by His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Bussorah, may be regarded with the caution which, on the face of it, it seems to require.

[illegible] (Mr McDouall's letter to me, dated the 30th September), I merely forward a copy of it as it is interesting to note what a widely different picture is suggested therein, compared to that presented in the accompaniment to Consul Crow's despatch of the same date.

A copy of this letter has been sent to His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Bussorah.

Inclosure 2 in No. 38

Consul Crow to Sir N. O'Conor.

Bussorah, September 30, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a report of a confidential nature which I have received regarding the affairs of Koweit, dealing with the alleged arrangements for a postal service between Bussorah and Hassa *vih* Koweit, and the establishment of an Ottoman postal official at Koweit. The report also draws attention to the proposed visit of German engineers to make a railway survey, and to the Sheikh of Koweit's growing Anglophobe tendencies. I have sent a copy to Bushire.

Inclosure 3 in No. 38

Report regarding the Affairs of Koweit.

AFTER some communication with the Vali the Sheikh of Koweit has guaranteed the safety of the Turkish post from Bussorah to Koweit and from Koweit to Hassa. He seems to have said that he is quite ready to give any help the Turks may require. The contractor for the post intends taking the post from Koweit to Hassa by motor-carriages, but awaits the Vali's consent to this. At present arrangements are made to carry the post by camel. In fact, everything is ready, and he only awaits the Vali's return to order the post-office here to give him the letters for Hassa by land. The [illegible] of the vilayet to Mubarak, the latter is stated to have said that he was very glad to

make it easy for the post to Hasa, and that, as he belonged to the Turkish dominions, he was in every way bound to serve and obey the Sultan rather than another. The contractor was instructed by the Vali to remain at Koweit as a Turkish official. His name is Abdur Rahman.

Sheikh Mubarak proposes to levy harbour duties on all steamers anchoring at Koweit. The "Turkestan," "Baluchistan," and "Lotus" were lately at Koweit.
1 The Sheikh was quite annoyed at seeing them there. The Sheikh has increased the
2 customs duty and the tax on property to enable him to pay off the English loan and
3 to free himself. When the "Redbreast" visited Koweit on her way to Bussorah the son of Mubarak seems to have said that, as there was no Consul or anybody else there, what business had the man-of-war to come. Did they do so in order to inquire about the arrangements for the post with the Turks?

4 Mubarak's Turkish flag is only hoisted when any steamer is in sight, and lowered when it leaves; otherwise the flag is not flown.

5 The Sheikh has given express orders against Koweitis engaging themselves as servants to the English.

It is said in Koweit that the Russian line of steamers will touch there. People going to purchase skins and hides speak of the Russian goods as being cheaper than English.

6 Since the Sheikh's visit to Sheikh Khazal of Mohammerah, and since the Bahrein incident, Mubarak seems to be dead against the English, and does not speak well of them.

7 There is a native agent for the German firm of Vanhos [*sic*] there. This firm has agents at Bahrein, Lingah, and Bushire. It is said they will give their goods to the German-African line, which, it is alleged, will come up the Gulf some day. At present some German engineers are expected in Koweit from Bombay, and a servant of theirs has actually arrived to make arrangements for them during their stay. The engineers will apparently come to inquire into the possibilities of making a railway.

8 There is a man named Khachik, an Armenian, Agent for Messrs. Gray, Mackenzie, and Co. This man is taking a lead in given news to Koweit people, and is always against the English and favourable to the Russians. He takes papers into the coffee-shops, saying he is reading from the "Times" of India, but he really reads from some Armenian paper. He is in correspondence with Zeytoon of Bushire, an Armenian, who in turn communicates with the Customs at Bushire. The Agent, Khachik, is much occupied in writing to him and to other places. Two of his letters were [illegible] by Mubarak and sent [illegible]

9 Haji Ali, the Agent for Goguyer, the Russian spy, also gets and supplies [illegible] Koweit. He sends his reports to Maskat, and Goguyer himself is expected shortly.

Mathos Effendi, the dismissed Dragoman of the Consulate, has, it appears, asked Mubarak to write to Lord Curzon to take him back into the English service, and promises to give Mubarak any information he requires.

Inclosure 4 in No. 38.

Item of News from His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Mohammerah, dated September 30, 1905.

I HEAR from a man who is in communication with Koweit, that Sheikh Mubarak is very unpopular, and some of the men there are in communication with Ibn Beamm. It is expected that [illegible] Turkish troops from Mofiza, a Turkish force will encamp between Riad and Koweit to prevent Abdul Aziz bin Saud from supporting Mubarak, and Ibn Rashid will arrange [illegible] Mubarak and others to attack Koweit in connection with a rising there in favour of one of the nephews.

Ibn Brahim has left Daura, but it is not known where he is; he has a force of 100 men as "watchmen" at Daura.

I, of course, cannot vouch for the truth of this, but thought it worth reporting, and am also giving it to Crow.

Inclosure 5 in No. 38.

Major Cox to Commander Bowman.

Bushire, October 1, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to attach, for your information, purport of two telegrams received [illegible] Majesty's Consul-General.

2. The subject of the first one is of immediate importance, and the Government of [illegible]

The subject of the second is likewise of importance, if Mr. Crow's information is correct.

I have the honour to request therefore that, instead of proceeding to Bahrein this [illegible] Koweit [illegible] Sheikh Mubarak on my behalf, and ascertain from him—

(1.) What truth there is in the report contained in the first of the attached telegrams [illegible]

(2.) Whether he or Assistant-Surgeon Daud-ur-Rahman Khan have received any [illegible]

I am inclined to think that the report is based on the fact that M. Rabino, the Assistant [illegible] M. Wratislaw [illegible] presents of trade there. This gentleman, however, left again [illegible]

3. In speaking to the Sheikh in regard to (1), you would simply say that the Resident [illegible] you to call and ask him what truth there was in the report, and that I have little doubt there is none, as he said nothing to me about it when I saw him ten days ago.

If it appears from what he says that there is foundation for the report, please say as from yourself that you feel sure I shall wonder a good deal at his not mentioning it to me or asking my advice; and that you yourself wonder at his not doing so. You might add also casually as from yourself, and with the reservation that you were only [illegible] have any Turkish official in Koweit, even though ostensibly only a subordinate of the Ottoman post.

4. If the [illegible] Sheikh the subjects [illegible] Resident [illegible] Koweit [illegible] Sheikh [illegible] Excellency the [illegible] Koweit on urgent [illegible]

Inclosure 6 in No. 38.

Commander Bowman to Major Cox.

Bushire, October 4, 1905.

WITH reference to your Confidential letter, dated the 1st October, 1905, I have the honour to inform you that I arrived at Koweit at 5 P.M. on the 2nd October.

I went on shore at once to the Sheikh, who agreed to receive me next morning at 8 A.M.

2. I accordingly landed then, and, after some conversation on other matters, I informed him that as I was cruising in the Gulf you had asked me to see him and find out what truth there was in—

(1.) A report that he had entered into a private arrangement with the Vali of Bussorah [illegible] Koweit, of the Hasa post. Also that the [illegible] was to be [illegible] Koweit as an official of the Ottoman post.

(2.) A further report that some German engineers were expected at Koweit with the [illegible] inquiring into railway construction possibilities there.

3. With reference to (1), I informed the Sheikh that you did not think it could be correct as he had told you nothing about it when he saw you about ten days ago

His answer was that about eight or nine months ago, when he had an interview with the Vali of Bussorah at Salwan, the Vali had then asked him to assist him in getting the post through from Bussorah to Hasa. He then told the Vali he would neither interfere with him nor help him, that he would take no responsibility in the matter, and that the Vali and Mutessarif of Hasa must make their own arrangements about the mails. About ten days ago the contractor came to the Sheikh from [illegible] and asked the Sheikh's permission to send a representative to Koweit to [illegible] of the postal arrangements. The Sheikh told him that he would have nothing to with the matter. (This happened before his interview with you, but, he says, he did not think it of sufficient importance to mention.)

He absolutely denied that there was any truth in the report that a Turkish postal official had been or would be established at Koweit, and was very emphatic on this point

He also professed great loyalty to the British Government, under whose protection he said his affairs were prospering.

4. With regard to (2), he said nothing about M. Bahnson's visit, but told me positively that no German engineers had been there lately, and he knew nothing about any being expected

He promised if he heard anything further about either of these questions he would at once report it [illegible]

5. I thanked the Sheikh for the frank way in which he had answered my questions, and [illegible] both reports. He requested me to convey his compliments to you, and I asked him not to trouble about having my visit returned, as I intended sailing before noon. (He had sent his brother to return the Commanding Officer of "Redbreast's" call.)

6. I also had a short interview with Assistant Surgeon Daud-ur-Rahman Khan, who told me he had heard nothing of any Germans, except M. Bahnson having been there, nor of any expected to come

7. As I should not have been able to enter the Shatt-el-Arab till to-day at 3 P.M., I came straight down here instead of proceeding to Fao to telegraph, as I can thus give you a fuller report in shorter time.

Inclosure 7 in No. 58.

Sheikh Mubarak to Major Cox

(After compliments.) *March* 12, 1905.

YOU had written about Sheikh Essa-el Khalifah, and as to his having communications and friendship with me. Yes, but I do not approve of his conduct, because he ruins himself and his name, and he is, therefore, exposed to danger

I was delighted by your kindness and the good graces of the high Government that the incident passed him easily, and an example of warning was set for him, which is due to your kindness towards him. I have always prevented him from doing what is not desirable for him. In the first place, I had requested him to administer justice, to be kind to the inhabitants, whether merchants or others, continue his intercourse with them, not allow the Cadi, whom he had appointed, to act in that manner, be careful about the Cadi's decisions, prevent his sons, nephews, and relatives from being proud and tyrannical, and to discontinue what is uncalled for

He is quite at ease, and his interests are safeguarded by your kindness.

Retinues are not necessary, except for serving the household. Bedouins are not necessary, nor are the inhabitants of Katr I have also told him to keep in good order his town cultivation and houses, and insure the safety of the people and their properties, and that by this means he will remain at ease, his prosperity will increase, he will derive [illegible] any other benefits, continue his good name, and, further, it will cause you to be satisfied.

I have also explained to him that you had kept him at ease on an island which is surrounded by the sea, and protected him against every accident.

It is therefore desirable for him to change his conduct, but he will henceforth do no act contrary to your wishes. You have not neglected in his case, and this is a kind warning given to him.

We had already written him a letter, and we will write to him again. Inshallah, he will act upon our letters. I shall remind him of my first letter to him, and he will understand that my advices are correct.

No. 59

Sir N. O'Conor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 199.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, December* 2, 1905.

KOWEIT

Mr Townley's despatch No. 78 of the 31st January

Have received following telegram, No. 58, from Consul, Bussorah

"Abdul Aziz, Sheikh of Koweit's Agent, was released on Monday last by Vali and sent to Koweit. I have no details at present, but apparently he went on some special service

---

No. 60

Sir N. O'Conor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 840.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, November* 27, 1905

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch, I have the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Jeddah, containing his quarterly report on the economic and administrative situation in the Hejaz and Yemen Vilayets

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure 1 in No. 60

Consul Devey to Sir N. O'Conor

No. 107.)
Sir, *Jeddah, October* 18, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to submit a report on the state of Hejaz and Yemen for the quarter ended the 30th September, with two inclosures.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. P. DEVEY

Inclosure 2 in No. 60.

Report on the Economic and Administrative Condition of the Hejaz Vilayet for the Quarter ended September 30, 1905.

The Sherifate.—The death of his Highness the Grand Sherif Aswan Rafik was the event of most moment during the past three months. No successor to the office of the Amaret-i-Jelile has yet been appointed, and local expectancy is still on the rack. It had been at first anticipated that Sherif Abdillah would be immediately nominated, but when these hopes fell short of fruition those interested in the matter felt confident that the Sultan would be pleased to make a selection upon the anniversary of his thirtieth accession. As the [illegible] loyalty may now be awarded upon His Majesty's birthday, 14th Shaban (15th October)

I forward herewith some remarks by Vice-Consul S. M. Hussain on the subject of the Sherifate, and will only observe that the conduct of the business of the Sherifate during the last twelve weeks by Ali Pasha has given much satisfaction; the changes

made by him in respect of his representatives have been all for the good. Bedouin affairs have received careful and prompt attention, and the measures of simple justice or custom-law practised at Mecca have obtained Arab public approval. The Hejaz roads have been safe, except for one instance of rapine, when the Moabbad tribe with other outlaws attacked a caravan from Jeddah for Mecca and snatched some forty or fifty camels in the last week of August; most of the goods stolen on this occasion were, however, recently recovered and restored. The absolute safety of the Tayif road was remarked immediately after the death of the late Grand Sherif

Yemen.—The progress and subsiding of the Yemen revolt has been reported in detail by His Majesty's Vice-Consul for Hodeidah, but one may remark that the Turkish successes have been more complete and more rapid than was at first expected, and this may be ascribed in great part to Ahmed Feizi Pasha's care and prudence and foresight. There seems to be no intention of withdrawing the Marshal from Yemen for the present.

Asir.—Referring back to my despatch No. 64 of the 10th June (and also No. 82), the seditious movement which was growing in Asir, and to meet which large Turkish forces were moved up from Hodeidah, received a severe blow in July by the capture or death of the two brothers of Sheikh Ahmed-bin-Aix, since which there has been no fighting to speak of, but merely military marches through the country. About three weeks ago this Sheikh made a humiliated appeal to the generosity and clemency of the Sultan through the medium of the Hejaz Vali, but, in spite of his "ana dakhilak," Ahmed Ratib Pasha was not disposed to listen favourably to his tale of ill-treatment and accusations against the military authorities. His conduct had been openly seditious, and largely inspired by the fall of Sana, and the deliberation of the Turkish advance in June and July to repair that loss. The appointment of Ferik Emin Pasha was a wise measure and affords a guarantee that the Ottoman Government means to establish and maintain better order in Asir

Nejd.—Very little has been heard from Nejd during the last six months. When Ahmed Feizi Pasha was appointed in May to the Yemen command he was far away from either Hayil or Kassim, and the message took some fifteen days in reaching his Excellency. The chief results of his mission would seem to be having brought Ibn Rashid into closer relations and a surer degree of subjection to Turkey; and I understand that about 2,500 troops remain in his province. Raids continue, and there is little security in Central Arabia, but no fighting on any extended scale. Some of the higher-class merchants have given up their residence in the towns of Riadh and Oneyza and emigrated.

Aden.—In a recent report I made a brief mention of the Aden frontier question, which was adequately settled some two months ago. This matter did not attract very much notice, I believe, here, although several months ago it did provoke criticism and perhaps some apprehension that, as a recent article in a weekly journal vaguely indicates (*vide* Inclosure 3), Great Britain might be tempted to extend her sphere of influence. In respectful rejoinder might be applied the words of Major-General Sir J. F. Goldsmid (under date 6th October, 1896), suggesting to those representing Europe (albeit on the east coast of the Red Sea) to be "content to cast aside the not always patriotic ways of a selfish conventional diplomacy, and to assist in working out the welfare of the once renowned country" to which the envy accredited." The recent punishment of pirate craft in the neighbourhood of Hodeidah, enforced in the presence of His Majesty's ship "Fox," has created much sore feeling, and will perhaps not conduce eventually to promote British interests as viewed from a higher standpoint than that of mere immediate and local concerns.

Hejaz.—In this province itself, as compared with surrounding ones, relatively perfect peace has prevailed for the last three months. The roads have been safe as above remarked, and unusually so. Only the Deri-Hassan pirates continue to give trouble occasionally, as reported again recently. The shocking punishment that befell them (*vide* No. [illegible] of May) was [illegible] and their brutal tribes have been commented on in previous correspondence, as also the savage behaviour of the black slave seamen of some of these sambuks.

Vilayet Revenue.—I have been endeavouring lately to obtain information as to the revenue and expenditure of this province, but details are not yet to hand. A considerable number of recruits arrived lately to serve here, and time-expired men are to be paid off very soon and sent home, but there is little ready money for the purpose.

* "Throughout the whole of the nineteenth century the European Powers have been alternately pumping up Turkey and pulling away her outlying provinces."—Sir Alfred Lyall's "Asiatic Studies."

Hejaz Railway.—The Hejaz railroad continues to make satisfactory progress. Nominally voluntary contributions are still exacted from pilgrims for this work, of whom some 30,000 may give perhaps 6,000*l.* or 7,000*l.* per annum.

[illegible] that there is now again a serious intention of uniting Yenbo with [illegible] communication (*vide* No. 4 of the 9th January, 1902), and that [illegible] being established between Medina and Yembo; thus Mecca itself may soon be put in direct land communication with the north as well as by submarine cable. Wireless telegraphy, it is asserted, already exists between Rhodes and Tripoli of Africa, and it might well tried in the Hejaz, and across from Jeddah to Port Soudan in due time

Pilgrimage Prospects.—Pilgrimage prospects are good. Already some 6,000 Javanese and Malays have arrived. A big influx from Egypt is promising again, as also large numbers from India. On all sides shipping fares are falling through over-competition, which also gives an impetus to trade. Naturally fewer pilgrims from the Caucasus or by the Trans-Caspian Railway are expected, but the total is likely to be an unusually high one, and ships for their conveyance plentiful.

Rain.—Rain during the last few weeks was fairly abundant both in Hejaz and in several parts of Yemen. There are signs of a more sufficient supply than has been the case for ten years past. This should help to keep the Bedouins less turbulent. But in the meantime Hejaz sheep and butter are still scarce, and are even now being imported again from Suakin. Whilst, on account of the Yemen revolt and famine, this town and neighbourhood are full of refugees from those parts, and some are even said to have been reduced to selling members of their families as slaves through extreme inopence

Yemen Trade.—The chief exports from Yemen are three only—

1. Coffee, which trade is falling to a very perceptible degree through causes beyond control;

2. Skins and hides, of which the increased export argues the squandering of capital and greater poverty of the province; and

3. Millet, which, from being an article of export, has, during the last few years, been gradually passing into the category of imports.

These facts are eloquent, and when quiet and order reign again in Yemen the authorities should hasten to find a remedy even in assisting the agriculturist. In other ways, too, something might be done to develop the resources of this unfortunate district by encouraging the pearl and pearl shell fisheries, and perhaps supplement this by promoting a search for sponges, which are known to be found between Leeth and [illegible].

Hejaz Trade.—Trade in general, and more especially with India, continues very [illegible]. No fresh suggestions can be made for bolstering up the petty export trade of Hejaz, but investigations might be instituted as to the product of gums and resins of these regions (a subject in which India is interested), were there any in Turkey qualified to make practical and scientific researches in botany.

Speaking of trade items, as the total disappearance of American petroleum from this market was noted in my recent Annual Report No. 3483, I may mention that a steam-ship has just arrived from New York bringing 42,000 cases again, besides consignments for other Red Sea ports. The very poor quality of "Regie" tobacco and cigarettes sent to Hejaz and Yemen might also be noticed; in Egypt a better quality can be obtained at lower prices.

The local custom-house continue to inflict various petty restrictions and annoyances affecting trade, similar to those to which attention is directed in the Trade Report for Constantinople (A 8.), but as, upon the whole, their business is transacted fairly and rapidly, it would be undesirable to insist overmuch on these defects.

Indemnities Paid.—All matters of payment of indemnity have been settled at this Consulate, with two trifling exceptions, viz., claims of Yakub Suliman and Rahmet Ladab Ismail.

(Signed) G. P. DEVEY,
His Britannic Majesty's Consul.

Jeddah, October 12, 1905

Inclosure 8 in No. 60.

Memorandum.

IT is now about three months since the late Grand Sharif Aun-er-Rafik Pasha breathed his last, and still the question of his succession remains unsettled. Rumours, as usual, have always been current here of the appointment and departure of Abdulla Pasha from Constantinople, but have always proved incorrect. In the last week of September some of the influential people of this town predicted that the appointment of Abdulla Pasha to the Amarat-i-Jadia was to take place on the 29th of that month, which date corresponded with the Miraj Bairam, and on that day telegraphic information to that effect was expected every moment, but this time also expectation ended in disappointment.

On the 28th ultimo information was received from a trustworthy source that a telegram was received by the Vali from His Majesty the Sultan, in which, after expressing His Majesty's satisfaction and pleasure towards Ahmed Ratib Pasha, opinion was asked as to the fitness, or otherwise, of Sharif Abdulla Pasha for the post of the Amarat of Mecca. A long telegraphic reply was sent by his Excellency showing reasons against the fitness of Abdulla Pasha on the following grounds:—

1. The advanced age of Sharif Abdulla Pasha and his delicate health.
2. His long absence from Hejaz and losing touch with the tribal affairs of the Arabs.
3. A terrible conditions of Hejaz and the increased turbulence of the tribes.

While, at the same time, other reasons were advanced giving preference to Sharif Ali Bey and showing desirability to his permanent appointment.

Another telegram was received two days later by his Excellency, again assuring Ahmed Ratib Pasha of the good-will of His Majesty towards him, and saying his [illegible] his venerable age. In reply of this telegram, his Excellency has wired [illegible] no more to say on the subject and that he will submit to the decision of His Majesty on the matter. From the above-mentioned telegrams it appears that His Majesty is quite [illegible] the Amarat of Mecca to Abdulla Pasha. Nothing has been heard [illegible] at expectations are now fixed on the 15th instant, on which day falls the b[illegible] His Majesty the Sultan, and possibly a donation may be announced on that day.

In the meantime, Sharif Ali Bey is ably carrying on the duties of the Amarat-i-Jalila, the roads in the country are quite safe, and no tribal disturbances have been heard of in these days. I have been informed on good authority that most of the [illegible] and also robbed on the Jeddah-Mecca Road by Moahbad tribe in the month of August last has been returned and restored to the owners. Sharif Ali Bey has warned the Moahbad tribe that he would not allow any disturbances on the roads in future and that the remaining loot must be returned or paid for within a limited time by the Moahbad tribe, otherwise the tribe should blame itself for the punishment that will be inflicted on it, which may amount to one man for each bag of rice plundered and remaining unrestored.

As far as I have been able to gather from the Bedouins and the townspeople, I find that everybody is satisfied with the administration of Ali Pasha, his straightforward dealings and even-handed justice, and, above all, by his personal qualities of refinement and politeness.

Most of the people in Mecca and Jeddah think that, even if Abdulla Pasha was appointed Amir of Mecca, he will depend for discharging his functions on Sharif Ali Bey, in whom he has full confidence, and I have been assured that till now Sharif Ali Bey is on extremely good terms with his uncle, Abdulla Pasha.

I may be permitted to correct an error in despatch No. 85 of this Consulate. Sharif Fittin, the present Sharif Kaimakam at Mecca, is father-in-law of Sharif Ali Bey, not his son-in-law. And I find also that Sharif Abdulmajid, who had been the Amarat Kaimakam for four years, though he had been in favour of the late Grand Sharif, had been dealing with the Bedouins and Mecca people in extremely high handed manner, and therefore he is disliked by the whole population of Hejaz, except his own tribe of Abadila Ashraf.

Sharif Fittin was Amarat Kaimakam for more than eight years, from 1894 till he was replaced by Sharif Abdulmajid in 1902.

Several caravans of the Mecca and Jeddah people who visited Medina in the month of Rajab have returned safely and report the perfect safety of the roads.

(Signed) S. MOHAMMED HUSSAIN.

October 10, 1905.

October 10.—At 8·30 on the evening of Friday, the 13th instant, a telegram came from Constantinople to his Excellency the Vali announcing the Iradé Saniah bestowing the rank of Vizaret on Sharif Ali Pasha and appointing his Highness the Grand Sharif of Mecca.

Long expectations were brought to an end, and general satisfaction is expressed by all.

I have heard to-day, from an official source, that Sharif Sadi Bey, the grandson of the late Grand Sharif Abdulmuttalib, lately presented a "laiha" to His Majesty the [illegible] a sermon to be read in the Mosque of St. Sofia, where he was himself present, and after [illegible] showed his ambition for the Khilafat, and therefore he is not a fit person to be appointed Amir of Mecca. This was done by Sharif Sadik Bey to advance the cause of the family of Abdulmuttalib, thinking the possibility of Amarat of Mecca being given to Haidar Pasha or himself, and thus bringing the Amarat back to the family of Abdulmuttalib. This might possibly have biased the mind of the Sultan from Abdulla Pasha, and, instead of proving useful to Abdulmuttalib's family, gave more weight to the proposals of Ahmed Ratib Pasha and hastened the appointment of Sharif Ali Pasha as Grand Sharif.

S. M. H.

No. 61

Sir N. O'Conor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(*Received December* 4.)

(No. 843.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, November* 27, 1905.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 391 of the 31st ultimo, inclosing copies of correspondence received through the India Office from the Government of India respecting the piracies committed by Ahmed-bin-Selman in the Persian Gulf, and inquiring whether I had received any reply to my latest representations on the subject, I have the honour to inclose a copy of a *note verbale* which I sent to the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the 19th September last.

I [illegible] this communication to the Vali of Bussorah, and some time must therefore elapse before I receive any definite reply, but I will see that there shall be no unnecessary delay.

I have, &c.

(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 6.

Note Verbale.

(No. 70.)

WITH reference to His Majesty's Embassy's *note verbale* of the 12th September, 1904, on the subject of the piracies committed near Katif by the notorious pirate, Ahmed-bin-Selman, His Majesty's Embassy has the honour to inform the Sublime [illegible] consequence of further complaints from the Government of India, it [illegible] to his Excellency the Minister of the Interior on the [illegible] pointing out that, in spite of orders sent from the Sublime [illegible] was well known, and asking for an assurance that immediate measures might be taken to capture the offending parties, especially Ahmed-bin-Selman, and that the value of the plundered property, amounting to 9,042 rupees, should be restored to the victims.

His Majesty's Embassy understood that orders were thereupon telegraphed to the Vali of Bussorah instructing him to act in conformity with this request, and they did not fail duly to inform His Majesty's Government of the assurances given to them by the Sublime Porte.

His Majesty's Embassy regrets to state, however, that up to the present moment these assurances have not only remained a dead letter, but that Ahmed bin-Selman has since committed two fresh acts of piracy. It appears that on the 25th and

20th June last he and eight companions seized a Tarut fishing-boat in Rufea Bay, on the east of Tarut Island. They compelled the crew of three men to work the boat, and sailed her to Fusht-al-Jarim, a few miles north of Bahrein.

Here they attacked a large boat which had been sent out by a Bahrein merchant to buy pearls from the divers, and killed one man, mortally wounding another, who afterwards died, and seriously injuring two more. They carried off the pearling-boat, together with the second son of the owner, and also pearls and cash to the value of several thousand rupees.

The British Agent at Bahrein subsequently called on the Kaimakam of Katif and endeavoured to persuade him to effect the pirates' capture, but from later information it appears that the latter has not taken any efficacious measures with that object.

Under these circumstances, His Majesty's Embassy is constrained once more to draw the serious attention of the Sublime Porte to this matter, and to request that prompt measures may be taken to secure the punishment of the pirate chief and his associates, and that due compensation may be paid to British subjects for the losses sustained by them in consequence of Ahmed-bin-Selman's acts of piracy, which are due to the supineness of the Ottoman authorities, and the failure of the Imperial Government to maintain proper police supervision in the Persian Gulf.

Therapia, September 10, 1905.

No. 62.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 6, 1905.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 28th ultimo, relative to the proposed loan to the Sultan of Muscat in connection with the reorganisation of the Muscat Customs.

I am to suggest, for the consideration of the Secretary of State for India, that it would be advisable that the question of a loan should not be mixed until after the conclusion of the negotiations on which Major Grey and M. Larronce are understood to be at present engaged with regard to carrying into effect the recent Arbitration Award.

I am, &c.
(Signed) F. H. VILLIERS.

No. 63.

Sir N. O'Conor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 578.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 5, 1905.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 340 of the 15th May, inclosing a despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad, reporting the departure of a small force of Turkish infantry and artillery to Nasariye on the Tigris to operate against Sadoun Pasha of the Muntefik, I have the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah, reporting the return on the 22nd October of the Vali, Moukli Pasha, from the Muntefik, where he had been directing a punitive expedition against Sadoun.

Although the Vali claims to have been successful in capturing some of his strongholds, and to have sequestered his lands, he appears to have failed to lay hands on this notorious Arab Chief, who made good his escape into the Syrian desert.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

No. 62 A.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 9, 1905.

WITH reference to my letter of the 14th August last, respecting the proposed further representations to be made to the French Government on the subject of the traffic in arms in the Red Sea, I am directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before Mr. Secretary Brodrick, copies of further correspondence on the subject.*

Owing to a delay on the part of the Italian Ambassador at Paris in co-operating with His Majesty's Ambassador, the instructions contained in the despatch to Sir F. Bertie of the 24th July (inclosed in my letter of the 14th August) remained unacted upon until, in September, the French Government sent an answer to the joint representation made in February.

It will be seen that in this note, while denying the alleged direct traffic in arms from French territory, the French Government make no allusion to the export of arms from Jibuti to the Arabian coast for re-exportation to Africa, to which attention had been drawn.

The reply of the French Government was communicated to the Italian Chargé d'Affaires, with a request that His Majesty's Government might be favoured with the views of the Italian Government in regard to the attitude adopted by the French Government, and the Italian Ambassador has now communicated to this Department the accompanying note (Inclosure 3), which the Italian Government proposes to address to the French Government.

Though it had been intended that the British and Italian Ambassadors at Paris should renew their joint representations to the French Government, Mr. Brodrick will observe that, in this note, the question is dealt with from a purely Italian point of view.

In these circumstances Lord Lansdowne is of opinion that, before instructing Sir F. Bertie to address a further note to M. Rouvier, it is desirable that all the information available should be collected in regard to the traffic in arms, whether direct or indirect, from French territory, with special reference to its effect upon the British possessions on the East African coast, in order that His Majesty's Government may be in a position to lay before the French Government any facts in support of their allegations which may be obtainable.

His Lordship would therefore be glad if His Majesty's Resident at Aden could be instructed to furnish a report upon such facts as may have come to his knowledge relative to the export of arms to the Arabian coast.

I am to add that the Colonial Office is being asked for a similar report from the local authorities in Somaliland.

I am, &c.
(Signed) F. H. VILLIERS.

No. 62 B.

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 9, 1905.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before Mr. Secretary Lyttelton, copies of correspondence on the subject of the repression of the illicit traffic in arms in the Red Sea,† from which it will be seen that, in reply to the joint Anglo-Italian representation in February last, the French Government have denied the existence of the traffic in question, affirming that the measures of prevention adopted by the French local authorities are fully adequate to meet the necessities of the case.

In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the reply of the French Government, in

* Sir F. Bertie, No. 37, Africa, September 15; to M. Carignani, October 2; communicated by M. Pansa, November 22, 1905.

† To Sir F. Bertie, No. 9, Africa, January 17; Sir F. Bertie, No. 5, Africa, February 2; to Sir F. Bertie, No. 23, Africa, February 13; ditto, No. 77, Africa, June 20; to M. Pansa, June 20; M. Pansa, July 17; to Sir F. Bertie, No. 91, Africa, July 24; Sir F. Bertie, No. 37, Africa, September 15; to M. Carignani, October 2; communicated by M. Pansa, November 22, 1905.

which no allusion is made to the export of arms from Jibuti to the Arabian coast for re-exportation to Africa, His Majesty's Government have agreed to join the Italian Government in a further representation at Paris.

A copy of the note which the Italian Government proposes to address to the French Government is inclosed. Mr. Lyttelton will observe that in this note the question is dealt with from a purely Italian point of view.

In these circumstances Lord Lansdowne is anxious, before instructing Sir F. Bertie to co-operate with the Italian Ambassador at Paris, to obtain any information available in support of the allegations of His Majesty's Government.

I am therefore to request, should Mr. Lyttelton see no objection to this course, that the British local authorities in Somaliland may be instructed to furnish a report on the subject.

I am to add that the India Office has been requested to obtain a report from His Majesty's Resident at Aden in regard to the export of arms from French territory to the Arabian coast.

I am, &c.
(Signed) F. H. VILLIERS.

Inclosure in No. 63.

Consul Crow to Sir N. OConor.

(No. 73.)

Sir, *Bussorah, November* 11, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Vali returned from Muntefik on the 22nd October. I called on his Excellency, and inquired the result of his Mission.

The Vali said that Sadoun's importance had been much exaggerated. He had been accused of acts which he never committed, and many mistakes had been made. On a previous occasion the Imperial pardon had been granted him, but he did not merit it. He was a troublesome man, and a source of unrest in the district, and the Vali had recommended that, unless he settled down, and abandoned his predatory habits, no clemency ought to be shown him. After a careful inquiry on the spot the Vali had come to the conclusion that Sadoun was a man of no standing or importance, who had taken advantage of his family name to collect a few followers and tyrannise over a few tribes in Muntefik, and exact tribute from them to which he was not entitled. Sadoun had now taken refuge from pursuit somewhere in the Syrian desert, and, in order to bring him to his senses, the Vali stated that he had stopped the allowance which he received from the Imperial Government, and sequestered certain of his lands, so that he could derive no benefit from them. The Vali hoped by this means to reduce him to submission, but he did not anticipate any satisfactory result, and thought Sadoun was likely to give trouble.

From other sources I hear that the Vali pursued Sadoun, and tried to catch him, but he escaped into the desert; that he sequestered a property called Sakharia, given by the Sultan to Sadoun, and established the El Bedur tribes there, and left a guard in the place; that he destroyed four strongholds belonging to Sadoun, and removed provisions from them; that he exiled about ten persons, lessees of Government lands, charged with mischief and corruption at Nasariye; and that he forced the Cadi of Nasariye to resign by the somewhat drastic method of placing him under guard in the sun until he agreed to tender his resignation.

After these acts the Vali left Nasariye, and returned to Bussorah.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. E. CROW.

No. 64.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 12.)

WITH reference to Sir E. Gorst's letter of the 6th instant, the Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of the Secretary of State, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 7th December, relative to the proposed loan to the Sultan of Muscat.

India Office, December 11, 1905.

Inclosure in No. 64.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *December* 7, 1905.

MUSCAT loan. Please refer to your Foreign Secretary's letter of the 21st October last to the Political Resident in Persian Gulf. Pending conclusion of the negotiations with regard to the recent Arbitration Award, it would not, in Lord Lansdowne's opinion, be advisable that question of loan should be raised with the Sultan.

No. 65.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 14.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 16th November, relative to the visits of His Majesty's ships to Koweit.

India Office, December 12, 1905.

Inclosure 1 in No. 65.

Captain Trevor to the Government of India.

Bushire, October 22, 1905.

Sir,

IN continuation of this Office letter dated the 7th October, 1905, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter, dated the 17th instant, which I have received from the Officer Commanding His Majesty's ship "Redbreast," denying that he ever had any conversation with Sheikh Mubarak's son on the subject of His Majesty's ships' visits to Koweit.

I have, &c.
(For Political Resident in the Persian Gulf),
(Signed) A. P. TREVOR.

Inclosure 2 in No. 65.

Lieutenant Commander Somerville to Major Cox.

H.M.S. "Redbreast," at Bushire, October 17, 1905.

(Confidential.)

WITH reference to your letter of the 7th October, 1905, I have the honour to inform you that I am unable to corroborate the statement quoted therein.

2. I had no conversation with Mubarak's son. He was present during my interview with his father, but sat at the other end of the room in which I was received, and he took no part in the conversation.

3. My visit was returned by Mubarak's brother.

4. The observation complained of was not made by anybody in my presence.

No. 66.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 14.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 16th November, relative to the attitude of Sheikh Mubarak and the Turkish authorities towards Sadun Pasha Muntifik.

India Office, December 13, 1905.

Inclosure 1 in No. 66.

Captain Trevor to the Government of India.

Bushire, October 21, 1905.

(Confidential.)

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a despatch which I have received from Mr. Crow, His Majesty's Consul, Bussorah, regarding the attitude of Sheikh Mubarak of Koweit and the Turkish authorities towards Sadun Pasha Muntifik.

Inclosure 2 in No. 66.

Consul Crow to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 66. Confidential.) *Bussorah, October* 14, 1905.

THE following is a translation of a telegram sent by the Sheikh of Koweit to the Vali of Bussorah dated 4th December (5th Shaban), 1904:—

To Mukhlis Pasha, Vali of Bussorah.

"I have received your telegram of 16th (29th) September.

"With the hands of obedience and sincerity about Sadun. You order not to let him approach our neighbourhood or our tribes. We are sure and convinced that every one who opposes the exalted wishes will regret it, and that Sadun is regretting it. We at once ordered all our tribes and all tribes in our neighbourhood not to let him approach, but to repel him. Your sincere friend is ready to do everything which may do good and be of use to the Ottoman Government.

"Your sincere friend,
"MUBARAK-ES-SUBAH.

"*Shaban* 5."

The Vali left Bussorah for Nasriye on 15th September last, and has not yet returned. I am informed that he is waiting there in order to capture Sadun Pasha, who is still at large. It is reported that, shortly after the Vali's arrival at Nasriye, a collision took place between the Bedour and Sadun's party, due to some dispute in regard to lands and taxation. The Ottoman troops took no part in these hostilities. Sadun was defeated with the loss, it is said, of twenty men, and fled into the desert. The Vali attempted to follow him in person, but had to abandon the pursuit owing to the difficulties of the ground and lack of water.

No. 67.

Sir N. O'Conor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 890. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 8, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith a Memorandum from the Dragomanate of His Majesty's Embassy, relating to the state of affairs in the Yemen.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 67.

Memorandum by Mr. Lamb.

(No. 382. Confidential.)

IN a conversation which I had to-day with an influential Arab, the latter depicted the present condition of the Yemen as deplorable. According to this authority, who is certainly in a position to be well informed, the Turks, since their reoccupation of Sanaa, have made no attempt to re-establish a civil administration. Feisi Pasha, who remains in sole command, has limited his efforts to dispatching punitive or raiding expeditions into the country, right and left of his main positions, which have plundered and burned the villages, massacred the adult population, and carried off the female children into slavery. He declares that at least 10,000 of the inhabitants have perished in this way at the hands of the troops, and that Arab girls from the Yemen are already arriving as slaves in Constantinople itself.

In conclusion, he declared that the Arab party here considers that its only hope of obtaining a certain measure of justice and liberty lies in the intervention of England, though he admitted that, in the present condition of affairs at the Palace, there was little chance of such intervention being successful.

(Signed) HARRY H. LAMB.

Constantinople, December 8, 1905.

No. 68.

Sir N. O'Conor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(*Received December* 18.)

(No. 902. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 11, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah relating to the condition of Turkish troops in Central Arabia and the political situation there.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 68.

Consul Crow to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 75. Confidential.)

Sir, *Bussorah, November* 18, 1905.

FROM information collected here, I learn that of the troops who went to Ghassim last year many died of starvation and many deserted. Some forty fugitives reached Koweit three weeks ago in a pitiable plight. The Sheikh provided them with clothing and money, hired a dhow for them, and sent them on to Bussorah.

Two officers, Reshid Bey, a Major, and Husni Bey, a Lieutenant-Colonel, left the troops in Ghassim and arrived recently in Bussorah. The latter came by way of Koweit with about fifteen men. He is said to be on his way to Egypt.

Orders were sent from Bagdad some weeks ago to Sudgi Pasha, in command of the troops in Ghassim, to discharge about 180 time-expired men. On checking the list it was found that of the 180 men only 18 remained, and the rest had died.

It is stated that the soldiers in Ghassim have received no pay, and that half the provisions sent from Medina were looted by the Arabs on the way. The troops now in Ghassim are said to number about 750.

Husni Bey seems to have quarrelled with his commanding officer, Sudgi Pasha, and to have left his post without leave. His account of the condition of the troops in Central Arabia may be highly coloured, but as regards numbers his version seems to agree roughly with that given by the Sheikh Mubarak to the Political Agent at Koweit.

The Resident at Bushire has sent me a copy of a statement made by Sheikh Mubarak to Captain Knox, describing the political situation in the interior of Arabia in October 1905. The Sheikh's account is as follows:—

Bin Reshid is not strong, even in Hail Hamood, his uncle, and brother of Mohamed-bin-Reshid, is in charge, and has lost four sons in the recent fighting. Their names are Maid, Salim, Mohamed, and Obeyd. He has three sons left. The eldest is Sultan, who is at enmity with the rest of the family and lives at Jof. He has recently been in correspondence with Sheikh Mubarak. The other two, Saoud and Feysul, are with their father Hamood in Hail. Abdul Aziz-bin-Meinah, the Chief of the Bin Reshid family, has not resided at Hail for the last six years, but is constantly wandering in the desert.

The state of the town of Hail is deplorable. The population consists of Bin Reshid's soldiers. The residents, having no means of livelihood, have dispersed to other towns, selling their property to provide money for their journey.

Abdur Rahman-bin-Feysul, the head of the Saoud family, is at Riad. The town and district are prosperous. There is no truth in the story of a rising at Sedeyr against Bin Saoud's power.

There are no Turkish troops or Turkish Representatives in Riad. Abdul Aziz-bin-Saoud, the eldest son of Abdur Rahman, lies armed in Boregda. There are fifty Turkish soldiers in Boregda, and thirty in Aneyza, but no Turkish civil Representative. The main body of the Turkish troops is at Shebiyeh, five hours north-west of Boregda. They number 600, with eight guns, but are being constantly withdrawn. They originally numbered 7,000. They are under the orders of a Ferik, Sadig Pasha. Ghassim is prosperous. No Turkish customs have been established, and caravans come and go between Koweit and Nejd unmolested.

Sheikh Mubarak states that the general situation in the interior is entirely satisfactory from his point of view and that of his friends of the Bin Saoud faction.

Captain Knox adds that none of Mubarak's assertions have been verified, and says that the description of the Turkish troops sounds improbable. From a source not usually favourable to Sheikh Mubarak, Captain Knox learns that Bin Saoud's people lately raided some tribes supposed to be well affected to Bin Reshid, and that the Sheikh of Koweit remonstrated with Bin Saoud on the subject, pointed out the impolicy of unprovoked aggression, and threatened to withdraw his favour if such lawless proceedings continued.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. E. CROW.

No. 69.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 18.)

(No. 913.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December* 12, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that, according to information which I have received, three torpedo-boat destroyers and two small cruisers of the Imperial Ottoman navy, bound, it is stated, for the Red Sea, passed out of the Golden Horn on the morning of the 4th instant.

I believe these vessels are intended to act against the pirates in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, whose proceedings have annoyed the Imperial Government since His Majesty's ship "Fox" exacted reparation for the act of piracy against the British barque "Alwani" close to Hodeidah last October.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

46
END